Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07BAGHDAD451
2007-02-11 11:51:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Baghdad
Cable title:  

PM INSIDER AL-ASKARI ON DEBAATHIFICATION, SUNNI

Tags:  PGOV IZ 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO4174
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #0451 0421151
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 111151Z FEB 07
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9537
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 000451 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/08/2017
TAGS: PGOV IZ
SUBJECT: PM INSIDER AL-ASKARI ON DEBAATHIFICATION, SUNNI
LEADERS, AND MINISTERIAL CHANGES

Classified By: Political Counselor Margaret Scobey for reasons 1.4 (b)
and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 000451

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/08/2017
TAGS: PGOV IZ
SUBJECT: PM INSIDER AL-ASKARI ON DEBAATHIFICATION, SUNNI
LEADERS, AND MINISTERIAL CHANGES

Classified By: Political Counselor Margaret Scobey for reasons 1.4 (b)
and (d).


1. (C) CoR member and Prime Minister insider Sami al-Askari
told PolCouns on February 7 that the Shi'a coalition, with
the possible exception of the Sadrists, was ready to make
changes to deBaathification legislation. Noting that
deBaathification reform was the single most important current
legislative initiative for the reconciliation process,
PolCouns pressed al-Askari to support reform that would focus
the punitive side of deBaathification on those who had
committed crimes and those who were in the very highest ranks
of the Baath party, while allowing lower ranking members who
had not committed crimes (i.e., the overwhelming majority) to
return to their jobs or receive pensions. Al-Askari
expressed concern that the victims of the Baath regime would
be forgotten but acknowledged that the 2007 budget allocated
money for victims' compensation. He also said that issues
such as land taken by leading Baathists needed to be
resolved. Finally, he characterized Tawafuq as "wanting to
abolish deBaathification all together."


2. (C) Al-Askari went on to harshly criticize Sunni leaders
such as Salih al-Mutlaq, Khalaf al-Ayyan, Adnan Dulaimi, and
Tarik al-Hashemi. He characterized them as "extremists who
do not believe in democracy." Their strategy, he claimed,
was to use the media to portray the situation in Iraq as a
civil war to force the U.S. to withdraw and to force regional
powers to get involved. "They think there is a Taif option,
whereby each community gets one third," he continued.
PolCouns observed that processes like deBaathification reform
offered the Shi'a a chance to make a strong gesture of
reconciliation to Sunnis, forcing Sunni leaders to make hard
and transparent choices about whether to support the
political process.


3. (C) Al-Askari said that "we" (i.e., the PM's staff and
confidantes, including him) had interviewed candidates
proposed by the Sadrists for the Minister of Agriculture and
the ministers of state for civil society and governorate
affairs, and that they would interview candidates for the
Minister of Health next week. He said that it was possible
the PM would name Rafi al-Isawi (Tawafuq) as Minister of
Health, but that there would "need to be an exchange."
Although the PM wanted to replace the Minister of Culture
(currently Tawafuq),al-Askari continued, the Sadrists would
not accept exchanging the Minister of Health for the Minister
of Culture. Another option under consideration, he said, was
for the Sadrists to allow the PM complete freedom in choosing
the Minister of Health in return for giving a Sadrist
candidate the deputy position.
KHALILZAD