PRT TIKRIT: ODIERNO, GRAND MUFTI, PROVINCIAL

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 000507

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/13/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER PINR IZ
SUBJECT: PRT TIKRIT: ODIERNO, GRAND MUFTI, PROVINCIAL
LEADERS DISCUSS CEASEFIRE POSSIBILITIES AND SUNNI ISSUES

REF: BAGHDAD 379

Classified By: PRT LEADER Stephanie Miley, for reasons 1.4 b/d


1. (U) This is a PRT Tikrit, Salah ad Din cable. It has been
cleared by MNC-I Commanding General Odierno, MND-N Commanding
General Mixon, and the 3/82 Brigade Combat Team.


2. (S) SUMMARY. In a February 8 meeting, MNC-I Commanding
General Odierno, MND-N Commanding General Mixon, Grand Mufti
Sheikh Jamal al Dabaan, the ranking Sunni religious authority
in Iraq, and the Salah ad Din Governor and Deputy Governor
discussed a possible ceasefire between the Coalition Forces
(CF) and Sunni insurgent groups. According to Sheikh Jamal
and the Deputy Governor, many of the Sunni insurgent groups
can be convinced to abandon fighting and to join the
political process, with the notable exception al Qaeda
(AQIZ). Sheikh Jamal, who claimed he was "only translating
the opinions of the resistance," called for a meeting between
the CF and insurgent groups and recommended the "watchful eye
of the CF" help the GOI and insurgent groups to find a
political solution. The SaD provincial leadership also used
the meeting as an opportunity to bring up other issues of
import to SaD Sunnis, including debaathification reformation,
changes in the electoral system, and bridging the gap between
the GOI and the province. The meeting was a cursory
discussion on ceasefire possibilities, and it is still
unclear with which insurgent groups the Grand Mufti and the
Deputy Governor have contact. Before discussions move
forward, that will have to be made clear, possibly in the
form of a letter or message from the groups authorizing the
Grand Mufti and the Deputy Governor to speak on their behalf.
END SUMMARY.

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Meeting with the Grand Mufti, Provincial Leaders
-------------- ---


3. (C) On February 8, MNC-I Commanding General Odierno, MND-N
Commanding General Mixon, the Brigade Taskforce Commander
with responsibility for Salah ad Din, and the PRT Leader met
with Grand Mufti Jamal al Dabaan, the ranking Sunni religious
authority in Iraq, Salah ad Din Governor Hamad Hamoud al
Shakti al Qaisi and Deputy Governor Abdullah Ajabarah al
Jabouri. Without apparent communication with the Sunni
insurgency, Governor Hamad was present for largely ceremonial
purposes. The principal interlocutors were Sheikh Jamal and
Deputy Governor Abdullah.

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Insurgent Groups Approach the Grand Mufti
--------------


4. (S) According to Sheikh Jamal, while he was on the recent
hajj, several insurgent leaders from the province approached
him to say that they were ready to open ceasefire
negotiations with the CF and to join the political process.
Asserting that "a great amount of the jihad in Iraq can
change from fighting to political engagement," he said many
insurgent groups were ready to meet with the CF, with the
notable exception of AQIZ. Sheikh Jamal, who claimed he was
"only translating the opinions of the resistance," called for
a meeting between the CF and insurgent groups and recommended
the "watchful eye of the CF" help the GOI and insurgent
groups to find a political solution. As evidence of the
Grand Mufti's pro-political engagement stance, the Deputy
Governor said that Sheikh Jamal had made a fatwa banning IED
emplacement in Tikrit and on the surrounding highways and
that, if ceasefire negotiations proceed, he was willing to
make a similar decree banning all attacks against the CF.
(NOTE: While it is often difficult to determine who emplaced
an IED, there has been no noticeable decrease in the number
of IEDs in Tikrit or on the surrounding highways.
Additionally, we hear conflicting accounts as to whether
issuing the broader fatwa is permissible under Islam. END
NOTE.)


5. (C) While discussing the recent detainment of several
high-level individuals, the Deputy Governor argued that many
of them had changed. He acknowledged that a year ago several
of them were actively promoting the insurgency, but that now
they were part of the current climate of change in the
insurgency. He alluded to the fact that their release may be
one of the good faith initiatives required to move ceasefire
negotiations forward.


6. (C) The Deputy Governor also asserted that the province's
Iraqi security forces (ISF) were ready to take greater
control of the security situation, but that they lack the

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necessary equipment. He recommended the CF provide
helicopters and additional armored vehicles to the IP.
Odierno committed to withdrawing troops from areas where
there is little violence, like the northern portion of the
province. Odierno did note that more security work had to be
done in Bayji.

-------------- -
Debaath, Elections, and the GOI-Provincial Gap
-------------- -


7. (C) Bringing up other issues of concern to the Sunnis of
Salah ad Din, the Governor and Deputy Governor highlighted
the need for debaathification reform, calling for drastic
reduction in the law's authorities and the immediate return
of many suspended workers (reftel). Additionally, the Deputy
Governor recommended that the current closed-list
proportional electoral system be changed to a system were
voters elect candidates directly to positions/offices.


8. (C) The Governor said that the gap between the central
government and the provincial government needs to be bridged
and that he was frustrated that the security situation made
it impossible to travel between Salah ad Din and Baghdad. He
expressed gratitude for the USG's engagement on this issue by
facilitating trips for the provincial government to Baghdad
to meet with central government officials on their issues of
interest. He expressed his desire to see this continued.



9. (C) The Deputy Governor expressed concern about detainees
who are often held for long periods of time without a trial.
Citing one specific incident, he said former SaD Chief of
Police Muzir had been detained in 2005 and had not yet had a
trial. General Odierno promised to look into the matter.

--------------
Trouble Brewing in Kirkuk
--------------


10. (C) The Deputy Governor also expressed concern that a
dangerous situation was brewing in Kirkuk, as he fears Arab
residents will be forcibly displaced. He said he has heard
rumors that Kurds are migrating to the area from Iran.

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Comment
--------------


11. (C) Falling short of the groundbreaking meeting the
Deputy Governor had implied it would be, the meeting was a
cursory but necessary initial discussion on potential
ceasefire negotiations. However, it is still unclear with
which insurgent groups the Grand Mufti and the Deputy
Governor have contact, and if they have the necessary
influence to coax them into the political fold. Before
discussions go forward, that will have to be made clear,
possibly in the form of a letter or message from the groups
authorizing the Grand Mufti and the Deputy Governor to speak
on their behalf.


12. (S) COMMENT CONTINUED. A timely meeting given other
reporting of a growing schism between insurgent groups and
AQIZ, this opening definitely holds potential and could
result in a greater Iraqi-base in the fight against AQIZ. We
should try to capitalize on it quickly, as there may be
further complications (such as debaathification legislation
that may fall short of Sunni hopes, delays in provincial
elections, referendum on Article 140, etc.) in the near
future which could renew the Sunni sense of aggrievement and
disaffection that could refuel insurgent aggression.
END COMMENT.


13. (U) For additional reporting from PRT Tikrit, Salah ad
Din, please see our SIPRNET Reporting Blog:
http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Tikrit.


SPECKHARD