PRT TIKRIT: A BALANCING ACT: THE OPF AND 4TH IA IN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 000677

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/23/2017
TAGS: ENRG EPET KCOR EIND IZ
SUBJECT: PRT TIKRIT: A BALANCING ACT: THE OPF AND 4TH IA IN
BAYJI

REF: BAGHDAD 462

Classified By: Classified by Stephanie Miley, PRT Deputy Team Leader, f
or reasons 1.5 (b) and (d).


1. (U) This is a PRT Tikrit, Salah ad Din cable.


2. (C) SUMMARY. The Oil Protection Force at the Bayji oil
refinery, normally overseen by the Ministry of Oil (MoO),is
now nominally under the command of the 4th IA according to a
January 29 directive by PM Maliki. In practice, however, the
OPF largely operates independently of MoO control, heavily
influenced by local sheikhs, politicians, and other
interests. Al Maliki,s edict, which also replaced the
current refinery chief Abdel Khader with Ali Obeydi, could
set the stage for a behind-the-scenes turf battle in Bayji
between OPF and the 4th IA (represented by three Strategic
Infrastructure Battalions, or SIBs, the 8th, 12th, and the
20th). The end result of the change is uncertain. On one
hand, the presence of the SIBs potentially increases the
possibility for increased illegal trafficking in refined
fuel. However, this development may also offer the GOI a
window of opportunity. An adroit policy on the ground which
encourages a system of checks and balances between the rival
groups could introduce an element of accountability in Bayji
not previously seen. END SUMMARY.

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One Big Happy Family
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3. (C) Tasked with providing internal and external security
at the Bayji oil refinery, the Oil Protection Force appears
to be heavily influenced by shadowy local leaders (sheikhs
and politicians),who may receive favors in the form of fuel
and employment opportunities for tribe members (reftel).
In order to curtail the widespread oil smuggling at Bayji
that creates severe refined fuel shortages throughout
north-central Iraq, PM Al Maliki ordered LTG Aziz, the
commander of the IA 4th Brigade (whose AO extends into
several provinces),on January 29 to mount a &military
invasion8 of the Bayji refinery; taking command of OPF,
eliminating corruption, and then ceding control to a revamped
Ministry of Oil security force. Given thirty days to deal a
substantial blow to the oil smuggling trade, Aziz deployed
additional detachments from the 8th, 12th, and 20th Strategic
Infrastructure Battalions (SIBs) to the refinery; elements
from these units were already guarding the front and rear
gates. Despite the fanfare, deployment of the SIBs to stop
corruption at Bayji is not a magic bullet. SIB units are
known to siphon fuel from pipelines as well as extort tanker
drivers, and according to evidence acquired from refinery
contacts, newly deployed units at the refinery may already be
enjoying newfound opportunities for self-enrichment.
(COMMENT: However, if coupled with a steady CF presence,
rivalry between the OPF and the SIBs may encourage them to
keep tabs on each other. Skillful manipulation of the
situation by the GOI could significantly assist in the
elimination of the rampant oil smuggling at Bayji and
simultaneously provide an immense boost to Iraq,s struggling
economy by ensuring greater supplies of refined fuel to the
general population. END COMMENT)

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A New Sheriff in Town
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4. (C) There is no doubt that the arrival of SIB forces to
Bayji has produced a number of positive changes. Nearly all
tanker drivers told IPAO during interviews on February 7 that
they perceive a dramatic increase in security in the
immediate vicinity of the refinery (previously AIF would
loiter outside the front and back gates, threatening and
extorting tanker drivers). In addition, some of the SIB
leaders, such as COL Yaseen, Commander of the 12th SIB,
appear to enjoy a strong reputation as being above corruption
among both local Iraqis (in and out of the refinery) and CF
alike. On February 7, Yaseen told IPAO that he and his men
saw the upcoming fight against corruption at Bayji as &a
struggle for the Sunni people.8 According to Yaseen, if oil
smuggling in Bayji is not ended soon, the Shia-dominated GOI
and Ministry of Oil would close the refinery. He has
embraced the responsibility for his unit to accomplish the
anti-corruption mission in order to avoid that outcome.


5. (C) Conversely, refinery officials were almost unanimous
in expressing skepticism at the idea that the SIBs would not
engage in corruption, and predicted it would be on a far more
massive scale than OPF corruption. Abdel Khader, Chief of
Production, told IPAO on February 7 that &With OPF we know
what to expect. A little fuel here, a jerry can there. The
IA will use whole tankers to steal the fuel.8 Khader also

BAGHDAD 00000677 002 OF 002


stated that he was aware of several fuel theft schemes
involving the IA (NFI). (COMMENT: The views expressed by
refinery officials should be weighed in consideration of the
fact that many of them may be involved in or complicit with
the OPF on oil smuggling ) and may also desire to maintain
the status quo - so their concern may not be entirely
altruistic. END COMMENT.)

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8They Won,t Be Happy8
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6. (C) During an interview conducted on February 6, Nebhan
Mehjoob, OPF Bayji District Manager, accused the IA of a
laundry list of alleged offenses ) such as fuel theft and
tanker driver extortion - committed by the 8th and 20th SIB
at the refinery during the first week of February. (NOTE:
Nebhan also provided photos to accompany his charges. END
NOTE.) Nebhan and Sabah repeated the concerns expressed by
other refinery officials; the SIBs have proven to be corrupt
already, they have the potential to steal greater amounts of
fuel. Both OPF managers conveyed to IPAO that they would
closely monitor IA activities and continue to report any
wrongdoing to CF. Nebhan and Sabah appeared to be ambivalent
regarding the new director, Dr. Ali Obeydi (in office for
only one week at the time of this writing); instead they
focused their attention on the IA. However, more important
to the long-term security situation at Bayji than the
response by refinery management to the new situation may be
the response by the local power players who have interests to
protect there. This remains an unanswered question: when
asked to predict the sheikhs, ) and their clients within
the OPF - reactions to a possible IA clamp down on
corruption, Nebhan simply stated enigmatically, &They won,t
be happy.8

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Comment
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7. (C) COMMENT. Deployment of the SIBs is not a panacea.
Considering their prior overall record, it is dubious that
alone they are capable of stopping fuel theft at Bayji. In
the wild-west like atmosphere of the Bayji oil refinery,
where a number of players are competing for power and
influence, neither the SIBs nor new Director Dr. Obeydi are
likely capable of terminating the entrenched oil smuggling
trade alone, the best intentions of General Aziz and Colonel
Yaseen notwithstanding. However, any measure of increased
security in Bayji is a positive development. In addition,
the OPF and the SIB,s suspicion of each other could be
carefully nurtured into a system of checks and balances,
ensuring a level of accountability at Bayji which has always
been lacking. Coupled with an increased CF presence at the
refinery, there now appears to be a window of opportunity )
given skillful leadership by the GOI - to effect positive
change upon one phase of the fuel smuggling epidemic.


8. (C) The local leadership of the OPF appears to be
grudgingly prepared to cooperate with the IA and Obeydi.
Less certain is the reaction of the local sheikhs and
politicians who appear to exert considerable influence at the
facility (largely through indirect control of the OPF). Many
of these players will probably wait to see how the situation
develops in the near-term; however, if oil smuggling is
actually reduced, a backlash by OPF and/or AIF elements in
the form of retaliatory attacks and other forms of sabotage
at the refinery is possible, even likely. The Bayji refinery
) probably due to its cash cow status for various players -
is one of the few locations in Iraq which has largely been
exempt from terrorist attack since 2003. This has the
potential to change in 2007 if Al Maliki,s plan is
ultimately successful. END COMMENT.


9. (U) PRT Tikrit thanks the soldiers of the 1st Battalion,
505th Paratroop Regiment, 82nd Airborne Division for their
invaluable contributions and support that make this reporting
possible.


10. (U) For additional reporting from PRT Tikrit, Salah ad
Din, please see our SIPRNET reporting blog:
http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Tikrit.


KHALILZAD