Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07BAGHDAD564
2007-02-18 11:04:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Baghdad
Cable title:  

CHALABI, SAD DEPUTY GOVERNOR DISCUSS

Tags:  PGOV PREL IZ 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO1137
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #0564/01 0491104
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 181104Z FEB 07
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9703
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC//NSC// PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 000564 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/17/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL IZ
SUBJECT: CHALABI, SAD DEPUTY GOVERNOR DISCUSS
DE-BAATHIFICATION ISSUES

Classified By: Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 000564

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/17/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL IZ
SUBJECT: CHALABI, SAD DEPUTY GOVERNOR DISCUSS
DE-BAATHIFICATION ISSUES

Classified By: Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: In a meeting with the Ambassador on February
9, Salah ad-Din (SaD) Deputy Governor General Abdullah
Al-Jebarah presented De-Baathification Commission Chairman
Ahmed Chalabi lists of individuals from his province who had
received exemptions from the HNDBC but had yet to be returned
to their employment. Chalabi explained that his commission
was not responsible for implementing the orders, but pledged
to work with the Deputy Governor and Ambassador on resolution
of the issue. During a discussion on de-Baathification
reform, Al-Jebarah said that the HNDBC draft did not contain
adequate provisions for reconciliation, and noted that "it is
time to turn a new page." Al-Jebarah gave Chalabi his own
proposal for reform, which Chalabi agreed to review.

--------------
Exemptions Issued, But No Implementation
--------------


2. (C) SaD Deputy Governor Al-Jebarah complained to Chalabi
that there were more than 400 school teachers who hadn't been
allowed to return to work, despite the fact that they had
been issued exemptions from the Higher National
De-Baathification Commission (HNDBC). He said that
implementation of exemptions was a widespread problem in his
province. Chalabi explained that the commission was
responsible for issuing orders and exemptions; however the
individual ministries were responsible for actually
implementing the decisions. He claimed that the commission
shared Al-Jebarah's frustrations, and had lodged complaints
against several ministries, including the Ministry of
Education, with the Commission on Public Integrity (CPI) for
non-compliance.


3. (C) Chalabi said that the HNDBC had received 1600
petitions for reinstatement and had approved 1300 of them to
date. He pledged to expedite processing of the remaining
300, most of which he anticipated would be issued exemptions.
The Ambassador welcomed Chalabi's assistance in processing
the remaining cases, and requested copies of the list of
school teachers, as well as the letters sent from HNDBC to
CPI, in order to follow up with the Ministry of Education and
Prime Minister.

--------------
Heated Discussion on Reform
--------------


4. (C) Commenting on the HNDBC draft, which he had previously
been given to him by the SaD PRT, Al-Jebarah stated that
provincial leadership was looking for reconciliation and
"this law is 100% against reconciliation." Al-Jebarah said
that there were problems in SaD which required the full
participation of the population. He noted that many of the
engineers, teachers and other professionals in SaD had been
members of the Baath Party, and that they should not be
excluded from reconciliation efforts. Chalabi said that
while he personally agreed, there were different problems in
the South, where people still harbor strong fears and anger
towards the Baath Party. Chalabi noted that although the
Shia Coalition may tell USG officials differently, they
privately tell him that his draft is too lenient. He
insisted that the commission had worked to strike a balance
between competing interests, and that its existence continued
to successfully prevent a large scale massacre of former
Baathists.


5. (C) The Ambassador stressed that the De-Baathification
reform law must serve the purpose of reconciliation while
providing accountability for those with blood on their hands.
He emphasized the need for a clear, simple draft that
eliminated blanket sanctions on all but the highest level
Baathists, as well as the complex bureaucracy. Chalabi
agreed that it would be nice to get rid of the bureaucracy,
but noted that he was "not sure it is possible." In the end,
he agreed to consider the Deputy Governor's proposal.

-------------- --------------
Deputy Governor Continues to Receive De-Baath Orders
-------------- --------------


6. (C) PRT Salah ad Din raised the issue of the Deputy
Governor's own de-Baathification order with Chalabi. A
former firqa member, Al-Jebarah had applied for and been
granted an exemption. Despite this, he continues to receive
de-Baathification orders, most recently in late 2006. The
PRT is frustrated by the continued threat that hangs over the
heads of those who are engaging with the PRT and CF elements
and working effectively on reconciliation and other issues

BAGHDAD 00000564 002 OF 002


important to U.S. efforts here. Chalabi claimed that he had
no knowledge of the Deputy Governor's case, but said that he
would look into it at his request. Embassy will work to
solve problems of Salah ad-Din schoolteachers mentioned in
paragraph 2.
KHALILZAD