Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07BAGHDAD868
2007-03-12 10:05:00
SECRET
Embassy Baghdad
Cable title:  

THE SHI'A COALITION: FADHILA'S WITHDRAWAL

Tags:  PGOV IZ 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO2346
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #0868/01 0711005
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 121005Z MAR 07
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0125
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 BAGHDAD 000868 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/12/2017
TAGS: PGOV IZ
SUBJECT: THE SHI'A COALITION: FADHILA'S WITHDRAWAL
UNDERSCORES LACK OF UNITY

REF: A. BAGHDAD 842

B. BAGHDAD 452

C. BAGHDAD 224

D. 2006 BAGHDAD 4020

Classified By: Political Counselor Margaret Scobey for reasons 1.4 (b)
and (d).

-------
Summary
-------

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 BAGHDAD 000868

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/12/2017
TAGS: PGOV IZ
SUBJECT: THE SHI'A COALITION: FADHILA'S WITHDRAWAL
UNDERSCORES LACK OF UNITY

REF: A. BAGHDAD 842

B. BAGHDAD 452

C. BAGHDAD 224

D. 2006 BAGHDAD 4020

Classified By: Political Counselor Margaret Scobey for reasons 1.4 (b)
and (d).

--------------
Summary
--------------


1. (C) Fadhila's March 7 withdrawal from the Shi'a coalition
(UIC) underscores the lack of cohesiveness in the UIC.
Encompassing a spectrum of Shi'a Islamist parties and
individuals that banded together to contest the December 2005
national election, the UIC has shown signs of strain since
the days of government formation. These strains partly
reflect personal rivalries or animosities between leaders and
partly diverging political views. In the Council of
Representatives (CoR),the UIC has not functioned as a single
bloc. The Sadrists and Fadhila have often opposed
SCIRI-driven initiatives, while Dawa has played more of an
intermediary role. Outside the CoR, UIC constituent parties
and individuals have also explored various formal alliances
that cross ethnic and sectarian lines.


2. (C) Because the UIC's constituent parties have not acted
cohesively, the practical impact of Fadhila's withdrawal in
the CoR will be small. A more important question is whether
it represents the breaking of a psychological barrier,
opening the door to further formal defections from the UIC
and perhaps its dissolution. While it is hard to see the UIC
holding together formally for the remainder of the CoR's four
year term, we cannot predict when further defections might
happen. The next provincial elections will likely prove a
defining moment in the evolution of the Shi'a Islamist
parties and the UIC more generally. We expect the UIC's
constituent parties to compete against each other in these
elections, although this competition will not necessarily
signal the end of the UIC at the national level. End summary.

--------------
Government Formation Reveals Rifts
--------------


3. (C) The UIC was formed in October 2005 by Shi'a Islamist
leaders to compete in the December 2005 national elections as
list 555. A similar coalition competed in the January 2005
national elections as list 169, with one significant
difference being that the December 2005 coalition included

the Sadrists. The UIC won 128 seats in Iraq's 275-member
CoR. By pre-arrangement, it divided the 128 seats among 7
entities as follows: 28 seats to Sadrists; 15 seats each to
SCIRI, Badr, Fadhila, and Dawa Tanzim; 12 seats to Dawa; and
30 seats to "Independents," some representing small political
parties who hitched their wagon to the UIC and others
prominent but non-aligned Shi'a politicians. (Note: One
Dawa contact told us that Dawa agreed to give the Sadrists 3
seats after the Sadrists threatened to back out of the
coalition. End note.) Constitutionally granted the right to
nominate a candidate for Prime Minister, the UIC eventually
chose Dawa member Nuri al-Maliki after fellow Dawa nominee
Ibrahim Ja'fari, who edged out SCIRI's Adel Abdel Mehdi, was
unable to form a government. After prolonged negotiations
within the UIC and with other blocs, al-Maliki formed a
cabinet in which all UIC groups except Fadhila were
represented.

--------------
SCIRI/Badr: The UIC's Dominant Player
--------------


4. (S) Despite Abdel Mehdi's failure to win the nomination
for Prime Minister, SCIRI, with its Badr affiliate, is the
dominant player in the Shi'a coalition. Abdulaziz al-Hakim,
SCIRI's chairman, is officially the head of the coalition,
and SCIRI and Badr enjoy a cadre of seasoned leaders at the
national and provincial levels. The party receives
considerable financing from Iran and has well developed
security, media, and charitable branches. SCIRI demonstrated
its political power most clearly during passage of the
regions formation law, which would allow for a nine-province
region in the Shi'a-dominated provinces south of Baghdad (ref
D). Yet the process also showed the limits of SCIRI's power
in the CoR; even with Kurdish support, SCIRI had to make
several important concessions to win enough additional
support to ensure the law's passage. It also confirmed the
rifts within the UIC, as Fadhila and the Sadrists opposed
SCIRI's position and boycotted the vote.


5. (C) While SCIRI has the strongest organization of any of

BAGHDAD 00000868 002.3 OF 004


the Shi'a Islamist parties, it has not been fully tested by
the Shi'a electorate. It ran on its own ticket only in four
provinces in the January 2005 provincial elections, receiving
less than 20 percent of the vote in Dhi Qar and Muthanna and
about 35 percent in Najaf and Karbala. SCIRI's deep ties to
Iran are sure to be challenged by Shi'a rivals if SCIRI runs
alone in the next provincial elections.

-------------- -
Dawa and Dawa Tanzim: Personality over Party?
-------------- -


6. (C) Dawa enjoys the legitimacy of being Iraq's first
Shi'a Islamist party, but it has been prone to splintering;
Dawa Tanzim is one of the more recent offshoots. Dawa's
members claim that Dawa is the most internally "democratic"
of any of the UIC's parties, but it has not held internal
elections since the fall of the Saddam regime. The stated
reason for this delay is that the security situation "does
not permit," but the underlying reason is likely that
competition between its principal leaders, including Prime
Minister Nuri al-Maliki, UIC deputy chairman Ali al-Adeeb,
and former PM Ibrahim al-Ja'fari, might drive the party to
splinter further. Dawa's lack of support for Maliki on the
"moderate front" is a clear indication of this competition.


7. (C) Dawa derives its political strength, therefore, not
from its organization but from the stature of its leaders and
their ability to intercede between SCIRI and the Sadrists.
Maliki gained the UIC nomination for PM because he was
acceptable to both SCIRI and the Sadrists, which together
control close to half of the seats in the Shi'a coalition.
While SCIRI seemed indifferent to the Sadrists' temporary
withdrawal from the CoR, Dawa and Dawa Tanzim leaders
actively negotiated with Sadr and his lieutenants for their
return. Although Maliki will say that he does not need or
even have the Sadrists' support, he knows that the more he
alienates the Sadrists, the more dependent he will be on
SCIRI support for his initiatives.

--------------
The Sadrists: Where Next?
--------------


8. (C) The Embassy's political contact with national Sadrist
leaders is extremely limited, so we must rely on their
actions, and on the evaluations of others, to understand
them. Until their temporary withdrawal from the government
starting in late November 2006, the Sadrists in CoR had a
one-issue platform: "end the occupation." They used every
possible opportunity, including the vote on the regions
formation law, to condemn coalition presence. Having gained
three service ministries (health, transportation, and
agriculture),the Sadrists by all accounts used these
ministries as fiefdoms for patronage. The Sadrists have done
little to build alliances with other groups in the CoR,
including parties within the UIC, and as a result may have
miscalculated in their temporary withdrawal. While elements
of the UIC, particularly Dawa and some of the independents,
urged the Sadrists to return to the CoR, they did not offer
the Sadrists any significant political concessions (ref C).


9. (C) One Dawa leader described the change in the Sadrists'
attitude upon their return to the CoR as "dramatic," and,
outwardly, he is right. The Sadrists appear to be in
retreat. Since their return, they have not used the CoR as a
bully pulpit, they have expressed support for the Baghdad
Security Plan (BSP),and several of their CoR members have
made tentative overtures to IIP and the Kurds. Overt Jaysh
al-Mahdi presence in Baghdad appears considerably reduced.
It remains to be seen whether these changes represent a new
willingness to work within the confines of Iraq's political
system and support the Maliki government, or are rather part
of a tactical move designed to deflect unwanted attention as
the BSP progresses.


10. (C) Although their CoR members have acted relatively
cohesively, the Sadrists' organization at a national level is
not as strong as SCIRI's. With the exception of Muqtada,
their leadership structure is unclear and appears prone to
change. They lack strong parliamentary leaders comparable to
SCIRI/Badr's Humam Hamoudi, Jalal al-Sin al-Saghir, and Hadi
al Amri. According to non-Sadrist Shi'a contacts, many
Sadrist CoR members disagreed with Sadr's order to
temporarily withdraw from CoR but could not oppose it. Sadr
appears to have wide popular support among poorer Shi'a in
the Shi'a-majority provinces thanks to his father's legacy
and his populist rhetoric, but the Sadrists' weak
organizational structure may limit their ability to
capitalize on this popularity at the polls.

--------------

BAGHDAD 00000868 003 OF 004


Fadhila: Going, Going, Gone
--------------


11. (C) Never comfortable in the UIC, Fadhila announced its
withdrawal on March 7 (ref A). Its leaders say it joined the
coalition because of extreme pressure from the marja'iya, and
that it participated in the UIC "in appearance only."
Fadhila leaders are clearly wary of SCIRI's power and
distrustful of SCIRI's federalist agenda and Iranian
connections. While Fadhila and the Sadrists both sprang from
Mohammed Sadiq al-Sadr's movement, share a distrust of SCIRI,
and boycotted the vote on the regions formation law, they
have not worked closely together at a national level.
Instead, even before its withdrawal from the UIC, Fadhila had
been actively exploring alliances with Sunni parties to
advance its vision of Iraqi nationalism (ref B). Fadhila
seeks a stronger central government and supports amending the
constitution to affirm Iraq's "Arab" identity and strengthen
the role of Islam, all points of agreement with Sunni
parties. While some within the UIC consider Fadhila's
withdrawal a negotiating tactic in its quest for a ministry,
it certainly also reflects Fadhila's distinct political
vision and its marginalization within the UIC. Fadhila is
strongest in the southern provinces and weakest in Najaf and
Karbala.

-------------- --------------
Fadhila's Withdrawal: Potential Impact on the UIC
-------------- --------------


12. (C) Because the UIC is not a cohesive entity and because
Fadhila often took its own positions on important
legislation, the practical impact of Fadhila's withdrawal at
the CoR will be minor. The more important question is
whether it represents the breaking of a psychological barrier
and will open the door to other defections from the UIC. In
its withdrawal announcement, Fadhila challenged the very
basis of the UIC, stating that coalitions based on sectarian
affiliation would not help Iraq overcome sectarian violence.


13. (C) Given the personal rivalries and differences in
vision within the UIC, particularly between SCIRI and the
Sadrists, many Mission contacts believe that its dissolution
is only a "matter of time," as one of them put it. But
opinions vary as to how long it will take and as to whether
Fadhila's withdrawal will speed the process. Contacts who
are more independent-minded believe that Fadhila's withdrawal
is a positive step that will cause others in the UIC to
consider more seriously new coalitions that are based on
political vision rather than sect. One of Vice President
Abdel Mehdi's more Western-leaning advisors, for example,
said that he believed it would give SCIRI more freedom to
pursue the "moderate front" and claimed that the Vice
President shared his view. However several SCIRI politicians
downplayed the significance of the withdrawal, arguing that
it was merely part of an attempt by Fadhila to gain a
ministry or suggesting that Fadhila received money from Arab
sources in return for its move. One Dawa member told us
recently that "the Shi'a are not ready for the coalition to
be dissolved."


14. (C) We see the potential for several scenarios over the
coming months. First, Fadhila could return to the UIC
because of pressure (e.g., from the marja'iya) or because of
a ministerial offer it cannot refuse. We do not discount
this possibility, but we think it likely that Fadhila's
withdrawal will hold. Several contacts have told us that the
marja'iya will not intervene, and Fadhila's bloc leader
assured us the withdrawal was final. Second, Fadhila's
withdrawal could spur other groups to break from or, at the
least, diminish their ties to the UIC. SCIRI could join a
"moderate front," for example, the Sadrists could break away
entirely, or various independents could join other potential
coalitions. Finally, the UIC could continue to function in
the way it has, a coalition formed to look after Shi'a
interests where SCIRI and the Sadrists contain each other and
where Dawa gains leverage as an intermediary between them.

-------------- ---
Provincial Elections: Upcoming Test of Strength
-------------- ---


15. (C) Although the UIC may continue as a national-level
institution, we expect that its remaining constituent parties
will compete against each other in upcoming provincial
elections (unscheduled as yet but potentially to take place
in 2007). As befits its organizational strength, SCIRI/Badr
is already gearing up for its run through formation of a
strategy committee in Baghdad. The elections will test
whether Dawa can maintain unity and organize itself
effectively across provinces. The elections will also test
the depth of appeal of the Sadrists and whether they are able

BAGHDAD 00000868 004 OF 004


to mount a cohesive campaign. Finally, the elections will
test the appeal of the Shi'a Islamist parties as a whole in
the Shi'a-majority provinces, as voter frustration with their
governance, and perhaps with sectarianism, may provide an
opening for moderate leaders and parties not aligned with the
Shi'a Islamists. By its withdrawal from the UIC, Fadhila is
clearly positioning itself to take advantage of this
frustration.


16. (C) While it is possible that Sistani will ask UIC
parties to run together on a single ticket, we believe it
more likely that he will stress the importance of avoiding
intra-Shi'a violence during the campaign and election.
Several moderate, non-aligned political figures in the
southern and central provinces have approached our PRTs and
REO Basrah expressing their concerns about political violence
and intimidation. The extent to which the militias
affiliated with the Shi'a Islamist parties refrain from
violence and intimidation will be a crucial indicator for
Iraq's democratic future.
SPECKHARD