Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07BAGHDAD754
2007-03-01 11:33:00
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Embassy Baghdad
Cable title:  

PRT KIRKUK: PC BOYCOTT: PARTIES AGREE TO FORMAL

Tags:  PGOV PREL IZ 
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VZCZCXRO1505
RR RUEHBC RUEHDA RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #0754/01 0601133
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 011133Z MAR 07
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 9963
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 000754 

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/I - KHOURY-KINCANNON

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/06/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL IZ

SUBJECT: PRT KIRKUK: PC BOYCOTT: PARTIES AGREE TO FORMAL
NEGOTIATIONS, NO MOVEMENT YET

REF: A) 06 KIRKUK 172

B) 06 KIRKUK 177

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 000754

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/I - KHOURY-KINCANNON

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/06/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL IZ

SUBJECT: PRT KIRKUK: PC BOYCOTT: PARTIES AGREE TO FORMAL
NEGOTIATIONS, NO MOVEMENT YET

REF: A) 06 KIRKUK 172

B) 06 KIRKUK 177


1. (SBU) SUMMARY. Calls for "joint administration" dominated a
January 12 meeting called to find an end to the Arab-Turkoman
boycott of the Kirkuk Provincial Council. Despite apparent
agreement at that meeting, the Arab and Turokman blocs have failed
to follow up and appear to be uninterested in serious negotiations
to end the boycott. END SUMMARY.


2. (U) As reported in reftels, since November 2006, most Arab and
Turkoman Kirkuk Provincial Council (PC) members have boycotted its
weekly sessions and select committee meetings, presenting varied and
shifting demands. Without the boycotting members, only PC members
elected on the Kurdish-dominated Kurdish Brotherhood List (KBL) have
participated in PC business. PC Chairman Rizgar Ali Hamajan (PUK)
is unwilling to use the KBL's majority to play hardball with
boycotters, claiming that doing so would fatally harm relations
among the communities. He has said that the KBL is willing to
continue governing without the boycotters indefinitely, though he
has consulted informally with boycotting members on issues
concerning them, such as public-works projects.


3. (U) In December 2006, the Arab and Turkoman blocs called on CF
to help enforce an August 8, 2005 agreement among the blocs
requiring "joint administration" (division of provincial jobs among
Kirkuk's major ethno-religious communities). Since the boycott
began, PRT staff have encouraged all parties to find a solution, and
the members of the blocs have been negotiating informally behind the
scenes. On February 1, 2007, the KBL began a very public campaign
to end the boycott, issuing, at a televised event, an open letter
inviting boycotting blocs to enter into a public dialogue with the
KBL to resolve all outstanding issues. This drew no response and,
on February 12, CF called the blocs to a meeting in an attempt to
clarify the boycotters' demands and move forward.

-------------- -
THE FEBRUARY 12 MEETING: WHAT IS IT YOU WANT?
-------------- -


4. (U) Talk of joint administration dominated the meeting. Though

long a touchstone and rallying cry for boycotting Turkoman PC
members, when asked about it individually, their ideas of what it
would mean in practice vary widely, with most calling for a 32-32-32
percent split of provincial Director General (DG) positions among
Kurds, Turkomen, and Arabs (with the remaining 4 percent going to
Chaldo-Assyrians). At the February 12 meeting, this understanding
seemed to prevail, with the Turkoman bloc pushing the point. Arab
bloc concerns centered on alleged extra-judicial detentions of Arabs
by Kurdish security forces in the KRG and implementation of Iraqi
constitution Article 140.


5. (U) PC Chairman Rizgar proposed a "reconciliation" committee
composed of one representative from each bloc to "coordinate" future
negotiations, to which the Arab and Turkoman blocs agreed. He also
agreed to provide a written KBL response to the Arab and Turkoman
blocs. The KBL response on February 13 was largely an extension of
the August 8, 2005 agreement, proposing a form of joint
administration, offering to continue cooperation on detainee issues
and project allocation (which it was already doing),and reaffirming
its support for Article 140.


-------------- --------------
TURKOMEN RAISE THE STAKES, KURDS HOPEFUL, ARABS HAPPY TO KEEP
BOYCOTTING
-------------- --------------


6. (U) On February 16, Turkoman member of the reconciliation
committee Hasan Torhan (Iraqi Turkoman Front (ITF)) rejected the
KBL's reply as nothing more than a rehash of the August 8, 2005
agreement, which the Turkoman bloc had abandoned because the KBL had
failed to implement it. He said that the Turkoman bloc would not
consider distribution of DG positions until the KBL had agreed to an
equitable division of positions in higher tiers of the provincial
government, such as the Governor, the Deputy Governor, and the PC
Chairman positions. He denied that this was a change from previous
proposals and insisted that the KBL would have to address this
demand.


7. (U) On February 18, KBL member of the reconciliation committee
Awad Amin Mohammed (Kurdistan Toiler's Party, KBL) dismissed
Torhan's demand that the highest tiers of the provincial government
be equally distributed among Kurds, Arabs, and Turkomen and rejected
a 32-32-32-4 percent split of DG positions as a starting point for
negotiation, as such positions ought to be granted according to
qualification rather than ethnicity. Though he said that the Arab
bloc appeared more flexible than the Turkoman bloc, Awad said that

BAGHDAD 00000754 002 OF 002


KBL would not pursue separate agreements as all parties had agreed
to resolve the boycott through multilateral talks and the KBL was
committed to the process.


8. (U) Awad felt that all blocs had passed a "psychological
barrier" and were ready for open and honest discussion. However,
reaching an agreement might take several months, and Awad urged CF
patience; he added that any resolution would be short term because
Kirkuk's future status has yet to be determined. He said that the
PC can alleviate Arab and Turkoman "fears" about Article 140;
however, Awad suspects that some really wish to stop Article 140
altogether, which is beyond the PC's authority and cannot be solved
in Kirkuk.


9. (U) On February 19, at the weekly meeting of the Hawijah Area
Council (Hawijah is a district in the western, Sunni Arab-majority
part of the province) the Arab member of the reconciliation
committee, Rakan Saed Al-Jabouri, said that the boycott had been
productive, "reversing four years of mistakes," and pointed to the
CF-organized February 12 meeting as evidence. Chairman and
influential sheikh Hussein al-Jubouri (a.k.a. Abu Saddam) said that
it was irrelevant whether Arab PC members attend PC sessions, as the
KBL has a majority and can do what it pleases. Later, in a rare
candid moment, he told PRT staff that the goal of the boycott is to
de-legitimize PC decisions by withholding minority participation.


10. (U) On February 18, KBL member of the reconciliation committee
Awad had complained that he had been trying to meet his Arab and
Turkoman counterparts, but they had stood him up more than once. On
February 20, PC Chairman Rizgar reiterated that Awad was in Kirkuk
and available to meet; however, the other two members of the
committee had gone to Baghdad, visiting Prime Minister Maliki "to
complain about the Kurds."

--------------
COMMENT: RETURN TO THE STATUS QUO ANTE
--------------


11. (SBU) Though Hasan Torhan is the titular head of the Turkoman
bloc in the PC, at the February 12 meeting that bloc was obviously
led by Ali Mehdi (Turkoman Eli party),who is known for his
ideological aggressiveness rather than his flexibility and is widely
regarded as a paid agent of Ankara. Moreover, at the meeting,
Turkoman bloc member Zhala al-Nafitchi (ITF) accused the Kurds of
"playing games," a remark regarded locally as a deliberate and
particularly bold insult. In addition, Turkoman PC members later
made press statements complaining that KBL was "not trustworthy."
Torhan then raised the stakes by demanding an equal division of the
province's top political offices even before discussing the division
of DGs, yet has failed to attend reconciliation committee meetings.
Taken together, these acts indicate that the Turkoman bloc is
uninterested in negotiating seriously. This could be because what
it wants -- a reversal of Article 140 -- is not available to them in
Kirkuk, as Awad suggests.


12. (SBU) What the Arab bloc wants is unclear. Its members are
extremely individualistic, rarely presenting a united front and
typically preoccupied with their own particular complaints. Though
Rakan is emerging as Kirkuk Arabs bloc's man in the PC, the bloc
lacks leadership. His and Abu Saddam's remarks indicate that the
Arab bloc has no program and no reason to end its boycott. In
conjunction with Rakan's absence from reconciliation committee
meetings, these suggest that the Arab bloc is uninterested in
negotiating. Additionally, Abu Saddam's remarks support PC Chairman
Rizgar's opinion, expressed privately, that the elites among
Kirkuk's indigenous Arabs will never accept being equal to and
sharing power with Kirkuk's other communities.


13. (SBU) Despite this opinion, Rizgar is pragmatic in dealing with
Arab leaders, though he prefers (and has asked the PRT to support)
non-sheikh Arabs such as Rakan. Rizgar is a shrewd politician who
understands that he needs some minority support to see Article 140
through, and one of his consistent public themes is minority
acceptance. His ability to deliver Kirkuk to the KRG will make or
break him within the PUK. At the same time, as suggested by Awad's
remark that any solution to the boycott will be short-term, Kurds
are unwilling to buy Arab or Turokman support at too high a price.
That is, for the sake of ending the boycott now, they will not make
precedent-setting deals (such as giving up the Governor or PC
Chairman positions) that they might regret later, after provincial
elections and Article 140 implementation, when their control of the
province will be reinforced. The KBL's February 13 response
reflects this, offering almost nothing new, and is probably the
furthest that the KBL is willing to go.