Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07BAGHDAD612
2007-02-20 13:22:00
SECRET
Embassy Baghdad
Cable title:  

ALLAWI BACK IN IRAQ; SEEKS TO BUILD CENTRIST

Tags:  PREL PGOV PINR IR SA IZ 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO1971
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #0612/01 0511322
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 201322Z FEB 07
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9765
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC//NSC// PRIORITY
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 000612 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/19/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR IR SA IZ
SUBJECT: ALLAWI BACK IN IRAQ; SEEKS TO BUILD CENTRIST
COALITION

Classified By: Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 000612

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/19/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR IR SA IZ
SUBJECT: ALLAWI BACK IN IRAQ; SEEKS TO BUILD CENTRIST
COALITION

Classified By: Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: Back in Baghdad after a prolonged absence,
Former Prime Minister Ayad Allawi told the Ambassador
February 16 he intended to re-enter Iraqi politics and build
a centrist, issues-based coalition. Allawi said that
regional leaders are increasingly frustrated with the GOI and
the future of USG-Iran relations. Former IGC President and
prominent Iraqiya List member Adnan Pachachi, who had been
traveling with Allawi, said that their conversations with
Iraqi leaders since their arrival indicated that an
Allawi-led alliance could attract broad based support. DPM
Barham Saleh, also present at the meeting, opined that Iraq
was at a crossroads, and the conditions might be right for a
centrist coalition to take root. All agreed that building
consensus on a good de-Ba'athification reform law would be
the best starting point for Allawi. End Summary.

-------------- --------------
REGIONAL LEADERS FRUSTRIED WITH GOI, WORRIED ABOUT IRAN
-------------- --------------


2. (C) Allawi reported that regional leaders, especially in
the Gulf, are concerned about USG "escalation" against Iran.
By the same token, he continued, they are worried that the
Iranian stance was softening, and that a US-Iran compromise
deal was in the making. Allawi said he had received reports
from the Iraqi border that the Iranian Embassy in Baghdad had
closed its doors, and all its "diplomats" had returned to
Iran. Allawi said that SCIRI head Abdel Aziz Al Hakim's trip
to the UAE was "a disaster." The Emiratis reportedly told
Allawi that their meeting with Hakim confirmed he was an
Iranian agent.

--------------
IRAQ READY FOR A CENTRIST COALITION?
--------------


3. (C) The Ambassador discussed efforts to build an
issues-based moderate front composed of key leaders from
various blocs. He pointed out that the Presidency Council
and PM Maliki recently agreed to narrow the size of the
Policy Council for National Security (PCNS),institute a
Secretariat that would track decisions, and cooperate on key

SIPDIS
issues such as passage of an oil law, constitutional review,
and de-Ba'athification reform.


4. (C) Allawi said he thought that it might be too late for
such an initiative, as the entire government had proved
itself to be a failure. Pachachi questioned whether the
various parties involved could agree on these issues, and
argued that religious sectarian parties inherently had no
place in a centrist coalition.


5. (C) DPM Saleh disagreed, arguing that the "time was right"
for a centrist coalition to take hold. Iraqis were tired of
sectarian politics, Saleh said. The Baghdad Security Plan is
showing results, and the decrease in sectarian violence would
create a space for moderates to come together. Further, with
the US finally "awakening to the reality of Iran", the
pressure of Iranian interference would also decrease.


6. (C) Further, Saleh continued, it had become clear that the
US presence was not open-ended or unconditional - an added
impetus for Iraqis to find a political middle ground. Given
these factors, Saleh said, Allawi would find many allies in
building such an issues-based coalition. Saleh said that
since Allawi was "part opposition, part government", he was
best placed to lead such a coalition.

--------------
DE-BA'ATHIFICATION LAW GOOD STARTING POINT
--------------


7. (C) The Ambassador told Allawi that President Talabani has
provided that the Presidency Council intended to pass a third
version of the de-Ba'athification reform law to the CoR for
its consideration. Allawi said that the Presidency Council
would not follow through, because while VP Abdel Mahdi "on a
personal level" favors reforming the Higher National
De-Ba'athification Commission, pressures from SCIRI would not
allow him to come out officially with such a stance.
De-Ba'athification reform is an issue where a supportive
political majority could be formed, the Ambassador argued,
but it required leadership. DPM Saleh and Pachachi agreed
that this would make a good issue for Allawi to start with.


8. (C) Comment: Aside from some regional travel in the next
month, Allawi has indicated that he intends to stay in Iraq.
If Allawi remains and takes on this centrist political
project, his return has the potential to be politically

BAGHDAD 00000612 002 OF 002


significant. Given the current disillusionment with the GOI
and popular perception of Allawi a secular alternative, a
centrist movement with Allawi at the helm, could gain
substantial momentum. Whether Allawi will rise to the
challenge - or revert to his isolationist, wildly-traveling
state - remains an outstanding question.
KHALILZAD