AL-HAKIM AND AMBASSADOR DISCUSS BADR DETAINEES,

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 000430

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/07/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINS IR SA IZ
SUBJECT: AL-HAKIM AND AMBASSADOR DISCUSS BADR DETAINEES,
REGIONAL TRIP

REF: A. BAGHDAD 212


B. BAGHDAD 38 (NOTAL)

Classified By: Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (S) Summary: Abdulaziz al-Hakim, leader of the Supreme
Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI),
questioned the Ambassador on February 1 about several Badr
members detained by the coalition. Badr leader Hadi al-Amri,
also present, repeated his usual call for "evidence." The
Ambassador told them that it appeared that some Badr elements
were not following al-Hakim's guidance by participating in
networks that smuggled weapons and EFPs into Iraq for use in
attacks against coalition forces. The Ambassador previewed
the heightened level of concern on Iraq in Sunni Arab
countries that al-Hakim would encounter on his upcoming visit
to the UAE and Bahrain. Al-Hakim lamented the sensationalism
of the Arab media in their coverage of Iraq and condemned
recent statements made by Sunni leader Adnan al-Dulaimi in
Brussels. He called for "practical cooperation" between
Kurdish, Shi'a, and Sunni leaders even in the absence of a
formal moderate front. End summary.

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Badr Detainees: Concerns on Both Sides
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2. (S) Al-Hakim opened by asking about the status of various
Badr detainees, including three detained December 21 at SCIRI
headquarters (ref B) and two detained January 16 in al-Kut
(ref A). (Note: Four of the seven Badr members detained
December 21 were released on January 28. End note.) Al-Amri
launched into his usual refrain, noting that Badr members
were under orders not to attack the coalition, calling for
evidence so that he could be the first to bring any guilty
Badr member to justice, defending the map found on December
21 as a tool in developing popular committees, and
characterizing Qassim al-Araji, one of those detained January
16, as "excited" about the good relationship he had developed
with U.S. officials on PRT Wasit before his detention. Asked
by the Ambassador about the receipts showing transfer of RPG
launchers and sniper rifles, al-Hakim said Badr members did
have RPG launchers and al-Amri asked to see the receipts.
Saying that it was an "injustice" to continue to hold the
remaining th
ree from December 21 without justification, Al-Hakim said
that the coalition should ask him and al-Amri, rather than
those three, about Badr's weapons.


3. (S) The Ambassador noted that questioning of the remaining
three from December 21 continues and suggested that the DCM
and MNF Deputy Commanding General Lamb would seek another
meeting with al-Amri to continue their conversation about
Badr's activites. He explained that the coalition had
developed information that the two detained January 11 were
involved in EFP facilitation, offering to ask General Casey
to discuss this information directly with al-Hakim. He told
al-Amri that General Casey believed al-Amri had not "leveled"
with him on certain issues. It appeared, the Ambassador
continued, that there were elements in Badr who were engaged
in activities contrary to al-Hakim's guidance, such as
working with the Quds Force to smuggle weapons and EFPs in
from Iran for use in attacks against the coalition in Iraq.
Al-Amri agreed that Badr did have previous ties to Iran but
asked for evidence that Badr members were involved in attacks
against the coalition. He argued that al-Hakim could not
visit the US and seek a strong relationship while at the same
time "conspiring against you." The Ambassador replied that
the US would not be seeking a strong relationship with
al-Hakim if there was any thought he personally was involved;
rather, it appeared that there were elements in Badr
operating contrary to his guidance.

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Sunni Arab Concerns: Previewing Hakim's Gulf Trip
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4. (S) Turning to al-Hakim's upcoming trip to Tehran, the
UAE, and Bahrain, the Ambassador said that al-Hakim would
find a "negative atmosphere" on Iraq in the Arab countries.
Their concerns, he said, centered on the belief that the GOI
was not protecting the rights of the Sunni minority, that
many Sunnis had been displaced from their homes, that there
was a program to make Baghdad a Shi'a city, that Saddam's
execution was carried out as an act of sectarian revenge by
the Dawa party, and that some Shiite leaders are too close to
Iran. The Ambassador stressed the importance of dialogue
between the Shi'a leaders of Iraq and their Sunni
counterparts in the Arab world, and offered to try to
facilitate an invitation to al-Hakim from Saudi leaders. The
Ambassador said that Hakim visits to Iran make it hard to

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convince Arab states to welcome him. Describing the positive
reception given him by Sunnis during his 9 Muharram speech in
a mixed neighborhood of Baghdad, al-Hakim lamented that the
Arab media never mentioned the positive side of developments
in Iraq. He condemned Sunni leader Adnan Dulaimi for his
"harsh and extremist" speeches outside of Iraq. The Shi'a,
al-Hakim argued, had nothing against the Sunnis. The Shi'a,
Sunnis, and Kurds, he noted, had agreed on a 30-point plan
and had evenly split the key leadership positions in the
government despite the majority status of the Shi'a.

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Opportunities for Shared Decision Making
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5. (S) The Ambassador urged al-Hakim to play a leadership
role in bringing Sunni and Kurdish leaders into the
decision-making process and asked about the status of the
moderate front. Al-Hakim replied that the idea was not dead
but needed work and the "belief" of other parties,
specifically IIP and the Dawa party. Even if the front did
not become official, al-Hakim continued, "there should be
practical cooperation." Al-Amri noted the importance of the
security and economic components of the Baghdad security plan
and said that Sunnis, Shi'a, and Kurds would share in the
decision-making in these areas.
KHALILZAD