Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07BAGHDAD831
2007-03-08 22:18:00
SECRET
Embassy Baghdad
Cable title:
AMBASSADOR AND PM: NEIGHBORS CONFERENCE, SAUDI
how-toVZCZCXRO0231 PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK DE RUEHGB #0831/01 0672218 ZNY SSSSS ZZH P 082218Z MAR 07 ZDK FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0086 INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 000831
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/08/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV IZ
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR AND PM: NEIGHBORS CONFERENCE, SAUDI
AGENDA, KURDISTAN TRIP
BAGHDAD 00000831 001.3 OF 003
Classified By: Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 000831
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/08/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV IZ
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR AND PM: NEIGHBORS CONFERENCE, SAUDI
AGENDA, KURDISTAN TRIP
BAGHDAD 00000831 001.3 OF 003
Classified By: Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
1. (S) SUMMARY. In a March 6 meeting, the Ambassador and PM
discussed the March 10 Neighbor's Conference, including
expected outcomes and working groups focusing on border
security, fuel and electricity imports, and Iraqi refugees.
The Ambassador suggested reaching out to participating
countries such as Saudi Arabia and Iran prior to the
conference so that delegates empowered to issue either a
joint statement or make decisions concerning a follow-on
ministerial level conference. The PM discussed his concerns
that Saudi Arabia continues to work against the GOI, citing
intelligence reports suggesting Saudi Arabia supports forming
a new government. The Ambassador briefed the PM on his March
1-3 trip to Kurdistan. On de-Baathification reform, the PM
emphasized his commitment to legislation that would
facilitate reconciliation. He stated that while he does not
have the legal authority to suspend the current
De-Baathification Commission's activities, he is not moving
forward with de-Baathification orders. The Ambassador urged
his support for compromise legislation put forward by the
Presidency Council.
2. (S) SUMMARY CONTINUED. The Ambassador asked the PM about
his intentions with the popular mobilization committees
created as part of the Baghdad Security Plan and led by Ahmed
Chalabi. The PM responded that Chalabi has a limited mandate
and limited funding and that he will not allow Chalabi to
turn these committees into militias. Turning to an
anticipated cabinet reshuffle, the PM stated that Tawafuq
(Sunni coalition) wants to change the Minister of Defense,
although the PM does not support this due to operational
issues with the Baghdad Security Plan. The Ambassador noted
that former CoR speaker Hajim al-Hassani (Iraqiyya) wants a
ministerial assignment; the PM responded that if he returns
to Tawafuq he would be a viable candidate to replace Salam
Zuba'i as Deputy Prime Minister. Finally, the PM criticized
the Basra operation against a Ministry of Interior building,
saying it "violated" Iraq's sovereignty and occurred without
proper coordination. END SUMMARY.
-------------- --------------
THE NEIGHBOR'S CONFERNECE: DESIRED OUTCOMES, NEXT STEPS
-------------- --------------
3. (C) The Ambassador began the meeting by offering any and
all assistance required to ensure the Neighbor's Conference
succeeds. The PM replied that General Abboud has been given
clear orders to ensure the conference is secure and that he
is coordinating this with MNF-I. The PM stated that Foreign
Minister Hoshyar Zebari, who returned to Baghdad earlier on
March 6, had briefed him meetings in Egypt during which these
discussions occurred. The Ambassador suggested that if the
PM still intends to open the conference, his remarks could
"set the tone" of the conference and identify "clear themes."
"What kind of assistance do you want from your neighbors?"
the Ambassador asked, further suggesting that the PM identify
these areas in his remarks so that the delegates can then
discuss them throughout the conference.
4. (C) It might be productive, the Ambassador continued, to
use the conference to establish working groups on issues such
as border security, fuel imports and Iraqi refugees. The PM
agreed and commented that he had already begun working on his
comments. The PM agreed that working groups or follow-on
committees would fit with the conference's theme of working
together to assist Iraq as opposed to finding solutions "to
be imposed on Iraq." He added that it might be more
beneficial to focus one working group not only on fuel
imports but also electricity supplies.
5. (C) The Ambassador asked whether the conference might
produce a joint statement to which the PM replied that the
delegates may not be authorized to issue such a statement on
behalf of their governments. This is why, the Ambassador
noted, the GOI should begin engaging prior to the conference
so that the delegates can support an announcement about the
follow-on ministerial conference. The Foreign Minister, the
PM said, wants the follow-on conference held in Baghdad while
others, including Egypt and Turkey, want the ministerial
conference outside of Iraq. Because neighboring countries
are still looking to compel solutions on Iraq instead of
supporting and assisting the GOI it is critical that the
ministerial conference's location and agenda are carefully
considered.
-------------- --------------
AGAINST THE GOI: PM DICUSSES CONCERNS ABOUT SAUDI ARABIA
-------------- --------------
6. (S) The PM expressed concern that some conference
participants, particularly Saudi Arabia, are actively working
BAGHDAD 00000831 002 OF 003
against the PM and the Iraqi government by advocating new
leadership. According to the PM, King Abdullah told U.S.
Secretary of Defense Gates that a troika consisting of Naseer
SIPDIS
al-Obeidi (Shia),Saadi Bazinji (Kurdish) and Mohammed
al-Shehwani (Sunni) should lead a new Iraqi government. The
Ambassador questioned the credibility of this intelligence
reporting stating that while Saudi officials have expressed
disappointment with the situation in Iraq they have not
articulated a plan such as this. The PM agreed that the
report is questionable, stating that analysts believe the
information might have originated on a French website. He
further acknowledged that Iraq's own intelligence analysts
report continued USG support for Maliki's government.
However, the PM cautioned, it is impossible to "fully ignore"
the report since another source close to the Saudi royal
family corroborates the information. The PM noted that he
wants to strengthen his relationship with the Saudis, saying
the Iraqis have been honest and have assured them of their
shared concern about Iran. "We are afraid of Iran as well,"
the PM said, "and we have conveyed that Iraq is not an
extension of Iran, but a barrier to Iran." The Saudis,
however, continue to believe that more Sunnis are dying in
Iraq while other GOI leaders believe there are more Shia
victims. In the end, the PM concluded, the victims "are all
Iraqi."
7. (S) The PM stated that if President Talabani is unable to
attend the March 28 Arab League summit in Saudi Arabia then
he "would like to go in his place." The Ambassador supported
this idea, saying he had raised the idea with Talabani.
Talabani has refused. The Ambassador further offered to
facilitate a meeting bringing Saudi King Abdullah and Maliki
together. The PM responded that he wants to improve
relations with Saudi Arabia but does not want to be away from
Baghdad for a long period during this critical time. For
this reason, he said, a quick trip to Riyadh for the Arab
League conference or subsequently could offer the best timing
and a chance to strengthen relations.
-------------- --------------
TRIP TO KURDISTAN: CLARIFYING MISLEADING PRESS REPORTS
-------------- --------------
8. (C) The Ambassador briefed the PM on his March 1-3 trip to
Kurdistan. The PM replied that he had been very concerned
about press statements made by Iraqiyya CoR member Osama
al-Najafi following the trip which stated that the Ambassador
supported Allawi's efforts to form a new front. The
Ambassador refuted these claims, stating that the political
discussions which occurred focused on encouraging Allawi to
"stay in Iraq and support the GOI and the BSP." The
Ambassador said he questioned Allawi about recent statements
against the government and suggested that Allawi should
discuss his concerns with Maliki instead of running to other
Arab countries. "What can they do to help?" the Ambassador
asked, and "how can Allawi be both in and out of the
government at the same time?" The Ambassador then said he
received a copy of Allawi's letter to the PM outlining his
concerns. The PM responded that he has not yet seen a copy
of the letter but would be willing to sit down with Allawi
and discuss it.
9. (C) The Ambassador stated that during the discussions
Barzani offered to host the PM and other GOI leaders,
including Abdulaziz al-Hakim, in Erbil. The Ambassador said
he raised this offer in a March 6 meeting with al-Hakim
(septel) as well. The PM said he would convene the Policy
Council for National Security (PCNS) and discuss whether a
retreat would be beneficial.
-------------- --------------
DE-BAATHIFICATION LEGISLATION: A COMPROMISE MOVING FORWARD
-------------- --------------
10. (C) In response to the Ambassador's question about the
PM's support for de-Baathification legislation, the PM stated
that his opinion "differs" from Ahmed Chalabi, chairman of
the de-Baathification Commission. The PM emphasized his
desire that the future law support and facilitate
reconciliation. The PM encouraged continued engagement with
the CoR Committee on de-Baathification, which would be
responsible for bringing forward new legislation, and offered
to go to CoR to share his opinions. Those who committed
crimes should be brought to justice, the PM explained, while
those who are innocent should not be punished. The current
process has protected criminals from prosecution while at the
same time preventing those who did not commit crimes from
participating in the government.
11. (S) The Ambassador stated that the Presidency Council has
recently put forward a new draft which combines the best
elements from other draft legislation submitted by the Iraqi
BAGHDAD 00000831 003 OF 003
Islamic Party (IIP),Iraqiyya, and the deputy Governor from
Salah ad Din. While the legislation is being debated, the
Ambassador asked, would it be possible for the PM to suspend
the de-Baathification Commission's work? The PM replied that
he does not "have the authority to do so," but that
operationally he has asked the executive branch to stop
signing de-Baathification orders. "I am trying to bring
people back," the PM emphasized, but it is not legally
possible to suspend the Commission.
-------------- --------------
CHALABI AND BSP'S POPULAR MOBILIZATION COMMITTEES
-------------- --------------
12. (S) The Ambassador asked the PM about the popular
mobilization committees developed through the Baghdad
Security Plan and led by Ahmed Chalabi. There have been
complaints, the Ambassador said, from local leaders that
these committees have become militias. The PM responded that
he refused to cooperate with Chalabi when he heard that
Chalabi used these committees as such. These committees, the
PM continued, have a limited mandate and limited funding.
They should not be used to create "institutions" but rather
"results-based" operations, he said, that work towards the
Baghdad Security Plan's larger goals. The PM noted that he
has asked Naseer al-Ani (Sunni, IIP),the co-chair for the
Popular Mobilization Committees, to oversee them so as to
prevent Chalabi from using them as militias.
-------------- --------------
CABINET CHANGES: AL-HASSANI AS DPM? TAWAFUQ WANTS NEW MOD
-------------- --------------
13. (S) The PM then stated that Tawafuq has yet to submit
names for new Ministers to their cabinet positions. "They
want to change the Minister of Defense (MoD)," the PM said,
but this is not right time to do that. Iraqiyya put forward
a few names for Minister of Justice. The PM said he wanted
Wael Abdullatif al-Fadel, also from Iraqiyya, to become
Minister of Justice. But the PM was uncertain whether Allawi
would agree. The Ambassador said that former CoR speaker
Hajim al-Hassani (Iraqiyya) wants a cabinet position. The PM
replied that if he returns to Tawafuq then he would be a
viable replacement for Deputy Prime Minister Salam Zuba'i.
-------------- ---
VIOLATING IRAQ'S SOVEREIGNTY: THE BASRA INCIDENT
-------------- ---
14. (S) The Ambassador raised a recent joint MNF-I and Iraqi
Security Forces (ISF) operation against a Ministry of
Interior (MoI) building in Basra. The PM responded that this
incident had not been properly coordinated and that Iraq's
sovereignty and institutions should not be continuously
violated. The British "could have informed us," the PM said
asserting that Basra does not respect the Iraqi government
because the British do not respect the government.
Furthermore, the PM said, the British claimed they received
permission before conducting the operation, yet the Iraqi
special forces did not participate "because they did not have
orders" from the PM. An investigation has been started, he
said, and until it is completed "the ISF will stop
coordination and cooperation" with the British in Basra. The
Ambassador agreed that coordinating with the GOI is critical
and offered cooperation in the investigation.
KHALILZAD
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/08/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV IZ
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR AND PM: NEIGHBORS CONFERENCE, SAUDI
AGENDA, KURDISTAN TRIP
BAGHDAD 00000831 001.3 OF 003
Classified By: Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
1. (S) SUMMARY. In a March 6 meeting, the Ambassador and PM
discussed the March 10 Neighbor's Conference, including
expected outcomes and working groups focusing on border
security, fuel and electricity imports, and Iraqi refugees.
The Ambassador suggested reaching out to participating
countries such as Saudi Arabia and Iran prior to the
conference so that delegates empowered to issue either a
joint statement or make decisions concerning a follow-on
ministerial level conference. The PM discussed his concerns
that Saudi Arabia continues to work against the GOI, citing
intelligence reports suggesting Saudi Arabia supports forming
a new government. The Ambassador briefed the PM on his March
1-3 trip to Kurdistan. On de-Baathification reform, the PM
emphasized his commitment to legislation that would
facilitate reconciliation. He stated that while he does not
have the legal authority to suspend the current
De-Baathification Commission's activities, he is not moving
forward with de-Baathification orders. The Ambassador urged
his support for compromise legislation put forward by the
Presidency Council.
2. (S) SUMMARY CONTINUED. The Ambassador asked the PM about
his intentions with the popular mobilization committees
created as part of the Baghdad Security Plan and led by Ahmed
Chalabi. The PM responded that Chalabi has a limited mandate
and limited funding and that he will not allow Chalabi to
turn these committees into militias. Turning to an
anticipated cabinet reshuffle, the PM stated that Tawafuq
(Sunni coalition) wants to change the Minister of Defense,
although the PM does not support this due to operational
issues with the Baghdad Security Plan. The Ambassador noted
that former CoR speaker Hajim al-Hassani (Iraqiyya) wants a
ministerial assignment; the PM responded that if he returns
to Tawafuq he would be a viable candidate to replace Salam
Zuba'i as Deputy Prime Minister. Finally, the PM criticized
the Basra operation against a Ministry of Interior building,
saying it "violated" Iraq's sovereignty and occurred without
proper coordination. END SUMMARY.
-------------- --------------
THE NEIGHBOR'S CONFERNECE: DESIRED OUTCOMES, NEXT STEPS
-------------- --------------
3. (C) The Ambassador began the meeting by offering any and
all assistance required to ensure the Neighbor's Conference
succeeds. The PM replied that General Abboud has been given
clear orders to ensure the conference is secure and that he
is coordinating this with MNF-I. The PM stated that Foreign
Minister Hoshyar Zebari, who returned to Baghdad earlier on
March 6, had briefed him meetings in Egypt during which these
discussions occurred. The Ambassador suggested that if the
PM still intends to open the conference, his remarks could
"set the tone" of the conference and identify "clear themes."
"What kind of assistance do you want from your neighbors?"
the Ambassador asked, further suggesting that the PM identify
these areas in his remarks so that the delegates can then
discuss them throughout the conference.
4. (C) It might be productive, the Ambassador continued, to
use the conference to establish working groups on issues such
as border security, fuel imports and Iraqi refugees. The PM
agreed and commented that he had already begun working on his
comments. The PM agreed that working groups or follow-on
committees would fit with the conference's theme of working
together to assist Iraq as opposed to finding solutions "to
be imposed on Iraq." He added that it might be more
beneficial to focus one working group not only on fuel
imports but also electricity supplies.
5. (C) The Ambassador asked whether the conference might
produce a joint statement to which the PM replied that the
delegates may not be authorized to issue such a statement on
behalf of their governments. This is why, the Ambassador
noted, the GOI should begin engaging prior to the conference
so that the delegates can support an announcement about the
follow-on ministerial conference. The Foreign Minister, the
PM said, wants the follow-on conference held in Baghdad while
others, including Egypt and Turkey, want the ministerial
conference outside of Iraq. Because neighboring countries
are still looking to compel solutions on Iraq instead of
supporting and assisting the GOI it is critical that the
ministerial conference's location and agenda are carefully
considered.
-------------- --------------
AGAINST THE GOI: PM DICUSSES CONCERNS ABOUT SAUDI ARABIA
-------------- --------------
6. (S) The PM expressed concern that some conference
participants, particularly Saudi Arabia, are actively working
BAGHDAD 00000831 002 OF 003
against the PM and the Iraqi government by advocating new
leadership. According to the PM, King Abdullah told U.S.
Secretary of Defense Gates that a troika consisting of Naseer
SIPDIS
al-Obeidi (Shia),Saadi Bazinji (Kurdish) and Mohammed
al-Shehwani (Sunni) should lead a new Iraqi government. The
Ambassador questioned the credibility of this intelligence
reporting stating that while Saudi officials have expressed
disappointment with the situation in Iraq they have not
articulated a plan such as this. The PM agreed that the
report is questionable, stating that analysts believe the
information might have originated on a French website. He
further acknowledged that Iraq's own intelligence analysts
report continued USG support for Maliki's government.
However, the PM cautioned, it is impossible to "fully ignore"
the report since another source close to the Saudi royal
family corroborates the information. The PM noted that he
wants to strengthen his relationship with the Saudis, saying
the Iraqis have been honest and have assured them of their
shared concern about Iran. "We are afraid of Iran as well,"
the PM said, "and we have conveyed that Iraq is not an
extension of Iran, but a barrier to Iran." The Saudis,
however, continue to believe that more Sunnis are dying in
Iraq while other GOI leaders believe there are more Shia
victims. In the end, the PM concluded, the victims "are all
Iraqi."
7. (S) The PM stated that if President Talabani is unable to
attend the March 28 Arab League summit in Saudi Arabia then
he "would like to go in his place." The Ambassador supported
this idea, saying he had raised the idea with Talabani.
Talabani has refused. The Ambassador further offered to
facilitate a meeting bringing Saudi King Abdullah and Maliki
together. The PM responded that he wants to improve
relations with Saudi Arabia but does not want to be away from
Baghdad for a long period during this critical time. For
this reason, he said, a quick trip to Riyadh for the Arab
League conference or subsequently could offer the best timing
and a chance to strengthen relations.
-------------- --------------
TRIP TO KURDISTAN: CLARIFYING MISLEADING PRESS REPORTS
-------------- --------------
8. (C) The Ambassador briefed the PM on his March 1-3 trip to
Kurdistan. The PM replied that he had been very concerned
about press statements made by Iraqiyya CoR member Osama
al-Najafi following the trip which stated that the Ambassador
supported Allawi's efforts to form a new front. The
Ambassador refuted these claims, stating that the political
discussions which occurred focused on encouraging Allawi to
"stay in Iraq and support the GOI and the BSP." The
Ambassador said he questioned Allawi about recent statements
against the government and suggested that Allawi should
discuss his concerns with Maliki instead of running to other
Arab countries. "What can they do to help?" the Ambassador
asked, and "how can Allawi be both in and out of the
government at the same time?" The Ambassador then said he
received a copy of Allawi's letter to the PM outlining his
concerns. The PM responded that he has not yet seen a copy
of the letter but would be willing to sit down with Allawi
and discuss it.
9. (C) The Ambassador stated that during the discussions
Barzani offered to host the PM and other GOI leaders,
including Abdulaziz al-Hakim, in Erbil. The Ambassador said
he raised this offer in a March 6 meeting with al-Hakim
(septel) as well. The PM said he would convene the Policy
Council for National Security (PCNS) and discuss whether a
retreat would be beneficial.
-------------- --------------
DE-BAATHIFICATION LEGISLATION: A COMPROMISE MOVING FORWARD
-------------- --------------
10. (C) In response to the Ambassador's question about the
PM's support for de-Baathification legislation, the PM stated
that his opinion "differs" from Ahmed Chalabi, chairman of
the de-Baathification Commission. The PM emphasized his
desire that the future law support and facilitate
reconciliation. The PM encouraged continued engagement with
the CoR Committee on de-Baathification, which would be
responsible for bringing forward new legislation, and offered
to go to CoR to share his opinions. Those who committed
crimes should be brought to justice, the PM explained, while
those who are innocent should not be punished. The current
process has protected criminals from prosecution while at the
same time preventing those who did not commit crimes from
participating in the government.
11. (S) The Ambassador stated that the Presidency Council has
recently put forward a new draft which combines the best
elements from other draft legislation submitted by the Iraqi
BAGHDAD 00000831 003 OF 003
Islamic Party (IIP),Iraqiyya, and the deputy Governor from
Salah ad Din. While the legislation is being debated, the
Ambassador asked, would it be possible for the PM to suspend
the de-Baathification Commission's work? The PM replied that
he does not "have the authority to do so," but that
operationally he has asked the executive branch to stop
signing de-Baathification orders. "I am trying to bring
people back," the PM emphasized, but it is not legally
possible to suspend the Commission.
-------------- --------------
CHALABI AND BSP'S POPULAR MOBILIZATION COMMITTEES
-------------- --------------
12. (S) The Ambassador asked the PM about the popular
mobilization committees developed through the Baghdad
Security Plan and led by Ahmed Chalabi. There have been
complaints, the Ambassador said, from local leaders that
these committees have become militias. The PM responded that
he refused to cooperate with Chalabi when he heard that
Chalabi used these committees as such. These committees, the
PM continued, have a limited mandate and limited funding.
They should not be used to create "institutions" but rather
"results-based" operations, he said, that work towards the
Baghdad Security Plan's larger goals. The PM noted that he
has asked Naseer al-Ani (Sunni, IIP),the co-chair for the
Popular Mobilization Committees, to oversee them so as to
prevent Chalabi from using them as militias.
-------------- --------------
CABINET CHANGES: AL-HASSANI AS DPM? TAWAFUQ WANTS NEW MOD
-------------- --------------
13. (S) The PM then stated that Tawafuq has yet to submit
names for new Ministers to their cabinet positions. "They
want to change the Minister of Defense (MoD)," the PM said,
but this is not right time to do that. Iraqiyya put forward
a few names for Minister of Justice. The PM said he wanted
Wael Abdullatif al-Fadel, also from Iraqiyya, to become
Minister of Justice. But the PM was uncertain whether Allawi
would agree. The Ambassador said that former CoR speaker
Hajim al-Hassani (Iraqiyya) wants a cabinet position. The PM
replied that if he returns to Tawafuq then he would be a
viable replacement for Deputy Prime Minister Salam Zuba'i.
-------------- ---
VIOLATING IRAQ'S SOVEREIGNTY: THE BASRA INCIDENT
-------------- ---
14. (S) The Ambassador raised a recent joint MNF-I and Iraqi
Security Forces (ISF) operation against a Ministry of
Interior (MoI) building in Basra. The PM responded that this
incident had not been properly coordinated and that Iraq's
sovereignty and institutions should not be continuously
violated. The British "could have informed us," the PM said
asserting that Basra does not respect the Iraqi government
because the British do not respect the government.
Furthermore, the PM said, the British claimed they received
permission before conducting the operation, yet the Iraqi
special forces did not participate "because they did not have
orders" from the PM. An investigation has been started, he
said, and until it is completed "the ISF will stop
coordination and cooperation" with the British in Basra. The
Ambassador agreed that coordinating with the GOI is critical
and offered cooperation in the investigation.
KHALILZAD