PRT TIKRIT: DOES THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT'S REACH

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 000056

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/02/2017
TAGS: PGOV PINR KDEM IZ
SUBJECT: PRT TIKRIT: DOES THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT'S REACH
EXTEND TO SALAH AD DIN?

REF: A. BAGHDAD 4666

B. BAGHDAD 4613

C. BAGHDAD 4331

Classified By: Stephanie Miley, PRT Team Leader, for reasons 1.5 (b) an
d (d)


1. (U) This is a PRT Tikrit, Salah ad Din cable.


2. (C) SUMMARY. The distance between the central GOI and the
Salah ad Din (SaD) Provincial Government appears to be
widening. Local politicians have little to no communication
with the national level political parties, leaving many to
become independents or to carry party membership as flags of
convenience. SaD residents see no tangible efforts toward
reforming de-Ba'athification or implementing reconciliation,
especially in the wake of the murder of 15 former military
officers who were traveling to Baghdad to discuss PM al
Maliki's announcement of the re-introduction of former regime
military officers into the Iraqi Army (IA). Provincial
security continues to deteriorate, and the provincial Iraqi
Security Forces see no GOI effort to support them, leaving
the province feeling as if it has taken a backseat to
attempts to re-claim the capital. If the GOI does not
attempt to bridge the gap and expand its influence in the
province, it risks further weakening its legitimacy and
isolating itself from the true needs of its provincial
constituents. END SUMMARY.

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Political Parties as Flags of Convenience
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3. (C) Like galaxies in a universe accelerating away from
each other, the distance between the central GOI and the
Salah ad Din (SaD) Provincial Government appears to be
widening. And like shipping flags of convenience, many
leading politicians and provincial council members in Salah
ad Din are members in name only of their declared political
parties with national affiliations. Generally referring to
themselves as independents, they rarely mention their
political affiliations, and only if it seems beneficial.
Local branches of political parties do not meet and claim to
have little to no communication with their national-level
offices. According to SaD Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP)
representative Ibrahim Karnik, IIP, the national party which
enjoys the broadest support in the province, is dormant and
will remain so until just before the elections. He and other
IIP representatives have expressed frustration that the
party's national office does not consult them on issues or
inform them of major policy developments. Deputy Governor
General Abdullah Ajabarah al Jabouri, a nominal member of the
Iraqi National Unity Party, says that few politicians in the
region have any real allegiance to the parties with which
they are affiliated.

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No Evidence of Deba'ath Reform or Reconciliation
-------------- ---


4. (C) Days after PM al Maliki's December 16 reconciliation
speech, where he announced the re-introduction of former
regime military officers into the Iraqi Army, 15 former
military officers from SaD were murdered while traveling to
Baghdad to discuss the PM's announcement (reftel A). The
PM's reconciliation speech was received in the province with
a heavy dose of skepticism (reftel B),and the ensuing
murders solidified SaD residents' view that al Maliki is
either incapable or not committed to bringing about
meaningful reconciliation or addressing the two key issues
for the majority of residents in the province: rectifying
the wholesale dismissal of the former Iraqi Army corps and
reforming the de-Ba'athification process. SaD leaders
believe that the al Maliki Administration's commitment to
reconciliation is not inclusive, as no one from the province,
or from the Ba'ath Party, was invited to participate in the
conference. (Note: Baath party members living outside of Iraq
were informally invited to the conference as long as they did
not attend under the name of the Ba'ath party. Ba'ath Party
representatives refused this condition and were subsequently
not formally invited. End Note).


5. (C) Recently, several politicians and religious sheikhs
have complained more fervently than usually about the GOI's
sectarian nature and called for a strong, secular leader to
take control. All mentioned former Iraqi PM Ayad Allawi by
name, contrasting his ability with al Maliki's to run
effectively the central government.

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BAGHDAD 00000056 002 OF 002


ISF without Support in the Province
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6. (C) As provincial security continues to deteriorate (ref
C),SaD residents blame lack of GOI support for the Iraqi
Army (IA) and Iraqi Police (IP) in the province. Many cities
throughout the province, including Samarra and Bayji, do not
believe they have an adequate number of police officers, and
the IA is unable to maintain security on several of the
province's major roadways, such as the highway between Tikrit
and al Tuz (en route to Kirkuk). The IP lack sufficient fuel
to patrol areas and to respond to incidents, and the IA has
inadequate supplies and equipment.


7. (C) With the announcement of the al Maliki
Administration's renewed efforts to secure Baghdad in early
2007, many SaD residents have questioned when, if ever, the
GOI will act on the poor security situation in Salah ad Din.
While the security situation is better here than in other
areas, SaD residents are ) naturally ) focused on issues
close to home.

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Comment
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8. (C) The consequence of flag of convenience, political
affiliation may be that the al Maliki government,s good
intentions toward reconciliation are falling short, as they
resonate no further than Baghdad, leaving out large numbers
of the intended audience, which further hampers the GOI,s
efforts. The GOI does not appear to have a PR campaign in
Salah ad Din, and that is causing it to lose ground in the
minds of the province's residents. If it does not attempt to
bridge the gap and expand its influence in the provinces, it
risks further damaging its legitimacy and isolating itself
from the true needs of its provincial constituents. Much
like U.S. domestic public service campaigns on buying war
bonds, conserving energy, or preventing litter, targeted
messaging can have an impact in shaping public attitudes and
response. An aggressive information awareness campaign in
the province about the progress the GOI is making in
developing democratic institutions and improving the lives of
average Iraqis could be an effective means of reasserting
the GOI's role in the province. END COMMENT.


9. (U) For additional reporting from PRT Tikrit, Salah ad
Din, please see our SIPRNET Reporting Blog:
http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Tikrit.
KHALILZAD