Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07BAGHDAD818
2007-03-07 15:14:00
SECRET
Embassy Baghdad
Cable title:
AMBASSADOR PRESSES AL-HAKIM ON DEBAATHIFICATION
how-toVZCZCXRO8613 PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK DE RUEHGB #0818/01 0661514 ZNY SSSSS ZZH P 071514Z MAR 07 FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0067 INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 000818
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/06/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINS IZ
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR PRESSES AL-HAKIM ON DEBAATHIFICATION
REFORM
Classified By: Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 000818
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/06/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINS IZ
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR PRESSES AL-HAKIM ON DEBAATHIFICATION
REFORM
Classified By: Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
1. (S) Summary: In a March 6 meeting with SCIRI leader
Abdulaziz al-Hakim, the Ambassador and General Petraeus urged
al-Hakim to make rapid progress on deBaathification reform.
Specifically, the Ambassador asked for al-Hakim's assistance
in ensuring Shi'a coalition support for a draft law to be
submitted by the Presidency Council and for a moratorium on
new deBaathification orders until reform legislation is
passed. Al-Hakim said that he did not see any problem with
moving quickly on deBaathification reform. Al-Hakim raised
fears from the Shi'a community that the U.S. was turning
against them and that Sunni Arab leaders were seeking to
impose a solution on Iraq. In a private session, he also
expressed deep concern over the detention of his son Ammar
and said that Iranian leaders had denied any involvement in
facilitating anti-coalition networks in Iraq. End summary.
-------------- --------------
The Need for Rapid Progress on DeBaathification Reform
-------------- --------------
2. (S) The Ambassador told al-Hakim that rapid progress on
deBaathification reform was critical to both Iraq and the
U.S. The Ambassador reminded al-Hakim of his statement that
Iraq had turned a new page with Saddam's execution and
suggested that genuine deBaathification reform would be an
important manifestation of this progress. Speed was very
important from the U.S. perspective, the Ambassador
continued, because Congress was soon going to consider
President Bush's funding request for Iraq. Results on
deBaathification reform would help correct the impression
that Iraq's leaders were not ready to take the necessary
steps toward reconciliation. General Petraeus noted that
there was a great deal of frustration and impatience in
Washington. To assure strong U.S. support, he explained,
Americans would need to see an improvement in the security
situation and clear, sustained progress by Iraqi leaders on
difficult political issues. The CG explained that the
coalition in conjunction with Iraqi security force
s can improve the security situation, but that only the Iraqi
leaders can bring about the needed political changes. The CG
stated that Sunni Arabs need to see the GOI reaching out to
them and Iraqi leaders should recognize the strategic
importance of this moment.
3. (S) Turning to specifics, the Ambassador laid out two
steps to al-Hakim. First, he referred to his work with the
Presidency Council on a draft deBaathification reform law
that it could present to the Council of Representatives
(CoR),a "unifying effort toward reconciliation and
accountability." President Jalal Talabani and Vice President
Tarik al-Hashemi, he said, were supportive of the proposed
legislation. Vice President Abdel Mehdi, the Ambassador
continued, was personally supportive as well but felt like he
needed clearer backing from the Shi'a coalition to move
forward. The Ambassador asked al-Hakim to give Abdel Mehdi
his full support to move forward in the next several days.
The Ambassador also asked al-Hakim to support a moratorium on
new deBaathification orders from the Higher National
DeBaathification Commission (HNDBC) until new legislation was
passed. He closed by reiterating the significance President
Bush and the U.S. government placed on rapid progress on
deBaathification reform and h
ow important al-Hakim's support would be.
4. (S) Al-Hakim said that he did not see any problem with
moving quickly on deBaathification reform and said he would
ask Abdel Mehdi to do so on behalf of the Shi'a coalition.
-------------- --------------
Shi'a Fear Abandonment by U.S. and International Community
-------------- --------------
5. (S) Al-Hakim then raised several issues of concern to the
Shi'a community. The Shi'a feared, he said, that the U.S.
had changed its position on Iraq and would side with Sunnis.
After watching "dedicated, committed Iraqi security forces
leaders" being detained by the coalition only to see
"massacres" ensue, as al-Hakim claimed happened in Diyala,
the Shi'a had begun to question coalition intentions. "The
Shi'a are wondering if the coalition is influenced by
Baathist information. Even I have no answers to some
questions." The CG reiterated to al-Hakim that the vast
majority of coalition targets are Sunni extremists and that
the fear that the coalition had turned against the Shi'a was
unfounded.
6. (S) On the issue of security, al-Hakim said that Shi'a
leaders had been pressuring Shi'a groups that were inciting
sectarian violence to stop. These efforts were helping, he
continued, but there was no comparable reduction in car
BAGHDAD 00000818 002 OF 002
bombings and other attacks by Sunni extremists. "If these
attacks continue for another two or four months, Shi'a will
ask what they are supposed to do." Finally, al-Hakim claimed
that the Shi'a are being pressured by Sunni Arab leaders to
undo key principles of the constitution. He called Arab
League Secretary General Amre Moussa's recent statements on
Iraq "dangerous" and described the Arab League as "opposed to
federalism." The Ambassador assured al-Hakim that the U.S
strongly supported democracy in Iraq, noting that democracy
served the interests of the Shi'a as the majority but
included protection of the rights of minority communities.
--------------
Ammar's Detention and Quds Force Networks
--------------
7. (S) In a smaller meeting, al-Hakim expressed his deep
concern with the detention of Ammar al-Hakim, asking whether
it was meant as a message to undermine SCIRI-U.S. relations.
General Petraeus explained the circumstances, assuring
al-Hakim that the detention was not the result of targeting
of Ammar and did not signal any change in the relationship
with SCIRI. He offered his apology for any possible sense of
mistreatment Ammar might have felt and pledged to look into
it further. In turn, General Petraeus asked that al-Hakim to
ensure that Iranian leaders realize how unhelpful lethal
activities are in Iraq. Al-Hakim said he had raised the
issue with Iranian leaders, impressing on them that the
coalition was present at Iraq's invitation and that it was
morally wrong to target its soldiers. According to al-Hakim,
his Iranian interlocutors denied any involvement in networks
targeting coalition forces. Al-Hakim expressed his
willingness to raise the issue again but said he would need
specific evidence given the Iranians' denial.
KHALILZAD
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/06/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINS IZ
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR PRESSES AL-HAKIM ON DEBAATHIFICATION
REFORM
Classified By: Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
1. (S) Summary: In a March 6 meeting with SCIRI leader
Abdulaziz al-Hakim, the Ambassador and General Petraeus urged
al-Hakim to make rapid progress on deBaathification reform.
Specifically, the Ambassador asked for al-Hakim's assistance
in ensuring Shi'a coalition support for a draft law to be
submitted by the Presidency Council and for a moratorium on
new deBaathification orders until reform legislation is
passed. Al-Hakim said that he did not see any problem with
moving quickly on deBaathification reform. Al-Hakim raised
fears from the Shi'a community that the U.S. was turning
against them and that Sunni Arab leaders were seeking to
impose a solution on Iraq. In a private session, he also
expressed deep concern over the detention of his son Ammar
and said that Iranian leaders had denied any involvement in
facilitating anti-coalition networks in Iraq. End summary.
-------------- --------------
The Need for Rapid Progress on DeBaathification Reform
-------------- --------------
2. (S) The Ambassador told al-Hakim that rapid progress on
deBaathification reform was critical to both Iraq and the
U.S. The Ambassador reminded al-Hakim of his statement that
Iraq had turned a new page with Saddam's execution and
suggested that genuine deBaathification reform would be an
important manifestation of this progress. Speed was very
important from the U.S. perspective, the Ambassador
continued, because Congress was soon going to consider
President Bush's funding request for Iraq. Results on
deBaathification reform would help correct the impression
that Iraq's leaders were not ready to take the necessary
steps toward reconciliation. General Petraeus noted that
there was a great deal of frustration and impatience in
Washington. To assure strong U.S. support, he explained,
Americans would need to see an improvement in the security
situation and clear, sustained progress by Iraqi leaders on
difficult political issues. The CG explained that the
coalition in conjunction with Iraqi security force
s can improve the security situation, but that only the Iraqi
leaders can bring about the needed political changes. The CG
stated that Sunni Arabs need to see the GOI reaching out to
them and Iraqi leaders should recognize the strategic
importance of this moment.
3. (S) Turning to specifics, the Ambassador laid out two
steps to al-Hakim. First, he referred to his work with the
Presidency Council on a draft deBaathification reform law
that it could present to the Council of Representatives
(CoR),a "unifying effort toward reconciliation and
accountability." President Jalal Talabani and Vice President
Tarik al-Hashemi, he said, were supportive of the proposed
legislation. Vice President Abdel Mehdi, the Ambassador
continued, was personally supportive as well but felt like he
needed clearer backing from the Shi'a coalition to move
forward. The Ambassador asked al-Hakim to give Abdel Mehdi
his full support to move forward in the next several days.
The Ambassador also asked al-Hakim to support a moratorium on
new deBaathification orders from the Higher National
DeBaathification Commission (HNDBC) until new legislation was
passed. He closed by reiterating the significance President
Bush and the U.S. government placed on rapid progress on
deBaathification reform and h
ow important al-Hakim's support would be.
4. (S) Al-Hakim said that he did not see any problem with
moving quickly on deBaathification reform and said he would
ask Abdel Mehdi to do so on behalf of the Shi'a coalition.
-------------- --------------
Shi'a Fear Abandonment by U.S. and International Community
-------------- --------------
5. (S) Al-Hakim then raised several issues of concern to the
Shi'a community. The Shi'a feared, he said, that the U.S.
had changed its position on Iraq and would side with Sunnis.
After watching "dedicated, committed Iraqi security forces
leaders" being detained by the coalition only to see
"massacres" ensue, as al-Hakim claimed happened in Diyala,
the Shi'a had begun to question coalition intentions. "The
Shi'a are wondering if the coalition is influenced by
Baathist information. Even I have no answers to some
questions." The CG reiterated to al-Hakim that the vast
majority of coalition targets are Sunni extremists and that
the fear that the coalition had turned against the Shi'a was
unfounded.
6. (S) On the issue of security, al-Hakim said that Shi'a
leaders had been pressuring Shi'a groups that were inciting
sectarian violence to stop. These efforts were helping, he
continued, but there was no comparable reduction in car
BAGHDAD 00000818 002 OF 002
bombings and other attacks by Sunni extremists. "If these
attacks continue for another two or four months, Shi'a will
ask what they are supposed to do." Finally, al-Hakim claimed
that the Shi'a are being pressured by Sunni Arab leaders to
undo key principles of the constitution. He called Arab
League Secretary General Amre Moussa's recent statements on
Iraq "dangerous" and described the Arab League as "opposed to
federalism." The Ambassador assured al-Hakim that the U.S
strongly supported democracy in Iraq, noting that democracy
served the interests of the Shi'a as the majority but
included protection of the rights of minority communities.
--------------
Ammar's Detention and Quds Force Networks
--------------
7. (S) In a smaller meeting, al-Hakim expressed his deep
concern with the detention of Ammar al-Hakim, asking whether
it was meant as a message to undermine SCIRI-U.S. relations.
General Petraeus explained the circumstances, assuring
al-Hakim that the detention was not the result of targeting
of Ammar and did not signal any change in the relationship
with SCIRI. He offered his apology for any possible sense of
mistreatment Ammar might have felt and pledged to look into
it further. In turn, General Petraeus asked that al-Hakim to
ensure that Iranian leaders realize how unhelpful lethal
activities are in Iraq. Al-Hakim said he had raised the
issue with Iranian leaders, impressing on them that the
coalition was present at Iraq's invitation and that it was
morally wrong to target its soldiers. According to al-Hakim,
his Iranian interlocutors denied any involvement in networks
targeting coalition forces. Al-Hakim expressed his
willingness to raise the issue again but said he would need
specific evidence given the Iranians' denial.
KHALILZAD