Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07BAGHDAD429
2007-02-08 14:49:00
SECRET
Embassy Baghdad
Cable title:  

PM MALIKI FRUSTRATED WITH THE SLOW PACE OF THE BSP

Tags:  PINS PNAT PINR PREL MOPS MARR IZ 
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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 000429 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/07/2016
TAGS: PINS PNAT PINR PREL MOPS MARR IZ
SUBJECT: PM MALIKI FRUSTRATED WITH THE SLOW PACE OF THE BSP

BAGHDAD 00000429 001.2 OF 002


Classified By: Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 000429

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/07/2016
TAGS: PINS PNAT PINR PREL MOPS MARR IZ
SUBJECT: PM MALIKI FRUSTRATED WITH THE SLOW PACE OF THE BSP

BAGHDAD 00000429 001.2 OF 002


Classified By: Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (S/REL MNF-I) SUMMARY: On February 5, Prime Minister
Maliki told the Ambassador and MNF-I Commanding General Casey
that he was frustrated with the slow pace of the Baghdad
Security Plan (BSP). Maliki said that our actions have not
yet lived up to our statements on the BSP, and noted that
Iraqis are growing increasingly impatient with a situation in
which terrorists continue to wreck havoc. Maliki said he
does not want any more delays in the start of the plan. In
the next few days, he said he would like to see the Baghdad
Operational Command fully staffed, all checkpoints manned,
all barriers fortified, and all commanders and forces in
place and operational. He requested formal assurances from
Casey and the Ministry of Defense that he can exercise full
command and control of the Iraqi Special Operations Forces
(ISOF). He said that for operations within Baghdad he wanted
the chain of command for the ISOF to go through Baghdad
Operational Commander Lieutenant General Aboud instead of
Minister of Defense Abdul Qader, while ISOF operations
outside of Baghdad should continue to fall under the command
and control of the Ministry of Defense. The Ambassador and
Casey agreed that Maliki's frustrations were justified.
Casey recommended that Maliki take his message to 'urgently
and fully implement BSP' to the security ministers and ISF
commanders as it was their slowness in occupying their
sectors that was holding up the plan. Casey also provided a
status report on the plan's various elements, illustrating
the progress that had so far been made. Casey said MNF-I had
turned full command and control of the ISOF over to the MoD
on January 1 and that the Prime Minister could exercise
command of the forces. At the close of the meeting, Maliki
asked for the Ambassador's help in expelling the MEK
terrorist organization from Iraq. END SUMMARY.


Maliki Wants Action Now
--------------


2. (C/REL MNF-I) In a February 5 meeting with the Ambassador
and General Casey, Maliki said he was disappointed with the
slow rollout of the Baghdad Security Plan, especially after
all the publicity that the plan has received over recent
weeks. He said that the strong statements and commitments
about the plan had raised the Iraqi public's expectations and
that these expectations were not being met. Maliki asked
Casey for no further delays, stressing the need to complete
manning and begin operations as soon as possible.


3. (C/REL MNF-I) The Ambassador and Casey told Maliki they
understood his frustration, assuring him the BSP will be
fully operational within days. Casey recommended Maliki take
his message to BSP commanders, stressing to them that Iraq's
future is at stake and that they need to treat this mission
with a sense of urgency. Maliki agreed, saying that he would
attend the February 6 BSP commander's meeting. He also said
he intended to begin visiting Iraqi forces in the streets.


4. (C/REL MNF-I) Casey reminded Maliki that while the BSP may
not be in full swing, successful operations against the enemy
continue in Baghdad. Casey pointed to the joint operation
against a car bomb (VBIED) network that had taken place two
days before in south Baghdad. He said the bomb maker was
killed along with at least seven of his top associates.
Maliki agreed this was a great strike against "Shia
Ba'athists," and went on to cite two further examples of
success by ISF in recent days. Both involved locating large
caches of sophisticated weaponry, one in Abu Ghraib and the
other in a Baghdad satellite television station.

Status of the 28 Barrier Checkpoints and Barriers
-------------- --------------


5. (C/REL MNF-I) Maliki told Casey that the Baghdad Commander
LTG Aboud reported to him that the 28 barrier checkpoints for
the BSP are still unmanned, the barriers themselves are not
complete, and not all checkpoints have adjacent trailers for
the forces. Casey pushed back, reporting 27 of the 28 are
manned and 20 of the 27 are operating as joint Iraqi Army and
Iraqi Police checkpoints. According the Casey, only one
barrier checkpoint remained unmanned. As for the barriers,
Casey assured Maliki that they are largely intact. There are
reportedly three or four breaches, but he assured Maliki that
these would be fixed. Casey also said that trailers for
checkpoint forces had been in place since September, but many
were in need of renovation because Iraqi forces had not
properly maintained them. CG Casey said he would ask MND-B
forces to assist with their rehabilitation.

Status of Additional Force Flow into Baghdad

BAGHDAD 00000429 002.2 OF 002


--------------


6. (C/REL MNF-I) Maliki asked why the additional security
forces that were designated for the BSP have not arrived, as
well as why some that had shown up were without proper
weaponry. Casey said that the U.S. brigade from Kuwait had
arrived and was in place and operational. Casey said the
problem of additional ISF lay with the Iraqi Army. While
Iraqi Army forces are present in eight of the nine districts,
most are not at their planned strength. Maliki said he would
contact the Iraqi Ground Force Command to correct the
problem. Casey then outlined the IA manning status of each
district. (NOTE: As of February 4, it is estimated that
approximately 63% of the additional Iraqi security forces are
in place. END NOTE)

--Rashid: all five planned battalions in place
--Mansor: four out of five planned battalions in place
--Karkh: one out of three planned battalions in place
--Kadamiyah: two out of four planned battalions in place
--Adhamiya: one out of three planned battalions in place
--New Baghdad: two out of four planned battalions in
place
--Rusafa: one out of three planned battalions in place
--Karada: not given
--Sadr City: none of the three planned battalions in
place.

As for weaponry, Casey assured Maliki that most Iraqi units
were outfitted, adding that those that are not soon will be.

Status of Iraqi Special Forces (ISOF)
--------------


7. (C/REL MNF-I) Maliki reported that Minister of Defense
Abdul Qader told him that he could not exercise command of
the ISOF because MNF-I still maintains command and control of
them. CG Casey denied this, noting that the GOI has had full
command and control since January 1. Casey said all Maliki
needed was to telephone Abdul Qader and direct him to carry
out an operation. Maliki asked CG Casey to relay this fact
to Abdul Qader as soon as possible; Maliki expects he will
rely heavily on the ISOF for operations under the Baghdad
Security Plan. (NOTE: In a meeting later that night with the
Ambassador, Abdul Qader said he needs formal notification
from CG Casey about the transfer of command and control. This
meeting will be reported septel. END NOTE).


8. (C/REL MNF-I) Maliki further requested that for operations
within Baghdad he be allowed to exert command and control of
ISOF through Baghdad Commander Lieutenant General Aboud.
Command and control for all operations outside of Baghdad
would still go through the Minister of Defense. Casey said
he would review this proposal and get back to the PM.

Maliki Wants MEK out of Iraq
--------------


9. (S/REL MNF-I) Maliki requested the Ambassador to assist
his government in expelling the unpredictable and volatile
Mujahedin e-Khalq (MeK) from Iraq. He stressed he could not
allow this 'terrorist group' to remain on Iraqi soil. The
group is increasing its threats against Ministers and
continues to make public anti-GOI statements. He said the
group is as dangerous as Saddam's former military and should
be sent back to Iran -- where Tehran has promised to grant
pardons to all. The Ambassador agreed to discuss the issue
in more detail after consulting with USG subject matter
experts.
KHALILZAD