VP MAHDI DISCUSSES DE-BAATHIFICATION REFORM,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BAGHDAD 000798

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/03/2017
TAGS: IZ KJUS PGOV PREL
SUBJECT: VP MAHDI DISCUSSES DE-BAATHIFICATION REFORM,
STRAINS IN SCIRI-US RELATIONSHIP

Classified By: Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D


1. (C) SUMMARY. In a February 28 meeting with the
Ambassador, Iraqi Vice President Adil Abd al-Mahdi
described the assassination attempt against him, calling it
a "well organized inside job." He discussed the issue of
de-Baathification reform and stressed the importance of
addressing the needs and concerns of victims of the former
regime. Mahdi also expressed concern about a series of
recent events that have appeared to target SCIRI members,
and passed the Ambassador a letter that he sent to the
President and other GOI officials requesting clarification
of the authorities and responsibilities of the Iraqi and US
governments (full text attached). END SUMMARY.

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VP: "If I had taken one step forward..."
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2. (C) Mahdi entered the room stiffly and with the use of a
cane. He had a small gash on his forehead and showed the
Ambassador ball bearings that had been removed from his
finger. He said that several other pieces of shrapnel had
not been removed from his legs as they were embedded too
deeply. Mahdi said he had been told that the bomb was
either concealed in a false ceiling or in one of the
chairs. He recalled that his name had just been announced
and that he had hesitated before approaching the podium.
He speculated that the bomber had possibly been in the room
or listening nearby, and had intended for Mahdi to receive
the full force of the blast. He was confident that the MOI
had recovered enough evidence to conduct a thorough
investigation, but gratefully accepted the Ambassador's
offer of FBI assistance during the process.

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De-Baathification Reform Must Offer Something for Victims
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3. (C) Mahdi told the Ambassador that he would work on
de-Baathification reform, but needed concessions for
victims of the Baath Party in order to get the support of
the Shia Coalition. He expressed support for a scholarship
program that would benefit relatives of victims, and noted
that he was open to other suggestions. He also mentioned
that an affirmative action program may make reform more
palatable, since certain government offices and ministries
were still unbalanced. He cited the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs as an example, noting that it employs few Shia.
Mahdi promised to review the various draft laws and agreed
to work with the Presidency Council to issue a compromise
draft by March 8.


4. (C) In a follow up meeting with Mahdi on March 3,
PolCouns stressed that de-Baathification reform should
further national reconciliation, and offered to work with
Mahdi to incorporate ideas to balance reform with measures
to compensate victims. She presented several proposals -
special medical and psychological care for victims,
discounted medications, preferential access to training and
education, and symbolic measures like a national day of
recognition and public monuments - that could help to
redress past suffering, but noted that these measures must
be available to all victims, and not based on sectarian
identities. "They should be based on justice," he stated.


5. (C) Mahdi expressed concern about moving too quickly on
reform efforts, noting that passing laws quickly may solve
one problem, but often creates others. He predicted that
it would take time to convince the Shia Coalition and
thought that a law introduced by Ahmed Chalabi and the
de-Baathification commission, rather than the Presidency
Council, would be more successful. PolCouns expressed
concern that Embassy efforts to engage Chalabi on reform
had produced few results, with Chalabi unwilling to
consider fundamental changes to the commission or to pursue
reconciliation. PolCouns instead suggested that the
Presidency Council release a draft law within the next
week, and then open up the issue for public consultation.
This would ensure broad support and reassure Shia Coalition
partners who are more sensitive to reform efforts.


6. (C) PolCouns further suggested that Prime Minister
Maliki issue an order to suspend the work of the
de-Baathification commission until new legislation is
passed. Mahdi supported the idea, noting that "the PM can
help."

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Recent Incidents Strain US-SCIRI Relations
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7. (C) The Ambassador apologized for confusion surrounding
the attack on Mahdi that resulted in the VP being turned
away from the Combat Support Hospital (CSH). He explained
that the problem was likely due to confusion over the
number of cars in the VP's convoy. Mahdi accepted the
apology, and hoped that the unfortunate incident would
result in better communication in the future.


8. (C) Mahdi briefly touched on the issue of the detention
of Ammar Al-Hakim, noting that Hakim's version of the facts
seemed to indicate that his detention was "coordinated."
He also made reference to a recent incident in which the
private plane he was traveling on was not allowed to land
at Baghdad International Airport and had to return to
Ankara. Mahdi said that he had written a letter to
complain about the issue to the Presidency Council, PM and
CoR Speaker. He gave the Embassy a copy of the letter,
full translation is below. The letter requested that the
PCNS revisit "the security agreement" between GOI and USG,
and that authorities and responsibilities of each side be
clearly delineated.

BEGIN TEXT:

Date: February 23, 2007

His Excellency President Jalal Talabani,
His Excellency the Prime Minister and Commander in Chief of
the Armed Forces, Nouri Al Maliki,
His Excellency the Vice President, Tariq Al-Hashimi
His Excellency Speaker of the Council of Representatives,
Mahmoud Al-Mashhadani


We have accepted the official invitation addressed to us by
the Turkish government for an official work visit for the
period of 20-21 February 2007, after consultation with Your
Excellencies and after discussing the matter in the
Political Council for National Security (PCNS). The Turkish
government had appreciatively sent a special government
plane to facilitate the trip back and forth. The visit took
place as scheduled and we came back to Baghdad expecting
that the plane would land at six o'clock in the evening of
February the 21st. Six minutes before the landing the
aircraft captain was informed that he could not land
because the civilian airport was closed. We attempted to
obtain an approval from the military airport but to no
avail. Thus we were forced to go back to Ankara after we
circled over Baghdad for a period of more than forty
minutes in order to obtain the necessary approvals for
landing. We were informed later that a civilian plane
landed on that same day at five o'clock and that two other
civilian planes landed around seven thirty p.m, which shows
that the news about airport closure was not accurate. We
were also assured that all necessary approvals were
obtained before the plane left Ankara. Additionally, our
protection and follow up team in Baghdad was following up
on the subject of landing with all relevant parties without
any positive results.

This incident has caused an embarrassment on the level of
sovereignty as well as the political and media levels. We
stated in the media that the inability to land was for
technical reasons and this was based more on assumptions
rather than on real facts. We are going to wait for the
results of the investigation but principally we believe
that the issue goes beyond human or technical errors that
can usually happen in these circumstances. We believe there
is a major problem that has to do with what we have raised
repeatedly which is the distribution of authorities and
responsibilities between the Iraqi government and the
friendly American side. If such matters are not resolved,
many consequential things will happen- as have happened
many times- whether from this side or the other.
Significantly harmful things will happen- as has happened
before and continue to happen now- without the ability to
investigate them, let alone stopping them or at least
curtailing them, because every side will lay the
responsibility on the other side, without the ability to
offer sound solutions because responsibilities are not well
defined. This will hamper reaching positive results for the
benefit of both sides.

Your Excellencies,

We had hoped to reach a "security agreement" between Iraq
and the United States in February of 2004 according to the
agreement of November 15, 2003, but nothing came of that.
Then we requested the resumption of negotiations to achieve
this agreement in most - if not all- of the meetings that
were held with the American side without any meaningful
progress, despite the fact that all agreed on the

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importance of the matter.

Iraq, before extending the mission of the MNF at the end of
last year, insisted on the importance of achieving this
agreement. The Prime Minister's letter has become part of
the last resolution issued by the Security Council
concerning the mission of the MNFI. And in order not to
turn the incident of the plane into a new personal matter,
I suggest to Your Excellencies that you approve placing the
subject of "the security agreement" among the priorities of
the agenda of the PCNS in order to advise the government to
resume the discussions with the American side about
reaching an agreement within an agreed upon period that
will be decided after consultation with the American side.

The desired agreement should be able to clearly define the
authorities and responsibilities in many matters. The most
important ones are the following:

-- The command of the Iraqi Forces, their movement, the
role of the MNFI in accordance with U.N Security Council
Resolution and the governing rules to prevent violations
against the sovereignty of Iraq and the independence of the
Iraqi decision, the authority exercised by the Iraqi State
over its citizens, territories, space, waters, wealth,
rights and interests and to take all of this into
consideration in order to achieve the highest coordination
and cooperation in the performance of duties between the
two parties.

-- The controls for the role of the MNFI in areas not
related to security.

-- Periods and limits of control by the MNFI on those Iraqi
facilities, institutions, lands and areas currently under
its administration.

-- The file of immunities and legal and juridical
authorities to settle cases and violations.

-- Camping, mechanisms and controls for movement to and
from and to the country and inside it.

-- The controls for movement on the air passages of civil
and military aircraft and the administration of the civil
and military airports.

-- The controls for controlling border entry points.

-- The controls for arrests and releasing and the
administration of prisons and the role of the Iraqi
Judiciary in all of this.

-- The timings that are agreed upon for receiving the
security files and the command of forces and for receiving
the facilities and other issues aiming to regulate the
relationship in a way that defines the authorities and
responsibilities of both sides in the above mentioned
matters and others and leads to achieving the duties
assigned to the MNFI and their successful return to their
countries.

Please accept our warmest greetings, and peace be upon you,

(Signed)
Adel Abdul Mahdi
Vice President of the Republic

A copy to:
- His Excellency, Zalmay Khalilzad, the Ambassador of the
United States.
- Commanding General Petraeus

Note: After signing this letter, we received the news about
the detention of His Eminence Ammar Al-Hakim by the U.S.
forces, and despite the intensive communications with His
Excellency the Ambassador, General Petraeus and other Iraqi
officials who all confirmed that a mistake was made and
that His Eminence would be released with an apology, yet
His Eminence's release happened after approximately ten
hours of detention. This incident and others which mix the
cards, confuse the thoughts, shake the confidence and
subject Iraqi leaders to degrading and serious situations(
as well as others carried out by the U.S Forces - as they
did in fact with my bodyguards and the guards of Ammar
Al-Hakim - of aiming their weapons at the accompanying
individuals from the Iraqi Army and Police, disarming them
and having them lay down and even blindfolding and
handcuffing them, are not simple mistakes but they are big
and serious violations whose consequences do not affect
only the Iraqis but they also negatively impact on the U.S
Forces and the MNFI. They are added evidence to the mixing

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of duties, authorities and orders which will lead to the
accumulation of mistakes preventing the establishment of
successful and effective policies and relationships.

END TEXT
KHALILZAD