BRITISH FS SAYS HMG AND USG THINKING ON IRAQ

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/19/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV UK IZ
SUBJECT: BRITISH FS SAYS HMG AND USG THINKING ON IRAQ
CONSISTENT; COORDINATION KEY GOING FORWARD


Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (S) SUMMARY: In a December 17 meeting, British Foreign
Secretary David Miliband, (FS) accompanied by UK Ambassador

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to Iraq Christopher Prentice and MNF-I Deputy CG William
Rollo, told Ambassador Crocker and MNF-I CG Petraeus that,
post-Basrah PIC, Her Majesty's Government (HMG) wanted to
work with the US on a broader policy on Iraq within a
regional context and wished to ensure progress continues
given the current &fair winds" in Basrah and in the rest of
Iraq. Miliband added that USG and HMG thinking on Iraq were
"consistent" and that joint planning of both countries'
future commitments in Iraq was crucial. The CG described an
improving security environment, but cautioned that Al Qaeda
Iraq (AQI) remained "dangerous" and had "regenerative powers"
the Coalition should not underestimate. Ambassador Crocker
told the Foreign Secretary that the Maliki government was
increasingly "under scrutiny" from the Iraqi political class.
UK Ambassador Prentice asked AMB Crocker if he thought the
floodwaters of Iraqi politics were ready to wash Maliki away.
Ambassador Crocker replied that Sistani,s view would likely
prevail and that ISCI may not be as ready to dump Maliki as
they claim. Foreign Minister Miliband assured Ambassador
Crocker and the CG that despite a more complex legal
environment, HMG's planning for Iraq runs into 2009. END
SUMMARY.

CURRENT POLITICAL CLIMATE


2. (S) Both Ambassador Crocker and the CG pointed out that
Prime Minister Maliki realizes his government is "under
scrutiny" and the CG volunteered that earlier in the day,
MNF-I had flown KRG Prime Minister Nechirvan Barzani to Najaf
to meet with Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani. Both the
Ambassador and the CG confided to FS that the Iraqi political
class is talking "government change." This, they said, may
help explain why they were finding the Prime Minister more
accommodating to their concerns and less responsive to
Iranian and Sadrist pressure. Ambassador Prentice asked if
the PM could be pushed out even without a US signal.
Ambassador Crocker said he did not think the Iraqis were
there because of the emphasis Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani has
always placed on Shi'a solidarity. Ambassador Crocker also
estimated that ISCI might not be as willing to unseat Maliki
as Vice President Adel Abdel Mehdi claims. The CG noted that
President Talabani's thinking about the Prime Minister had
noticeably "hardened" but that the Kurds, overall, were "more
pliant," partly because of the Turkish issue.

BASRAH


3. (S) The CG commented that the Basrah PIC "visuals" were
good, and commended UK MG Binns, the MND-SE commander, for
the "fantastic" job he has done in Basrah. The Foreign
Secretary mentioned he had not planned his Iraq visit around

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the Basrah PIC and emphasized that HMG wanted a "whole Iraq"
policy that puts efforts into Iraq in regional strategic
context. HMG, he continued, wished to ensure continued
progress given the &fair winds" post-PIC in Basrah and
elsewhere in Iraq. General Petraeus commented that the key
to this was greater coordination between Baghdad and other
parts of Iraq. He advised the FS to "get some bright folks
to connect what's going on in Basrah to what's going on in
Baghdad." According to the CG, Basrah offers "enormous
economic opportunity": and there are already a number of
"reasonable" local development opportunities underway. The
province needs to be linked with the central government for
big projects to get underway. Better coordination with the
central government might also help with the provinces
"absorption problems" for the several billion dollars (much
of it from Japan) in development aid already earmarked for
Basrah.


4. (S) Ambassador Crocker noted that the PIC was a "driving
event" that allowed Prime Minister Maliki and Basrah Governor
Wa'eli to get back on "speaking terms." He hoped the
improving personal relationship would permit the province to
strengthen ties with the central government. Both the
Ambassador and the CG gave guarded responses to Miliband's
question about private sector prospects in the Basrah. CG
regretted the continued lack of a legal, regulatory and
security environment strong enough to encourage private
sector investment. Private investment, he concluded, was
"not coming soon to a theater near you" for Basrah until
regulatory framework laws can be put in place and private
confidence in the security situation improves. FS noted "a
lot of complacency" from private sector actors in Iraq, but
Ambassador Crocker cautioned against underestimating security
concerns, pointing out that, despite our pressure on the GOI
to take effective action, JAM remained in control of the port
of Umm Qasr. The CG added that the Prime Minister delivered
to Governor Wa'eli an ultimatum to expunge within two months

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perceptions of Wa'eli's corruption.

SECURITY


5. (S) The CG provided a detailed briefing on current MNF-I
anti-AQI efforts including the killing of 35 AQI operatives
in the Hamrin mountains the previous week. The CG noted that
the Tigris river valley continued to provide AQI "some
refuge" and that the northern city of Mosul, in Ninevah
province, remained "a concern." The CG warned that AQI
remained dangerous and cautioned the FS against
underestimating AQI's regenerative capability. The CG
described Syria as "more on side" but tempered this estimate
by noting it was completely "out of self interest." Concern
in Syria, he said, focused on possible International Criminal
Court action against SARG members in the wake of the Hariri
assassination. This, he concluded, gives the US and the UK
leverage with the SARG and the two countries "absolutely had
to take advantage" of the SARG increasing "lean" towards the
West and away from Iran. The CG mentioned that regional
source countries also were being more pro-active in the fight
against AQI.

SECTARIAN VIOLENCE


6. (S) The CG underscored that IED attacks were at their
lowest levels since spring of 2005 and that Coalition forces
were finding significantly more devices in the field and in
caches because of the MNF-I surge, Concerned Local Citizens
(CLC) programs, and a dramatic (160,000) increase in IA and
IP numbers since January 2007. To FS's Miliband's inquiry
about attacks on CLCs, CG pointed out that there was a "fair
amount" of violence against them and that they were targets
for AQI because of their effectiveness. CG described CLCs as
part of an anti-insurgent strategy that includes a "wide
variety of tools, including finances, command and control and
public opinion." He emphasized that kinetic operations were
not enough and Miliband pointed out that HMG were also very
interested in the financial and ideas aspect of
counter-insurgency/counter terror warfare. The Foreign
Secretary added that HMG were also "very interested in

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de-radicalization" and CG noted that MNF-I Maj. General
Stone was already doing important work in that area, which
the CG agreed was a key to winning the fight against AQI.

IRAN


7. (S) The CG noted a "huge Iranian influence" in Iraq but
told FS he thinks Iran is "leaning" on Moqtadah Al Sadr,
whose reputation was tarnished by this summer's violence in
Karbala. The Iranians, assisted by Lebanese Hezbollah
elements, continue with militia training inside Iran and the
CG said at the next (anticipated) round of trilateral talks,
he would provide US representatives with intel gleaned from
captured militia fighters which they could show the Iranians.
The CG stated that Iran would raise US support to the PJAK,
but assured FS that the organization receives no USG support
whatsoever.

TURKISH RAID


8. (S) The CG told Ambassador Wilson in Turkey we had "very
serious concerns" about the way the Turks conducted the CBO,
adding the Turks "flew way outside" cleared airspace and came
near the Iranian border, prompting the Iranians to scramble
jets to meet them. Wilson's reply was that the Turkish
military had "to do something now." Petraeus told the FS
that our message to the GOI should be "if you don't like this
kind of operation, do something about the PKK problem." The
Foreign Secretary, who was traveling to Erbil the next day,
asked what his message to the KRG should be. Ambassador
Crocker said it was imperative the "KRG stay the course they
are on, and that they not use these air strikes as a pretext
to back away" from the positive steps they have taken so far
against the PKK. The CG added that FS could tell the KRG
that we "had pushed back" over the raid which we did not
approve ahead of time. He noted that in private, GOI
contacts were not inclined to over-react to the event.

WAY FORWARD


9. (S) To the Foreign Secretary's direct question, the CG
emphasized that MNF-I would continue to reduce forces, and
that his drawdown planning generally ran in six month
increments. FS wondered if security gains had reduced
political pressure in Washington for drastic action and the
CG confirmed that they had. Foreign Secretary Miliband
continued that USG and HMG thinking on the way forward was
"consistent" and that joint planning for future commitments
was crucial. The question, he went on, was "will we want to
say we have wasted 4-5 years, or have we done something for
Iraqis." Ambassador Crocker said SPD was a clear signal our

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focus went beyond 2008, even though current legal authorities
expired at the end of 2008. FS noted that the lack of a
Security Council mandate "complicated the legal terrain" for
HMG and both Ambassador Crocker and FS agreed they would have
liked to continue with a UNSCR framework beyond 2008, but
political realities made that impossible. FS assured the
Ambassador and the CG that HMG's Iraq planning ran into 2009.
CROCKER