Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07BAGHDAD836
2007-03-09 11:49:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Baghdad
Cable title:  

REQUEST FOR EXPEDITED APPROVAL TO PROVIDE

Tags:  EAID ECON ENRG IZ 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO0925
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #0836/01 0681149
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 091149Z MAR 07
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0093
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 000836 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/07/2017
TAGS: EAID ECON ENRG IZ
SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR EXPEDITED APPROVAL TO PROVIDE
TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE TO GOI UNDER SECTION 607 OF THE
FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT


Classified By: ZALMAY KHALILZAD, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 000836

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/07/2017
TAGS: EAID ECON ENRG IZ
SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR EXPEDITED APPROVAL TO PROVIDE
TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE TO GOI UNDER SECTION 607 OF THE
FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT


Classified By: ZALMAY KHALILZAD, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) This is an action request. Please see paragraphs 9 and

10. This is a joint cable from Ambassador Khalilzad and
General Petraeus.


2. (C) Summary: Government of Iraq ministries continue to
face major obstacles to the prompt execution of their
budgets, particularly major procurements of goods, services,
and infrastructure. This lack of capacity has negative
impacts on numerous governmental functions, particularly the
energy sector. To provide assistance as GOI capacity
improves, Mission-Baghdad and MNF-I have determined that the
Department of Defense is well-suited to provide expedited
procurement assistance under the authority provided by
Section 607 of the Foreign Assistance Act. For instance, the
GOI Ministry of Electricity has expressed specific interest
in high-priority procurement of additional fuel for power
generation and specific power plant upgrades needed to meet
Baghdad's summer electricity plan. Mission-Baghdad and MNF-I
request that Washington (State & Defense) expedite all
necessary approvals for negotiation and conclusion of a
Section 607 agreement and that a small team of experts be
sent immediately to Baghdad to support such efforts. End
Summary.


3. (C) The USG and GOI have instituted a number of
initiatives and reforms to address systemic weaknesses in GOI
capacity for resource planning, public finance, and
procurement. Even as these take hold, the GOI must still
demonstrate the capability to use its own resources to
deliver services that benefit the Iraqi people.


4. (C) Electrical power generation is among the most critical
of these services. It relies on ready supply of refined fuel
product. The supply of such fuel has been seriously
constrained by difficulties in boosting oil production,
refinery capacity, and internal logistics, as well as
impediments to the importation of refined products from
neighboring countries. USG officials, Embassy and MNF-I,
have met frequently with the Minister of Electricity, the

Minister of Oil, the Deputy Prime Minister for Economics, and
the Deputy Prime Minister for Services to develop
alternatives to solve this fuel crisis.


5. (C) Among the options potentially available to GOI
officials is to leverage the significant procurement capacity
and expertise of USG agencies, especially elements of the
Department of Defense, through a Section 607 agreement. This
capability would not supplant the need for GOI ministries to
improve their procurement capacity, but simply provide a
procurement mechanism that, in the short term, takes
advantage of USG's ability to provide rapid, transparent and
flexible contracting.


6. (C) The South Oil Company made initial inquires to GRD on
February 5th regarding a Section 607 agreement for continuing
oil well 'workover' projects with GOI funding. The initial
cost of this work would be $30 million, but could be
expanded. The Ministry of Oil expressed interest in the
concept, subject to concerns regarding competitive bidding
and approval by DPM Salih.


7. (C) The Minister of Electricity subsequently expressed
strong interest in using Section 607 authority for at least
two projects. Completing expansion of the Mussaib power
generation station and topping plant facility, estimated at
$20 million, could potentially add 400-500 Mw to the Baghdad
power grid. In addition, expedited procurement of $100
million of imported diesel fuel, including logistical
support, would allow the Qudas power plant to supply
approximately 132 Mw of power for 143 days. Both efforts are
well within the MoE's budget for 2007. The MoE is likely to
send a letter to DPM Salih or the Prime Minister expressing
his interest in Section 607 authority. While other senior GOI
leaders remain to be fully briefed on the proposal, Mission
and MNF-I believe that these expressions of interest should
be encouraged. In order to complete procurement and delivery
of these projects this summer, a Section 607 agreement would
need to be in place by May 1, 2007.


8. (C) Provision of this authority would permit DoD to sell
relatively small amounts of commodities and services with
high potential impact to Iraqi ministries. In addition to
the electrical sector projects described in paragraph 7, a
number of other urgent projects could be completed if a
Section 607 agreement were in place. Such projects include
retrofitting of the Mosul Dam, urgent repairs of the Basrah
Sweetwater Canal, and security upgrades to ministry and
judicial facilities to enable the uninterrupted functioning

BAGHDAD 00000836 002 OF 002


of federal and provincial government.


9. (C) USG agencies should be prepared to act promptly on the
formal submission of the Iraqi request. To be prepared, we
should start now by reviewing whether Circular 175 approval
is needed to initiate formal negotiations with the GOI.
Simultaneously, the Department of Defense should submit a
request for a Section 607 determination by the Director of
Foreign Assistance. Past precedent indicates this
determination can be made in advance of a formal request from
the participating government if well-justified by the
requesting agency. Finally, a small team of experts should
be sent immediately to Baghdad to support the Post and MNF-I
representatives leading U.S. efforts to negotiate and
conclude an agreement with the Government of Iraq by May 1,

2007.


10. (C) While initial GOI interest is focused on a limited
number of projects, the Mission and MNF-I recommend that the
associated agreement between the US and GOI be made
sufficiently broad to include a range of procurement needs in
civilian ministries. Under such a framework agreement, the
USG and GOI could conclude "Implementing Arrangements"
specific to each ministry's needs and resources. The
Mission and MNF-I concur that any procurements under such
Implementing Arrangements should require advance financing
from the GOI ministries via a letter of credit or deposit in
a USG account, not on reimbursable basis. This will avoid
the diversion of USG resources for initial procurement, as
well as the difficulties encountered with GOI reimbursement
of DFI-related procurements.


11. (C) Mission and MNF-I are cooperating to develop a
suggested draft section 607 agreement, Implementing
Arrangement, and Financing Arrangement.
KHALILZAD