Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07BAGHDAD4162
2007-12-23 13:50:00
SECRET
Embassy Baghdad
Cable title:  

TURKEY/PKK: STOPPING THE CYCLE OF VIOLENCE

Tags:  MOPS PGOV PINS PREL PTER IZ TU 
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VZCZCXRO8764
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #4162/01 3571350
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 231350Z DEC 07
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4981
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY 0459
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 004162 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/23/2017
TAGS: MOPS PGOV PINS PREL PTER IZ TU
SUBJECT: TURKEY/PKK: STOPPING THE CYCLE OF VIOLENCE

Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker. Reasons: 1.4 (b) & (d).

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 004162

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/23/2017
TAGS: MOPS PGOV PINS PREL PTER IZ TU
SUBJECT: TURKEY/PKK: STOPPING THE CYCLE OF VIOLENCE

Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker. Reasons: 1.4 (b) & (d).


1. (S) SUMMARY: Turkish military airstrikes against PKK
targets in the Qandil Mountains December 16 and the
subsequent December 17/18 crossing of Turkish infantry in
pursuit of KGK elements were successful in demonstrating that
PKK terrorism will not be tolerated either by the Turks or
the U.S. However, the scope of the attacks, absence of
adequate notification of the government of Iraq, and
uncertainty in the KRG about the U.S. role have put the GOI
in a difficult position and caused KRG leaders to publicly
show their anger with the U.S. To keep the Iraqis on our side
in the effort to end the PKK's terrorist activities, and to
protect our own equities with the Kurds, we need to focus on
political steps that will bring Turkish and Iraqi, including
KRG officials, into a dialogue on this issue. This becomes
particularly important as Iraq enters a very important period
during which the focus needs to be on legislation rather than
on issues with the Turks and PKK. END SUMMARY.

Turkish Airstrikes: Effects in Iraq
--------------


2. (S) Iraqis took the immediate purpose of the Turkish
airstrikes against PKK targets December 16 and cross-border
movement of infantry December 17/18 to be the long-expected
retaliation for early October PKK ambushes that cost the
lives of Turkish soldiers. The numbers of planes involved,
the attacks continuing for three consecutive days and
targeting of villages which were literally "outside the box"
in the Southern Qandil Mountains conveyed the ability and
willingness of the Turks to carry out attacks when and
wherever they desired. Likewise, it is now clear to all that
the traditional lull in TGS and PKK actions dictated by
winter is no longer a given, a notion re-enforced by the
December 22 airstrikes in the Zap region.


3. (S) Iraqis also took away from the events and public
statements by Turkish officials that intelligence-sharing

with the U.S. played a significant role in the attacks. Mixed
public messages on whether the Turks benefited from
intelligence specific to the airstrikes (which did not, in
fact, happen),when the U.S. was notified and whether
clearing the airspace counts as supporting the operation,
have also left some with the impression that the U.S.
"approved" the attacks.


4. (S) Though early public statements by the PKK and KRG
politicians of civilian casualties appear to be greatly
exaggerated, it is clear that there were some, though how
many remains undetermined. There also have been reports of
destruction of a school building and perhaps some residences,
as well as the evacuation of over 1,000 Kurds from the area
of attack.

Impact in Iraq
--------------


5. (S) The Maliki government, which has up to now been
willing to actively work with us on a program of putting
pressure on the PKK, was put in a delicate position by the
public discussion of U.S. association with the strikes,
reports of civilian casualties and howls of outrage from
members of the COR. Speaking on the eve of Secretary Rice's
arrival here, the PM chose to say as little as he could
politically get away with. He called the death of a civilian
"unacceptable" and publicly announced he was sending a
written protest to the Government of Turkey. Foreign
Minister Zebari told us that he was intentionally trying to
modulate Iraqi reaction, but characterized the Turkish
actions, including the fact that there was no contact with
the GOT, even after the strikes, as definitely "pushing the
envelope."


6. (S) In conversations with the Ambassador directly and
others via his Chief of Staff, KRG President Massoud Barzani
said he regarded the scale and geography of the strikes and
Turkish statements about them as indications of Turkish
intentions that went beyond the limited goal of punishing the
PKK. He was particularly galled that the attacks took place
just a few days after what he considered to be very
constructive talks with visiting TNIO chief Taner. That he
not only chose to boycott the December 18 leadership
gathering in Baghdad on the occasion of the Secretary's
visit but went so far as to announce publicly he was doing
so was a clear indication of the depth of his anger with the
U.S. We understand that KRG PM Nechirvan Barzani, widely
considered to be more practical than his uncle, was
prohibited by Massoud from boarding the plane MNF-I sent to
bring him to Talabani's lunch for the Secretary.


7. (S) We expect that after a cooling off period Massood

BAGHDAD 00004162 002 OF 002


will return to doing business with us, but his reaction
should be taken as a warning that recent events brought us
perilously close to putting our core interests here in
jeopardy. For example, we only recently succeeded, due to
flexibility on the part of the Kurds, in arriving at
agreement to deferring a referendum on the status of Kirkuk,
which, had it been carried out on schedule, would have
risked a dramatic reaction on the part of the city's
now-minority Arab population. Kurdish flexibility will also
be needed if we are to succeed in getting a hydrocarbon law
passed, while Kurdish support is necessary for the passage of
virtually any other of our legislative benchmarks. With the
recent experience of negotiating the Strategic Partnership
Declaration behind us, it is clear we are going to need solid
Kurdish support if we are to be successful.

The Way Forward: Breaking the Cycle of Violence
-------------- --


8. (S) It is clear that a continuing cycle of PKK attacks and
Turkish retaliation is in no one's interest. To avoid getting
trapped in such a cycle, we need to look at ways to get the
Turks talking to the Iraqis directly about how to end PKK
violence. Embassy Ankara has reported on a number of
initiatives we agree should be pursued and the sooner the
better.


9. (S) The proposed visit by Turkish Deputy Chief of Defense
Saygun to Iraq would be a good first step. In addition to
meeting with the MNF-I Commanding General Petraeus, Saygun
should meet with GOI officials, including PM Maliki and MOD
Abdul Qadr. This could be followed by engagement between
officials of the two governments, hopefully with KRG
representatives included on the GOI side. President Talabani
has told us that despite recent events he is still willing to
travel to Ankara, an offer that should be taken up as soon as
feasible. Ultimately, we would hope to get a trilateral
mechanism restarted where more difficult issues, such as the
repatriation of the residents of the Mahmour refugee camp,
could be addressed. In the meantime, it is important to
consider the unintended effects of U.S. support to the Turks
on our ability to achieve political progress in Iraq.
CROCKER