Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07BAGHDAD4142
2007-12-20 13:42:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Baghdad
Cable title:  

PROVINCIAL ELECTIONS: SHIFTING GOI PRIORITIES

Tags:  PGOV PREL KDEM IZ 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO6707
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #4142/01 3541342
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 201342Z DEC 07
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4959
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 004142 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/19/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM IZ
SUBJECT: PROVINCIAL ELECTIONS: SHIFTING GOI PRIORITIES

REF: A. BAGHDAD 3885

B. BAGHDAD 3840

C. BAGHDAD 3540

Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker for Reasons 1.4(b) and (d).

-------------------
Summary and Comment
-------------------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 004142

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/19/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM IZ
SUBJECT: PROVINCIAL ELECTIONS: SHIFTING GOI PRIORITIES

REF: A. BAGHDAD 3885

B. BAGHDAD 3840

C. BAGHDAD 3540

Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker for Reasons 1.4(b) and (d).

--------------
Summary and Comment
--------------


1. (C) Summary/Comment: Draft legislation on provincial
elections has stalled in the Prime Minister,s office, in
part because Iraq,s dominant national political parties
assess that new elections would work to their disadvantage.
Moreover, Iraqi politicians now say they must finish the
provincial powers law before turning to the elections law.
Notwithstanding the obvious political motivations at work,
this proposed sequencing makes some sense -- ironing out
provincial powers will provide a sounder basis for the next
elections at the provincial level. In any event, convincing
the Iraqis to abandon this course would likely require more
political capital than it is worth. Meanwhile, with top-down
political reconciliation not in prospect for the moment,
improving day-to-day life for the average citizen takes a
higher priority in the minds of Iraq's leaders than benchmark
legislation. Likewise, the Embassy is increasingly focused
on improving GOI services, developing ministerial capacity,
and reducing corruption/militia influence. While the
benchmarks remain important milestones, and the prospect of
passage of a Budget Law and the Accountability and Justice
Law by late January will send much needed signals of a
leadership engaged in reconciliation, the provincial powers
and provincial elections legislative benchmarks will not
necessarily ensure reconciliation in and of themselves )-
especially if they come at the cost of confrontation with our
Iraqi political allies. In short, we are adapting our
priorities to match the political reality and the need to
produce immediate, tangible improvements in daily life for
the average Iraqi. End Summary/Comment.

--------------
Why the Election Law is MIA
--------------


2. (C) In June 2007, in response to Embassy pressure, the
Prime Minister,s Office (PMO) agreed to draft an elections
law. On July 1 the Prime Minister issued a press release

stating that "we are determined on performing the provinces
(sic) councils election this very year, we should not give up
because of challenges." Five months later, the PMO has yet
to complete a first draft of the elections law, and in fact
has made no progress since September.


3. (C) Why this inertia? Because neither the Dawa party
(Shia) nor its principal allies in the United Iraqi Alliance
are likely to benefit from a fresh round of provincial
elections. Readers will recall that the Sunnis and Sadrists
boycotted the January 2005 provincial elections. As a
result, the following five provinces had a turnout below 60%
in January 2005: Anbar 2%, Ninewa 17%, Salah ad-Din 29%,
Diyala 33%, and Baghdad 51%. All remaining provinces had
turnouts in excess of 60%, and the three Kurdistan Regional
Government (KRG) provinces had voter turnout in excess of 80%.


4. (C) When provincial elections do actually occur, the
disenfranchisement of the Sunnis and Sadrists stands to be
redressed, to dramatic effect. In Baghdad, the Office of
Muqtada Sadr (OMS) will go from zero representation on the
Baghdad provincial council to a near majority. In the other
Southern provinces, OMS will likely gain seats at the expense
of Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI - Shia) control.
The Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP - Sunni) may well lose control
of Anbar to local Sunni groups. Similarly, the Patriotic
Union of Kurdistan (PUK - Kurdish) and the Kurdistan
Democratic Party (KDP - Kurdish) will almost certainly lose
their disproportionate influence on the Ninewa, Diyala,
Salahaddin and perhaps Kirkuk provincial councils.


5. (C) Accordingly, most of the dominant national parties,
including the IIP, ISCI, the PUK, and the KDP, are not
rushing to facilitate provincial elections. In the Council
of Representatives (CoR) ISCI has 30 seats, the IIP has 26,
the KDP has 23, the PUK has 22, and the miscellaneous Kurdish
parties hold 8; out of 275 seats in the CoR, blocs totaling
109 seats stand to lose local power if provincial elections
are held. This goes some way in explaining the Prime
Minister's and the CoR's general reluctance to draft and push
an elections law, despite the occasional public pronouncement
in favor of provincial elections.

--------------
Procrastinating on Elections
--------------

BAGHDAD 00004142 002 OF 002




6. (C) This reluctance to facilitate elections is manifesting
itself in the very ugly fight in the CoR to appoint the
twenty Governorate Electoral Officers (GEOs) (Note: Baghdad
has two, each remaining province has one, and the KRG region
has one. End Note). The Independent High Electoral
Commission (IHEC) law requires that the CoR nominate a slate
of five candidates for each provincial GEO, after which the
IHEC selects one of the five. Although the CoR nominated and
the IHEC selected, on November 18, twelve of the twenty GEOs,
the UN-led International Electoral Advisory Team deemed the
process fraught with political and sectarian interference.


7. (C) In fact, the CoR has been deadlocked for the past six
months on the appointment of the remaining eight GEOs. It
should come as no surprise that the deadlocks exist over the
provinces in which the Kurds and ISCI have the most to lose:
Baghdad (2 GEOs),Basra, Najaf, Karbala, Wasit, Ninewa, and
Diyala. Their refusal to compromise over these GEOs
foreshadows additional gridlock on the choice of electoral
system, treatment of internally displaced persons, and dates
for elections - all required components of an elections law.

--------------
A Self-Serving Sequencing
--------------


8. (C) Lack of enthusiasm for elections is also discernable
in the GOI's and CoR's preference to finalize the provincial
powers law before holding provincial elections.
Interlocutors argue that this is eminently logical, since
this law will clearly define the powers and authorities of
the provincial councils who are to be elected. (Note: The
GOI could technically pass an elections law first and then
debate and pass the provincial powers law during the six
month timeline required to prepare for the elections. As
long as the provincial powers law is passed before elections
day, either approach would be acceptable. End
Note.)


9. (C) Supporting the GOI,s proposed sequencing (i.e.,
provincial powers first, then the elections law) makes sense,
if only because progress on most other pieces of benchmark
legislation appears even more remote. The Constitutional
Review process is stalled over: first, Kurdish objections to
the lack of an Article 140 process; and second, the
Sunni/Shia debate over federalism. In addition, top-down
reconciliation has stalled and the 3 1 process is dead in the
water. The provincial powers law is the one piece of
legislation that everyone seems willing to negotiate.

--------------
De-emphasizing Benchmarks
--------------


10. (C) Although national level reconciliation has stalled,
the GOI is making progress where it matters most to the
average citizen: in the day-to-day neighborhood security and
delivery of services (reftel B). A focus on services has
already begun to provide tribal leaders a powerful role in
their communities by allowing them to identify local service
priorities (reftel C). Proof of progress is reflected in the
fact that families displaced from their homes in Baghdad have
begun returning, according to Post and PRT contacts,
officials at the Ministry of Displacement and Migration, and
local press reports (reftel A). While returns are taking
place throughout Iraq, the trend appears more prevalent in
Baghdad than in other provinces, and may continue to
accelerate should security gains consolidate.


11. (C) Comment: Prioritizing benchmark legislation higher
than the Iraqis themselves do could lead to unconstructive
outcomes. If we press for an elections law over Iraqi
objections or their preference to focus on provincial powers
first, we could obtain a poorly drafted elections law that
defeats the beneficial effect we are trying to achieve. For
example, we may lose our ability to shape a more responsive
electoral system or prevent the disenfranchisement of
internally displaced persons. Our experience with
de-Ba'athification reform serves as a cautionary reminder of
how too much pressure on the fragile GOI legislative capacity
can generate multiple, competing, low-quality draft laws that
do not fully achieve the original desired outcome of
reconciliation. While deficiencies in the de-Ba'athification
law can be compensated for via adroit implementation,
weaknesses in the framework for provincial powers and
provincial elections laws could, over time, actually inflame
rather than dampen ethnic and sectarian violence. Getting
these difficult issues "right" means allowing Iraqis the
space to proceed at their own pace towards common
understandings of the underlying issues without outside
pressure. End Comment.
CROCKER