Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07BAGHDAD628
2007-02-21 13:44:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Baghdad
Cable title:  

FADHILA BLOC LEADER DISCUSSES DEBAATHIFICATION

Tags:  PGOV IZ 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO3149
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #0628 0521344
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 211344Z FEB 07
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9793
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 000628 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/18/2017
TAGS: PGOV IZ
SUBJECT: FADHILA BLOC LEADER DISCUSSES DEBAATHIFICATION
PROPOSALS


Classified By: Political Counselor Margaret Scobey for reasons 1.4 (b)
and (d).

-----------------------
DeBaathification Reform
-----------------------

C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 000628

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/18/2017
TAGS: PGOV IZ
SUBJECT: FADHILA BLOC LEADER DISCUSSES DEBAATHIFICATION
PROPOSALS


Classified By: Political Counselor Margaret Scobey for reasons 1.4 (b)
and (d).

--------------
DeBaathification Reform
--------------


1. (C) Hassan al-Shammari, Fadhila bloc leader in the
Council of Representatives (CoR),told PolCouns on February
14 that Fadhila supported an approach to deBaathification
reform that made reconciliation the driving priority.
Fadhila, he said, wanted to see the "rehabilitation" of Baath
party members who did not commit crimes, after which they
should be able to return to political life. He professed
indifference as to whether deBaathification would affect
those starting at the firqa level or those starting at the
shawba level, as long as they were able to receive pensions
(if they had not commited crimes) and "were not pushed to
become terrorists." He expressed concern at reports he had
received that former Baath party members at the shawba level
and higher were receiving letters threatening that they would
be killed if they did not join the resistance. Al-Shammari
noted that individuals who worked with Saddam's special
security services presented a difficult problem, in that they
believed "in God and then Saddam" so firmly that
rehabilitation might not be possible.


2. (C) Al-Shammari, who had read the draft laws submitted to
the CoR by Tawafuq and the Higher National DeBaathification
Commission (HNDBC) and also Ayad Allawi's proposal, seemed to
favor the Tawafuq submission. He dismissed Allawi's proposal
as "points rather than a real law" and observed that it would
basically gut the deBaathification process. He contrasted
the HNDBC draft with Tawafuq's draft, clearly favoring the
Tawafuq version. He noted that the HNDBC draft was more
focused on bringing Baath party members to account whereas
the Tawafuq draft was more focused on promoting
reconciliation. Al-Shammari said he supported the Tawafuq
proposal to separate the commission into a council of
advisors and an executive board as opposed to the more
centralized structure of the commission in the HNDBC
proposal, where the political power and implementing power
rested with the commissioner. He also supported the right to
appeal found in the Tawafuq version and criticized the HNDBC
version for having the judicial function subsumed under the
commission. He suggested two amendments to the Tawafuq
version, namely that the council should be required to meet
more than once per month and that the council should have
full time employees.

--------------
Ministerial Changes: Fadhila Wants In
--------------


3. (C) Al-Shammari, who is a member of the constitutional
review committee (CRC),said he had chosen not to travel over
the CoR recess (as opposed to most CRC members) because
negotiations over ministerial changes were intensifying and
Fadhila was pressing for a ministry. He said that he doubted
there would be a major overhaul because "the bloc leaders
will not agree to it." On the Baghdad security plan,
al-Shammari said that he thought it would be effective in
stopping militia activity but expressed doubt that suicide
bombers could be stopped.
KHALILZAD