Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07BAGHDAD83
2007-01-09 18:05:00
SECRET
Embassy Baghdad
Cable title:  

AMBASSADOR AND ABDEL MEHDI DISCUSS NEW STRATEGY,

Tags:  PREL PGOV PINS IZ 
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VZCZCXRO3400
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #0083/01 0091805
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 091805Z JAN 07
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8993
RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC//NSC//
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 000083 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/08/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINS IZ
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR AND ABDEL MEHDI DISCUSS NEW STRATEGY,
IRAN, AND THE MODERATE FRONT

REF: BAGHDAD 38 AND PREVIOUS (NOTAL)

Classified By: Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 000083

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/08/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINS IZ
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR AND ABDEL MEHDI DISCUSS NEW STRATEGY,
IRAN, AND THE MODERATE FRONT

REF: BAGHDAD 38 AND PREVIOUS (NOTAL)

Classified By: Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (S) Summary: Vice President Adel Abdel Mehdi stated his
support for the new strategy for securing Baghdad in a in a
January 8 meeting with the Ambassador. His offered only one
suggestion after hearing the Ambassador's brief preview,
namely that additional forces and attention be paid to Diyala
as well as Anbar and Bagdad (Note: PM Maliki made the same
suggestion in a separate January 8 meeting. End Note). On
Iran, Abdel Mehdi argued that it was necessary to work with
Quds Force commander Qassem Suelimani because he is
"influential." He claimed to have spoken strongly to
Suliemani against Iranian-sponsored targeting of coalition
forces. The Ambassador said that the Quds Force officers
recently detained in Baghdad were clearly not playing a
helpful role in Iraq and argued that the Quds Force, while a
normal interlocutor for Iraqi opposition figures during the
Saddam regime, was no longer an appropriate interlocutor for
a state to state relationship. End Summary.

--------------
New Plan for Baghdad Security
--------------


2. (S) The Ambassador offered Abdel Mehdi a short preview of
the new U.S. strategy resulting from the President's review.
He emphasized that the most important finding of this review
was the continued recognition that Iraq was vital to U.S.
interests and that the U.S. must succeed in Iraq. He noted
to Abdel Mehdi the commitments Prime Minister Maliki had made
to President Bush on the new plan for Baghdad security,
namely that anyone who breaks the law would be a target; that
the commander for Baghdad would have full authority and not
be subject to political interference; and that operations
would continue until the job was done. The Ambassador also
described the three necessary characteristics for the Baghdad
commander: proper experience; broad acceptability; and
ability to work with coalition forces. Abdel Mehdi noted his
approval; his only comment was that additional forces and
attention should be paid to Diyala as well as Anbar and

Baghdad (Note: PM Maliki made the same suggestion in a
separate Janu
ary 8 meeting. End Note).

--------------
The Quds Force: An Acceptable Interlocutor?
--------------


3. (S) Joking that if Talabani made any invitations to visit
Iraq during his upcoming trip to Damascus the Syrian visitors
might end up getting detained, Abdel Mehdi turned the
conversation to the Iranian detainee episode (reftel).
Talabani, Abdel Mehdi claimed, had invited the Iranians to
Iraq "to help stop criminal acts because they have influence
over JAM." The Ambassador noted that while it was normal
that Iraqi opposition figures had relationships with Quds
Force commander Qassem Suelimani during the Saddam regime,
the Quds Force was no longer an appropriate interlocutor for
Iraqi leaders. There is no doubt, the Ambassador told Abdel
Mehdi, that the Quds Force is killing Americans in Iraq and
undermining the country's stability. The Ambassador noted
that the Iraqi government did not want to see Iran and the
U.S. fighting in Iraq, and that neither did the U.S.
However, if Iran continued to escalate by causing more
coalition deaths through explosively formed projectiles
(EFPs),the Ambassador continued, the U.S. would escalate as
well.


4. (S) Abdel Mehdi argued that Iraqi leaders had to work
with Suleimani because "he is influential, and you need to
work with influential people to build good relationships."
He said that Iraqi leaders were making a "very strong
argument" to Suleimani that Iranian-facilitated targeting of
coalition forces in Iraq had to stop and that they were
"ruining" Iraq by their acts. The Ambassador replied that it
was clear that the purpose of the Iranians' visit was not to
stop JAM from criminal activities. He said that the
operations had uncovered some disturbing evidence about Badr
as well that was still being processed. He promised Abdel
Mehdi that he would return for a frank conversation about
this evidence.

--------------
The "Moderate Front"
--------------


5. (S) The Ambassador asked Abdel Mehdi about the status of
the "moderate front." Abdel Mehdi said that before going on

BAGHDAD 00000083 002 OF 002


the hajj he had discussed a proposed press statement with
Prime Minister Maliki, who had appeared enthusiastic and
promised to bring Dawa on board, and with IIP leader Tarik
al-Hashemi, who was also "convinced." Abdel Mehdi said that
he later heard that Dawa had not supported the idea and that
the IIP also had doubts. The Ambassador urged Abdel Mehdi to
continue to pursue the idea, even if it turned into a
"virtual front" rather than a publicly recognized coalition.
He noted that the idea of a group of moderates had particular
resonance with President Bush, who saw the key struggle in
the region as that between moderates and extremists. Abdel
Mehdi agreed, saying that this sort of grouping was "the
future of Iraq."

--------------
Shooting Incident
--------------


6. (SBU) The Ambassador offered Abdel Mehdi his personal
condolences for the death of one of Abdel Mehdi's guards on
December 24 in a shooting incident apparently involving an
employee of a security company that is a contractor to the
Embassy. The Ambassador assured Abdel Mehdi that the U.S.
took the incident extremely seriously, was undertaking an
investigation, and was reviewing jurisdiction, and that the
Embassy was working with the company in question to achieve
an adequate offer of compensation. Abdel Mehdi said that
justice was even more important that compensation, noting
that Iraqis would not understand how a foreigner could kill
an Iraqi and return a free man to his own country. He said
that he had tried to keep the issue from the public eye and
had not disclosed to the press the nationality of the suspect.
KHALILZAD