CHIEF OF STAFF DISCUSSES IRAQI PM ROLE IN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 000807

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/06/2017
TAGS: IZ KDEM KJUS PGOV PREL
SUBJECT: CHIEF OF STAFF DISCUSSES IRAQI PM ROLE IN
DE-BAATHIFICATION REFORM


Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Daniel Speckhard for
reasons 1.4 (B) and (D).


1. (C) SUMMARY. In a March 5 meeting with DCM and PolCouns,
PM Chief of Staff Tariq Abdullah said that the PM preferred a
de-Baathification policy that targeted only those involved in
criminal activities rather than entire classes of members,
but cautioned that the matter was exclusively reserved for
the Council of Representatives to decide. He noted that the
PM had organized a conference in support of former military
officers and was quietly taking steps to suspend the
implementation of de-Baathification orders. Abdullah
confirmed that many political leaders supported the
Presidency Council compromise draft, however they feared
public reaction. The DCM noted that the PM was currently
working from a position of strength, and could use the
momentum from the Baghdad Security Plan to make key
announcements on de-Baathification. END SUMMARY.

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CoR Controls De-Baath Policy, but PM Working Towards
Reconciliation
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2. (C) Abdullah began by emphasizing that the Prime Minister
firmly believes that any initiative on de-Baathification must
start from the Council of Representatives (CoR),per the
Constitution. The PM has publicly announced his position,
which is that current de-Baathification policies that exclude
entire groups of people based on their membership level in
the Baath Party are flawed. The PM instead advocates a
policy that would target only those former Baathists who have
criminal charges or civil cases against them in the courts.
However, Abdullah emphasized that the de-Baathification
mandate cannot be changed or eliminated by the Prime Minister.


3. (C) Abdullah noted that the PM is taking steps to provide
relief to those affected by de-Baathification, the majority
of whom are former military officers and Iraqi Army staff.
To that end, Abdullah explained, the PM had organized a
recent reconciliation conference to bring as many former
officers as possible back into the military or to provide
them with adequate pensions. On the civilian side, the PM
was unofficially working to postpone the implementation of
orders against individuals who do not otherwise face charges
in court. The PM had instructed ministers not to implement
orders, Abdullah explained, and most were following the PM's
order. This instruction includes both new orders and ones
that were previously issued but have not yet been
implemented. Abdullah stressed that the PM was pursuing this
initiative quietly and informally (i.e. without
documentation) because it would be viewed as a violation of
his position were it to be known.


4. (C) The DCM praised the PM's position, noting that the USG
also supported a policy that would only punish those
individuals involved in criminal activity. However he noted
that if the public is not aware of ongoing reconciliation
efforts, those efforts will have no impact on reducing
violence and fostering cooperation. He also noted that
implementation of orders was not the only problem, there is
also a problem with ministries which refuse to implement
exemptions that would reinstate previously removed employees.
PolCouns mentioned that this was a problem in Salah ad-Din,
where the Ministry of Education had not reinstated almost 600
teachers who had been issued exemptions by the
de-Baathification commission. Abdullah agreed that
ministries should immediately implement reinstatements.

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DCM: PM Could Take Lead While CoR Reviews Legislation
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5. (C) The DCM suggested that the way forward may be the
compromise draft that the Presidency Council had been working
on. Abdullah confided that although the political leaders
agreed with the draft in principle, they would have
difficulty supporting it as they were afraid of public
reaction. The DCM noted that if enough leaders came out in
support of the compromise draft, the political risk would be
less as it would be shared. He suggested that the PM and VP
Mahdi could agree to support the draft.


6. (C) Abdullah said that such a scenario may be possible,
but reasoned that the PM would need "some credit on the
security front" from the Baghdad Security Plan before he
could make such an announcement. The DCM suggested that the
PM could take a few steps in the interim to lay the
groundwork. He suggested that the PM could make an
announcement that a compromise draft on de-Baathification
reform would be presented to the CoR shortly. The PM could
then publicly ask his ministers to postpone implementing

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de-Baathification orders until the CoR reviews this
legislation. The PM could also insist that ministers
reinstate those employees who have received exemptions. The
DCM reasoned that all of these actions could be taken under
the cover that de-Baathification needs to be addressed by the
CoR in a neutral environment.


7. (C) Abdullah said that de-Baathification is an important
issue, but reiterated that "we must work slowly so that it
matures properly." He noted that early concessions on
de-Baathification would be perceived as a weakness by the
insurgents and could be used against the government. The DCM
countered that the GOI was actually approaching the issue
from a position of strength and should move quickly to
capture the momentum generated by the Baghdad Security Plan.
He acknowledged that it was a politically sensitive issue and
that the PM would need the support of other political leaders
to move forward and reiterated USG's commitment to helping
gain that support.
KHALILZAD