Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07BAGHDAD4225
2007-12-31 14:29:00
SECRET
Embassy Baghdad
Cable title:  

PRT MUTHANNA: SECURITY FORCE LEADER SAYS IRANIAN

Tags:  PINS PGOV IR IZ PREL 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO2397
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #4225/01 3651429
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 311429Z DEC 07
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5058
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 004225 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/30/2017
TAGS: PINS PGOV IR IZ PREL
SUBJECT: PRT MUTHANNA: SECURITY FORCE LEADER SAYS IRANIAN
NETWORKS GREATEST THREAT

Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 004225

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/30/2017
TAGS: PINS PGOV IR IZ PREL
SUBJECT: PRT MUTHANNA: SECURITY FORCE LEADER SAYS IRANIAN
NETWORKS GREATEST THREAT

Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (U) This is a Muthanna PRT reporting cable.


2. (S/REL MNF-I) Summary and Comment: Colonel Ali al-Khawam,
the leader of Muthanna,s Criminal Intelligence Unit (CIU),
sees Iranian influence and militia violence spreading from
Basra as the greatest threats to stability in southern Iraq.
According to Colonel Ali, "non-kinetic" development efforts
geared to employment and outreach to the poor can drain the
pool of militia recruits. The December 9 assassination of
Babil Police Chief LTG Qais underscored the vulnerability of
key provincial security leaders, including Colonel Ali. The
MOI must provide Col. Ali with appropriate security
equipment. MOI designation of the CIU as an I-SWAT unit
could also provide Colonel Ali with crucial leverage in his
efforts to disrupt Tehran,s networks and counter the
Iranian-backed militias. End Summary and Comment.


3. (S/REL MNF-I) PRT Muthanna met with Colonel Ali
al-Khawam, commander of Muthanna,s premier anti-militia
strike force, on December 13. Colonel Ali profusely thanked
us for MNF-I,s help in overcoming efforts by Sadrist
elements within the Ministry of Interior (MOI) to sack him
and acknowledged he was deeply in our debt. The conversation
then turned to a wide ranging discussion of the threats
facing Muthanna and southern Iraq.

FEAR OF GROWING IRANIAN INFLUENCE FROM BASRAH
--------------


4. (S/REL MNF-I) Colonel Ali expressed concern about Basrah:
"Basrah is almost completely under Iranian control. They
had this for years as their long-term objective. It is a
vital part of their strategy to control and indirectly govern
southern Iraq." He foresaw a spillover in the coming months
of the JAM threat from Basrah to neighboring Muthanna and Dhi
Qar.

MONEY BUYS RECRUITS AND PROTECTION
--------------


5. (S/REL MNF-I) Colonel Ali stated that Iran has
established a well-developed training program for militia
members in camps near the border. He explained that liberal
training stipends, along with the promise of future payments

once back in Iraq, created an ample pool of recruits from
among the poor, young men of Samawah, Rumaytha, and Khidr.


6. (S/REL MNF-I) Colonel Ali said militia members returning
to Iraq fell under the command of operatives with
long-standing ties to Iran. While OMS and JAM in Muthanna
were nominally led by Nasiriyah-based Ali al-Khorasani and
Sayyid Uday, they were considered "foreigners" because of
their Basrawi origins. According to Colonel Ali, the most
prominent and dangerous JAM commander in Muthanna was Halim
Bashir Atiyah al-Hassani. Halim, who headed Tehran,s lethal
aid smuggling network in Muthanna, used Iranian money to ply
tribal sheikhs, recruit disaffected youth, and run at least
one assassination cell. Halim targeted his recruiting effort
particularly on the Albu Eaynayn and Abdulhussein branches of
the Albu Hassan and the al-Abbas tribes, with promises of
money and luxury goods.


7. (S/REL MNF-I) Colonel Ali observed that Halim represented
a case study of how Iran operates. Halim used a relative,
Abu Sajad Gharawi, a fellow JAM commander in the Maysani
capital of Amara, as a conduit to Iran. Gharawi, along with
his operations officer, Haydar, facilitated Halim,s travel
through Maysan to Iran, supplied him money, weapons, and
vehicles, and transferred Halim,s militia trainees across
the border. According to Colonel Ali, Halim,s "gifts" to
tribal sheikhs included cars and up to $3,000 in cash in
exchange for safe passage through and safe havens in their
areas. Colonel Ali stated that much of Iran,s lethal aid
passed through the al-Abbas tribal area located between Khidr
and Samawah spanning the northern and southern sides of the
Euphrates.


8. (S/REL MNF-I) Colonel Ali said even though he knew where
Halim lived southeast of Rumaytha, he could not arrest him
because he was under the powerful protection of the Albu
Eaynayn tribe. "They,ll defend him as one of their own,"
Colonel Ali remarked ruefully.

"NON-KINETIC" EFFORTS TO REDUCE POOL OF RECRUITS
-------------- ---


9. (S/REL MNF-I) Colonel Ali said the PRT could help counter
Iranian influence in Muthanna by undertaking projects that
helped the poor and provided them jobs, thereby reducing the
number of potential recruits for the militias. By giving

BAGHDAD 00004225 002 OF 002


credit for these projects to key Albu Hassan sheikhs, such as
Abu Chefat, the PRT could boost the influence of strong,
tough leaders who could counter and constrain Halim,s
influence within the tribe.

NEED FOR MORE AND BETTER EQUIPMENT
--------------


10. (S/REL MNF-I) Coupled with "non-kinetic" efforts to drain
the pool of potential JAM recruits, Colonel Ali advocated
intensified ISF strikes against Iranian networks and JAM
proxies. The CIU was willing and able to do so, Colonel Ali
said, but needed more and better equipment and greater
logistics and political support. We noted that the MOI had
begun to designate key strike units within each province as
I-SWAT units, and provided these units with advanced
equipment and improved logistics. Colonel Ali said he would
pursue I-SWAT designation with the MOI, noting that his unit
was the only force in the province that merited the title.


11. (S/REL MNF-I) While confident that he could suppress
Iranian influenced JAM violence, Colonel Ali worried about
the uncertain levels of GOI resources and support, commenting
that much of his current equipment was inadequate. He held
up a Saudi-origin VHF hand-held radio and remarked wryly,
"This is the best I,ve got." Asked what additional equipment
could improve the CIU,s effectiveness, Colonel Ali listed
his most critical needs:

-- 25 up-armored Humvees for strike operations against desert
smugglers;
-- 250 M-16/M-4 rifles with scopes;
-- 20 sniper rifles;
-- Night vision equipment;
-- Explosive ordnance disposal training and equipment; and,
-- Radios with a range of 120km.


12. (S/REL MNF-I) Colonel Ali wondered if the central
government, which - as the effort to fire him showed - was
divided and weak, was capable of dealing with the threat. He
pointed to the recent killing of LTG Qais al-Mamuri, saying,
"If Iran was not directly responsible for General Qais,
death, it had a hand in the affair." He stated that Qais,
killing was having a ripple effect on other anti-militia
security commanders around the country, highlighting their
acute vulnerability and intimidating them from being
pro-active.

COMMENT
--------------


13. (S/REL MNF-I) Since August 2007 we have pursued exactly
the type of "non-kinetic" strategy advocated by Colonel Ali.
Using Quick Response Funds, we have reached out to key tribal
leaders and moderate clerics in order to reinforce stability
and counter the noxious influence of the militias. We will
continue to develop and expand this approach in 2008.


14. (S/REL MNF-I) The CIU is widely recognized as Muthanna,s
most capable anti-terrorist unit. Designating it as an I-SWAT
unit would reinforce Colonel Ali,s ability to counter the
Iranian-backed militias and disrupt the smuggling networks in
the province. To that end, Colonel Ali will seek designation
of his unit as an I-SWAT unit, and should be supported in
this by the Mission if necessary.

15. (S/REL MNF-I) Colonel Ali is an extremely able and
charismatic commander, who leads by personal example. He has
survived numerous assassination attempts. His loss would
represent a significant setback to the security of the
province, thus it is important that he and his security
detail have the necessary equipment to protect him from
assassination.
CROCKER