PRT MAYSAN: NO ANBAR AWAKENING IN MAYSAN

S E C R E T BAGHDAD 004189

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/27/2017
TAGS: PGOV IR IZ
SUBJECT: PRT MAYSAN: NO ANBAR AWAKENING IN MAYSAN

Classified By: Deputy Political Counselor Greg D'Elia for reasons 1.4 (
b) and (d).


1. (U) This is a PRT Maysan reporting cable.


2. (S/NF) Summary. PRT assesses that the unique demographics
and historical legacy of Maysan make it infertile ground for
a Concerned Local Citizens (CLCs) approach to tribal
engagement. Incorporating tribal members into a community
security force would be ineffective and endanger many of the
fragile political gains with Maysan's leadership. However,
the PRT will continue to engage with tribal members on
developmental and political issues. End Summary.


3. (S/NF) The two largest tribal confederations (qabila) in
the Maysan area (and bordering areas in Iran, Basrah, and
Wasit) are the Bani Lam and the Albu Muhammad, under which a
host of clans ( ashira) claim membership. Other tribal
affiliations found within the province include but are not
limited to the as-Sawa,d, as-Sarai, al-Bahadil, Albu Darraj,
Ka,ab, Kinana, Banu Malik, as-Saadun, Ubada, Khafaja,
Tameem, al-Maryan, and the al-Zairij. Like other Iraqi
tribes, their constituent clans have merged, fought, and
formed alliances over the centuries.


4. (S/NF) A variety of factors weakened the strength and
influence of Maysan,s tribes over the last century. In the
late 1920s, Maysanis began large-scale emigration from the
rural areas of the province to urban centers in Baghdad and
(to a lesser extent) Basrah. Subsequent large-scale
emigrations occurred in the mid-1970s and during the
Iran-Iraq war. While many sent remittances back to family in
the tribal areas and visited from time to time, those ties to
the province and to the tribe began to fray over time and at
a distance. Tribal leaders' inability to protect their
people during the Iran-Iraq war further weakened their
influence, as did internal tensions among tribes that
straddled the Iran-Iraq border. The killings and arrests
that followed the 1991 Shi'a revolt, as well as the draining
of the marsh areas, reinforced a sense of tribal
helplessness. Finally, the Coalition has directed the
majority of its reconstruction spending through the
Provincial Council (PC),Provincial Reconstruction
Development Committees (PRDCs),and elected government
structures, targeting mixed population centers at the expense
of rural areas.


5. (S/NF) PRT assesses there is no grassroots movement or
underlying motivation that a CLC program could capitalize on
to interdict lethal aid. Despite widespread Maysani distrust
of 'Persians', most Iranians along the border are Arabs and
belong to the same tribal networks. If these networks are
being used to smuggle lethal aid, we assess that few Maysani
tribesmen would be willing to betray their family for an
occupying power. Likewise, JAM's ruthlessness as well as
Sadrist engagement with tribal officials would reduce the
possibility of tribesmen cooperating against JAM. To date,
the PRT has met with the leader of the al-Sawa,d and senior
members of the al-Gharawi and al-Saadi, and plans to meet
with a wide range of Maysan tribal leadership over the coming
month and will report these meetings septel.


6. (S/NF) Comment: Given the provincial government,s
interest in being seen as the legitimate, elected leadership
and representation of the Maysani people, a policy of tribal
engagement involving even the appearance of military training
or donation of equipment in Maysan would endanger recent
political progress made in the province and be unsuccessful
at stopping lethal aid flows. End Comment.
CROCKER