VIOLENCE IN BAGHDAD'S AMEL NEIGHBORHOOD: SUNNI AND

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 000415

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/31/2017
TAGS: PGOV KDEM PHUM IZ PREL
SUBJECT: VIOLENCE IN BAGHDAD'S AMEL NEIGHBORHOOD: SUNNI AND
SHIA PERSPECTIVES

Classified By: POLCOUNS MARGARET SCOBEY FOR REASONS 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary. Sunni residents of the Baghdad area of al
Amel told EmbOffs that Sunnis in their neighborhood
continued be tortured, killed and forcibly displaced by
Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM) militia members. They claimed that the
operations had been so severe that the neighborhood had
lost most of its Sunni residents. In contrast,
conversations with Shia residents of the same neighborhood
complained about terrorist torture and killings
against Shia residents in al Amel, claiming that some
attacks originated from local Sunni mosques. The Shia
contacts
acknowledged that displacement was a problem, but turned
their attention
to the hundreds of Shia who had come into the
neighborhood because they were forced out from other
predominantly Sunni neighborhoods. End Summary.

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A LITTLE ABOUT AL AMEL
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2. (C) Al Amel, located in South-Central Baghdad in the
Rasheed district is considered by some to be a working
class, lower-income area, bordering Sunni-dominant
neighborhoods such Jihad and Yarmouk. Local Neighborhood
Advisory Council (NAC) members estimate the population to
be approximately 175,000. Terrorist or JAM attacks in al
Amel are reported in the local media on a weekly basis, if
not daily. Amel is an example of a story that has become
common in Baghdad over the past year -- a previously mixed
neighborhood that has suffered intensified violence and
displacement following the February 22, 2006 attack on the
Askariyah shrine.

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SUNNIS SEE JAM VIOLENCE, FORCED DISLOCATION
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3. (C) Emboffs spoke February 1 with three Sunni Arab
residents of al Amel at a meeting arranged by a regular
political contact. The three -- a professor and two mid-
level government workers -- said they were average citizens
who had become deeply alarmed and concerned about increased
polarization and forced displacements in their
neighborhood. One actually used the term "ethnic
cleansing" when describing the situation in al Amel. The
three residents pointed to the establishment of a branch of
the Office of the Martyr Sadr (OMS) in al Amel this past
spring as a turning point. The branch office had rapidly
begun to recruit local Shia residents to join the Jaysh al-
Mahdi (JAM) militia and compiled a list of Sunni tribal
sheikhs and other Sunni notables in the area, ostensibly to
target them. One of the Sunni interlocutors claimed that
thereafter, JAM had systematically targeted certain pockets
of
the Amel area, starting with sections with only a small
number of Sunni residents and then moving to sections with
higher Sunni concentrations. They said that Sunni
residents were either attacked or kidnapped and taken to a
former power plant compound to be tortured and killed. The
Sunni professor claimed he knew this because of his
continued association with long-time Shia residents, who
continued to covertly protect some of their Sunni
neighbors. He had also heard this report from other Sunnis
living in the area. The three claimed that the violence
had led Sunni residents to leave the area, such that al
Amel -- which was previously evenly split between Sunni and
Shia residents -- was now only ten percent Sunni.

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SHIA CONCERNED ABOUT SUNNI TERRORISM
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4. (C) Separate conversations with Shia residents of al
Amel portrayed a different picture. During a
December 3, 2006 conversation with Emboffs, Shia residents
-- including Neighborhood Advisory Council (NAC) members
complained that
that the neighborhood was being torn apart by Sunni-
sponsored terrorism and insurgent activity. These Shia
contacts claimed that that Sunni terrorist groups were
using local Sunni mosques as headquarters for their
operations, including the the Ahra Mubashrrah mosque
(mahallah 809). They said that the mosque had become a
bastion for sniper activity, torture of Shia residents, and
planning operations. They described various events which
they linked to the insurgents, including the killing and
beheading of a young Shia boy over the summer, and numerous
bomb attacks on residents' activities, including a

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children's soccer game.


5. (C) The council members brushed aside any mention of
JAM, admitting that there was indeed an OMS office for the
area, but declining to elaborate on JAM activities. One
Shia NAC member instead complained about several
reconciliation attempts he had tried to organize between
Sunni/Shia residents, which he said inevitably would be
targeted by terrorists. When asked about displacement, the
NAC member noted that the biggest displacement issue that al
Amel was facing was the influx of Shia residents who were
being forced out of their homes from other areas of Baghdad
such as Saydia, Jihad, and Khadra. He said that the NAC had
registered over 700 incoming displaced families since
February.

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COMMENT
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6. (C) In many conversations we have had with Baghdad
inhabitants, we have found that Sunni residents - almost
universally - focus on JAM violence (sometimes in collusion
with Iraqi Security Forces) while Shia residents focus on
Sunni terrorist/insurgent attacks. Despite these
almost formulaic one-sided perspectives, which to some may
indicate an irreconcilable schism, there are signs of hope.
For example, one Sunni resident was clear in pointing out
that long-time neighbors, whether Shia or Sunni, still
maintained strong, albeit covert bonds. He said that they
were not willing to turn their backs on their Sunni
neighbors, many times discretely warning neighbors when
they knew a JAM attack to be coming -- though by doing so
they were putting themselves at risk. He asserted that
the only way to stop JAM was to get rid of the leadership,
saying that otherwise there was no other way to entice JAM
members away from the organization. Many were too "afraid"
to leave the organization for fear of being killed because
of the secrets they carried about JAM. Alternatively, it
is clear based on conversations with other Baghdad
residents that many Shia view the JAM as a viable means of
protection against terrorist attacks.
KHALILZAD