CG AND DCM MEET IRAQI PRIME MINISTER

S E C R E T BAGHDAD 000792

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/04/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV MOPS IZ
SUBJECT: CG AND DCM MEET IRAQI PRIME MINISTER

Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Daniel V. Speckhard for reasons
1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (S) Summary. The Commanding General and Deputy Chief of
Mission met with Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki March 3
to discuss progress on the Baghdad Security Plan,
reconciliation efforts, and sovereignty issues. The CG and PM
agreed that there was optimism on the streets of Baghdad,
though the PM lamented that he still struggled with how to
control suicide bombers. The CG briefed the PM on the 'soft
knock' strategy for securing Sadr City, except when going
after targets responsible for coalition deaths. The CG told
the Prime Minister that he had put a halt on raids in Sadr
City temporarily to set the conditions for the emplacement of
the first Joint Security Station there. He also suggested
that the PM look at trying to demobilize the Facilities
Protection Services (FPS) associated with the Ministry of
Health, which the PM and National Security Advisor (who was
also in attendance) both agreed was a good idea. The PM asked
the CG to allow Iraqis to arrest Iraqi Security Force
members, when necessary, versus having the coalition conduct
these arrests. He told the CG and DCM that Sunnis lacked a
strong leader, and that this limited their ability to reenter
civil society. Finally, the DCM briefed the PM on the
Georgian desire to send more troops to Iraq, and suggested
that the GOI might want to issue a statement of support, to
which the PM agreed. End Summary.


2. (S) The CG told PM Maliki that he walked through the
Sharja Market in Baghdad, only weeks after a bomb ripped
through it. He was impressed with how well it had rebounded,
and credited the physical security measures put in place with
creating this environment. The PM agreed; he knew that
merchants complained about all of the barriers, but in the
end their lives were more important than the inconveniences
rendered by increased security. Additionally, the PM pitched
for the need for electronic bomb detecting equipment for all
of the 28 checkpoints surrounding Baghdad. Currently, Baghdad
province had five, which would be distributed to the most
strategic locations.


3. (S) The CG said his forces were taking a 'soft knock'
approach in Sadr City. The PM agreed with this tact. It
strengthened the moderates within the Sadr movement, he said,
and helped empower the mayor of Sadr City - who the CG
acknowledged was working well with coalition forces. It also
would help set the conditions for the formation of a Joint
Security Station in Sadr City. Raids might still be
necessary, the CG admitted, but only to go after those
responsible for killing coalition troops.


3. (S) The PM was happy with the progress made so far under
the "Law and Order" iteration of the Baghdad Security Plan.
He cited reduced assassinations and kidnappings as building
national unity and marginalizing terrorists and gangs, but
struggled still with how to stem individual suicide bombers.
He also warned that any incident akin to the Samarra Golden
Dome bombing of February 2006 would completely derail the
plan. Al-Qaeda and the hardcore Baathists remained the
largest problem. The PM also raised a concern about arresting
Iraqi Security Force members involved in criminal activities.
While the PM understood the need for these actions, he asked
that the GOI be notified and given the opportunity to make
these arrests. Having CF arrest ISF was "demoralizing", he
said.


4. (S) The Sunnis lacked a credible leader, the PM said, and
this was holding them back. The Kurds had two leaders in
Talabani and Massoud Barzani and two strong parties (PUK and
KDP); the Shia, for all of their problems, had leaders too.
But the Sunnis did not, and this was keeping them from
forging a national identity. He said that he had recently
been visited by two investigative judges, who presented the
PM with 130 complaints against mainstay Sunni CoR member
Adnan Dulaimy (IIP). Dulaimy was a problem; he also recalled
Dulaimy's unhelpful comments from Turkey, when Dulaimy called
on Iraq's Arab neighbors to support the Sunni struggle in
Iraq. Dulaimy's IIP, meanwhile, was not well-liked in Anbar
province, a Sunni stronghold. In the meantime, the PM would
be hosting a conference for former regime soldiers and
officers on March 4, with the goal being to sign up those
eligible for pensions and reintegrate others. This was a
positive step for reconciliation.


5. (S) The CG suggested that the PM kickstart DDR efforts by
demobilizing and reintegrating the Ministry of Health FPS
starting with those guarding the Medical City in Baghdad. The
PM said he too was concerned, and had ordered the formation
of a committee to look into the FPS earlier in the day. The
same committee, he briefed, would be responsible for tackling
militias. It was to be comprised of the Deputy Minister of
the Interior for Administration, a member from the PM's
office, a Ministry of Defense representative, and a military
intelligence representative. Major General Wajih would direct
the committee.


6. (S) The PM told the CG and DCM that the judges he met with
complained of U.S. interference in their interrogations at an
MOJ detention facility, Hathiya Prison in Mansour. They told
of U.S. soldiers bringing cell phones to detainees and
preventing interrogators from pursuing lines of questioning.
The DCM said that the US would look into these allegations.
However, the US had a strong desire not to see the bad
practices witnessed at other Iraqi detention facilities in
the past repeated. The PM replied that he believed the
judicial system was improving; judges were moving quickly
through files, releasing those it could and prosecuting
others. The Ministry of Human Rights was also tasked with
visiting detention facilities to prevent and/or report
abuses. The CG asked for specifics and said that he would
look into the allegations.


7. (S) The DCM reported to the PM the desire of Georgian
President Saakashvili to announce March 4 that Georgia would
be sending 2750 additional soldiers to aid the coalition. The
DCM suggested that the GOI might wish to issue a statement
welcoming this gesture. The PM agreed, but warned against a
Georgian statement implying that the forces were needed
because the GOI was unable to provide for the needs of its
citizens. The DCM assured him that this would not be the tone
of Saakashvili's announcement.
KHALILZAD