Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07BAGHDAD42
2007-01-07 05:21:00
SECRET
Embassy Baghdad
Cable title:  

MOI BOLANI SLOW TO DEVELOP REFORM PLAN

Tags:  PGOV PHUM PREL MOPS PINS PNAT IZ 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHGB #0042/01 0070521
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 070521Z JAN 07
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8943
INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC
S E C R E T BAGHDAD 000042 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/06/2017
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL MOPS PINS PNAT IZ
SUBJECT: MOI BOLANI SLOW TO DEVELOP REFORM PLAN

REF: A. BAGHDAD 04718

B. BAGHDAD 04270

C. BAGHDAD 04292

Classified By: Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

S E C R E T BAGHDAD 000042

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/06/2017
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL MOPS PINS PNAT IZ
SUBJECT: MOI BOLANI SLOW TO DEVELOP REFORM PLAN

REF: A. BAGHDAD 04718

B. BAGHDAD 04270

C. BAGHDAD 04292

Classified By: Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (S//REL GBR AUS) SUMMARY. PM Maliki is frustrated by the
lack of progress by Minister of Interior (MOI) Jawad
al-Bolani and National Security Advisor Muwafak al-Rubaie to
develop a plan for comprehensive MOI reform as was ordered by
Maliki at the October 22 meeting of the Ministerial Committee
for National Security. Without this plan, Bolani has been
unable to take significant actions to remove those members of
MOI's Shia-dominated leadership with links to corruption,
illegal activities, and sectarianism. Nor have sufficient
steps been taken to plan for and implement the recent
decision to place Facility Protection Service personnel under
the MOI. Progress has been hindered by Bolani's travel
schedule and personal security situation, as well as the
recent execution of Saddam Hussein and the Eid al Adha
holiday. Despite the lack of progress on a comprehensive
reform plan, Bolani still receives good marks for making at
least some positive change, particularly in the area of human
rights. END SUMMARY.

REFORM PLAN DELAYED
--------------


2. (S//REL GBR AUS) Minister of Interior Jawad al-Bolani and
National Security Advisor Muwafak al-Rubaie have not
developed on a comprehensive MOI reform plan as ordered by
Prime Minister Maliki at the October 22 Ministerial Committee
for National Security (MCNS). Maliki extended the initial
deadline of November 15, in order to give Rubaie the time he
needed to focus on Ministry of Defense reform. Six weeks
after the extension, however, little progress has been made
on efforts to reduce corruption and eliminate sectarian
influence.


3. (S//REL GBR AUS) When Prime Minister Maliki expressed
frustration at the slow pace of MOI reform at the December 24
MCNS session, Rubaie and Bolani admitted that little had been
so far accomplished by the ministerial committee charged with

developing the reform plan. They claimed however, that the
committee would meet again to take up this subject within a
week. Due to Saddam's execution, however, this did not
occur. With Rubaie and other officials out of Baghdad for
Eid al Adha, progress towards MOI reform was further delayed.

BOLANI UNABLE TO TAKE NEEDED REFORMS
--------------


4. (S//REL GBR AUS) Without an approved plan, Bolani appears
unable to take the decisive action necessary to transform the
Ministry of Interior into a reliable security organization.
No significant action has yet been taken to remove those in
the Shia-dominated leadership linked to corruption, illegal
activities, and sectarianism. Despite months of U.S.
pressure, Bolani has failed to enforce arrest warrants
against the fifty-seven police officers (including a major
general) suspected of human rights violations at the Site 4
detention facility despite months of U.S. pressure (REF A).


5. (S//REL GBR AUS) The need for MOI reform became both
harder and more necessary by the GOI's decision in September
to place most Facility Protection Service (FPS) forces --
except the Oil Protective Force and Electrical Facilities
Protection Service - under the authority of the MOI. Thus
far, implementation of this decision has been proceeding
extremely slowly, especially in the areas of pay, training
and logistics. While Deputy Minister of Interior for Support
Forces Major General Admed Al-Kafajy has developed a program
to retrain FPS personnel, no retraining has actually taken
place. Furthermore, the MOI has yet to assume responsibility
for paying FPS personnel. At the December 24th MCNS meeting,
Prime Minister Maliki expressed frustration with the speed of
MOI's integration program and stated that he would
reemphasize to each minister that their FPS units now report
to the MOI. Finance Minister Jabr asked for a copy of this
order so that he can begin transitioning appropriate
budgetary resources to the MOI (Ref. A).

BOLANI'S TRAVEL AND PERSONAL SECURITY HINDER REFORM
-------------- --------------


6. (S//REL GBR AUS) Bolani has been out of the country for
much of December and we are unaware of any meetings on this
topic being held by Ministry of Interior staff. Most
planning discussions have been between Rubaie and senior
Multinational Forces - Iraq leaders, with little Ministry of
Interior participation.


7. (S/REL GHR AUS) Bolani's ability to take decisive action
on police reform is further constrained by his personal
security situation. Bolani now lives outside the
International Zone and has survived at least one
assassination attempt. Coalition forces are working to
obtain housing within the IZ. The threat of assassination
and abduction is a real concern for senior MOI leaders: on
December 26, Ministry of Interior Director General for Ports
of Entry Major General Imad Muhsen Jaafar was assassinated in
Baghdad's Adhamiyah district.

BOLANI'S POSITIVE CHANGES
--------------


8. (S//REL GBR AUS) Despite Bolani's failure to make
significant changes in the senior Interior Ministry
leadership, some MOI officers credit him with making positive
changes and improving the ministry's respect for human rights
(REF B). He has reassigned several officers to positions of
reduced authority. Recently, Bolani fired Major General
Mohsen Abdulhasan Lazim, Director General of the Directorate
of Border Enforcement - although we can not yet confirm the
cause for Lazim's firing. At meetings, Bolani has reassured
senior U.S. Embassy and elected officials that he is working
incrementally, citing a proverb that "good health comes
slowly" (REF A).
KHALILZAD