Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07BAGHDAD828
2007-03-08 15:49:00
SECRET
Embassy Baghdad
Cable title:  

IRAQIYYA LEADERS DISCUSS WITHDRAWAL FROM GOI

Tags:  PREL PGOV PINS PINR PTER KDEM IR IZ 
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VZCZCXRO9904
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #0828/01 0671549
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 081549Z MAR 07
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0080
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 000828 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/07/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINS PINR PTER KDEM IR IZ
SUBJECT: IRAQIYYA LEADERS DISCUSS WITHDRAWAL FROM GOI


Classified By: Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 000828

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/07/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINS PINR PTER KDEM IR IZ
SUBJECT: IRAQIYYA LEADERS DISCUSS WITHDRAWAL FROM GOI


Classified By: Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (S) Summary: During the Ambassador's March 1-4 trip to
Kurdistan with Iraqiyya leaders, Ayad Allawi and Adnan
Pachachi discussed options for pursuing their party's
secular, nationalist agenda. Allawi professed his support
for the Maliki government in establishing security and moving
forward on key political priorities, but expressed extreme
frustration with the GOI's sectarian approach and its failure
to act on national reconciliation. Allawi complained that
Iraqiyya has been marginalized and has no role in government
decision-making despite its five ministries. Allawi and
Pachachi discussed Iraqiyya's potential withdrawal from the
GOI, wondering if they might be a more effective as an
opposition force. Allawi shared the text of his March 1
letter to the Prime Minister in which he called for
implementation of the political reforms necessary for the
Baghdad Security Plan (BSP) to succeed. End summary.

--------------
GOI: Failure as National Unity Government
--------------


2. (S) Allawi criticized the UIA-led GOI, calling it
incompetent, inefficient, and heavily influenced by Tehran.
The Ambassador pressed Allawi to support the PM's current
effort to implement the BSP, pointing to his recent
operations to go after all violent elements regardless of
sect. Allawi professed his support for stabilization
efforts, but complained that the GOI behaved as a majority
government, encouraging sectarianism and failing to make
progress on reconciliation issues critical to Iraq's future.

--------------
Allawi's Letter to the Prime Minister
--------------


3. (S) Allawi shared with the Ambassador the text of his
March 1 letter to PM Maliki. The letter stated Iraqiyya's
support for the BSP, but called on the GOI to carry out the
necessary political reforms to coincide with the security
plan (full text below). The letter lists 14 "demands"

including: cleansing the Iraqi security forces from militia
infiltration; suspending the High National Council of
De-Ba'athification pending de-Ba'athification reform and
transfer of its duties to the judiciary; establishing a
formula for a participatory government of national unity and
ending the sectarian quota system of representation in the
government; dealing with the problem of the former Iraqi
army; and, issuing an amnesty to those who worked for the
state under Saddam but committed no crimes against humanity.


4. (S) Pachachi made a public statement on behalf of Iraqiyya
coinciding with delivery of the letter to the PM; he
expressed the party's disappointment in the Maliki
government, saying "it may become difficult to remain in this
government for a long time." Allawi said these words were
carefully crafted to be strong enough to convey his
nationalist party's frustration, without directly threatening
a withdrawal from the GOI. Pachachi suggested that
withdrawing from the government might increase Iraqiyya's
influence, particularly since as part of the government they
had been sidelined. Allawi said that the national list would
likely have more credibility in the Council of
Representatives (COR) as a force of opposition. The former
PM characterized joining the Maliki government as a mistake.
The Iraqi people are fed up, he continued, hoping that
building opposition to sectarianism would pressure the GOI to
implement the political elements of the BSP and eventually
advance a nationalist, secular future for Iraq.

--------------
Comment
--------------


5. (S) Iraqiyya's leadership is strong on vision but weak on
practical planning to implement its agenda. Allawi's letter
to the PM seems more designed to put his position on the
record than to elicit change within the GOI. Iraqiyya does
not appear to have actual plans to withdraw from the
government, despite its complaints of marginalization.
Frustrated with the impasse in the executive, Allawi has
proven to date unwilling to engage in Parliamentary politics
to push forward his political agenda, preferring instead to
spend most of his outside of Iraq lobbying heads of Arab
governments to support his nationalist secular vision for the
future of Iraq. End Comment.

Begin text.

To His Excellency the Prime Minister

Subject: Political reforms coinciding with the Operation of

BAGHDAD 00000828 002 OF 002


Law and Order

The Iraqi list conveys its greetings to you Excellency, in
support of Operation Law and Order and to restore security to
our beloved Iraq, the Iraqi National List stresses the
necessity to carry out reforms on the course of the political
work to coincide with the security plan. Stemming from this,
the Iraqi National List demands the following:


1. To review the Terrorist Law in line with the serious,
sincere and action movement and not at the level of the media
only, toward national reconciliation and for the building of
a unified democratic Iraq away from sectarianism.


2. To draw up a clear and effective plan for the clean up of
the Iraqi army and police from infiltrated elements
especially those associated with militias, forces of terror
and officers who do not hold appropriate academic
certificates. Selection should be based on loyalty to the
homeland, and rely on professionalism in building the army
and security agencies.


3. To suspend the Law of the High National Commission for
De-Ba'athification until its discussion and approval by the
Council of Representatives in preparation of transferring it
into a judicial issue in which the judiciary is the
arbitrator.


4. To suspend the work of the "Balancing Committee" and to
cancel all manifestation of sectarian and partisan dimensions
which lead to igniting religious and ethnic sedition in the
country, also to adopt the principles of integrity and
efficiency in appointments and not political, sectarian, or
ethnic affiliations.


5. To work on establishing a formula for true participation
in the government of national unity far from the sectarian
quota system in which all Iraqis are represented even those
who are outside the political process and for the government
to be capable to save Iraq and ensure its unity.


6. In order to achieve genuine reconciliation, to prevent
interference from neighboring countries in the Iraqi issues
and for the reconstruction and building of Iraq and its
national economy, we call for convening an international
conference and anther regional one under the supervision f
the UN.


7. To draw up an immediate plan to deal with the problems of
the former Iraqi Army particularly what is related to
restoring confidence and assuring dignity for them and to
determine their salaries consistent with the present standard
of living, also to embrace the former army's technical
competencies so as to be a true building factor in an Iraqi
army for all Iraqis.


8. To draw up a clear and carefully studied plan to return
those forcible displaced inside Iraq to their areas and homes
from which they were displaced, and to provide future
protection for them so that this will not be repeated in the
future.


9. To issue a comprehensive amnesty for whoever took up arms
against the State and its military and security agencies and
those who took up arms against the Coalition Forces, but have
not committed crimes against humanity.


10. To draw up a clear and well studied plan for the return
of millions of Iraqi refugees and migrants in the Arab and
foreign countries to Iraq with pride and dignity, even if
that requires seeking the assistance of Arab and
international organizations.


11. To mobilize all Iraqis to achieve security and stability.


12. To ask the UN and the Arab League and the Organization
of the Islamic Conference to play a wider role in Iraq and
for the benefit of Iraq.


13. To disclose names and details, in a clear and courageous
manner the harmful interference in Iraq and to its people by
neighboring countries.


14. To release political prisoners, and issue a general
amnesty that does not include who has committed a crime
against the Iraqis or the international community.

End text.
KHALILZAD