BRITISH AMBASSADOR TO IRAN: IRAN SEES U.S. AS ITS

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 BAGHDAD 003903

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/29/2027
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER IR IQ
SUBJECT: BRITISH AMBASSADOR TO IRAN: IRAN SEES U.S. AS ITS
BIGGEST STRATEGIC ISSUE

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Classified By: by CDA Patricia Butenis for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

1.(S) Summary: In the course of several meetings with U.S.
officials, UK Ambassador to Iran Geoffrey Adams laid out the
following perspectives of the current state-of-play in Iran
and Iran,s views of the situation in Iraq in advance of the
next rounds of trilateral talks. He said Iran,s
relationship with the U.S. is the biggest strategic issue
facing the country, and he believes views are divided how to
deal with the U.S. While reactions he heard to the previous
trilateral discussions on Iraq were lukewarm, he believed
they had triggered an internal debate over Iran,s strategic
interests. That said, he thought there were pockets inside
the Iranian government lobbying to shut down the talks. He
maintained that Iran,s strategies on all issues ) Iraq,
nuclear, the U.S., etc, -- were intertwined, and Iran sees
Iraq, in part, as a tool in its broader strategy to
counteract the U.S. threat. Iran,s top priority in relation
to Iraq was that its territory not be used to launch an
attack against Iran -- by the Iraqi government, the U.S., or
any terrorist groups. He underscored the importance of the
Iran-Iraq war in shaping the psyche of those currently in
office, adding that mistrust and misunderstanding of the West
are rampant. He added that Iran,s obsession with the West
at times blinds it to its other interests, which is why the
Iranians will align itself with otherwise anathema groups or
promote instability in Iraq when it appears contrary to their
national interests. Adams thought that if Iran had had a
hand in bringing down violence in recent months in Iraq, it
may have been because intra-Shia killing crossed a redline
and prompted push-back from clerics in Qom. To change
Iranian behavior, Adams said, &unanimity and uncertainty8
were the international community,s best tools. While
Iranian officials will be on a very short leash in talks with
the U.S. and will be required to stick to talking points, the
questions and points the U.S. raises will likely spark useful
internal debate over their interests. The Iranian side will
return to the next meeting with at least some responses.
While the system of consensus-seeking in Iran makes changing
course slow and difficult, Iranian decision-makers will
reassess policy if it feels it advances their interests. End
summary

2.(S) British Ambassador to Iran Geoffrey Adams described his
views of Iran,s mindset towards Iraq and the U.S. in a
series of meetings with U.S. officials and military officers
in Baghdad November 23-24. The following is an amalgamation
of three meetings held in advance of the fourth round of
Iran-Iraq-US trilateral discussions on Iraq. Adams, who has
served in Tehran for almost two years, also described the
general political situation inside the country. British
Ambassador to Kuwait Stuart Laing also joined the
discussions, as well as British First Secretary in Tehran
Alex Pinfield. Among those present on the US side at various
briefings were Ambassador Crocker, MNF-I Commanding General
Petraeus, Pol-Mil Minister Counselor Ambassador Marcie Ries,
MG Kevin Bergner, Special Advisor David Pearce, and IRPO
Director Jillian Burns. The British ambassador's
recommendations on negotiating strategy with the Iranians to
be reported septel.

His Take on Iranian Strategy
--------------

3.(S) Iran,s relationship with the U.S. is the biggest
strategic issue facing it, according to Adams, and he
believes that power circles in Iran remain divided on the
issue of how to deal with the U.S. Adams suggested that the
Supreme Leader may have approved talks regarding Iraq as a
conciliatory gesture towards those who advocate opening a
relationship with the U.S., and perhaps also to actually test
the waters. However, he added, there is a &significant
lobby8 within the policymaking apparatus that opposes these
talks. The feedback in Tehran that Adams heard of the
previous rounds of trilateral talks on Iraq was
disappointment, with Iranians claiming the meetings contained
no substance. Nonetheless, he thought the talks had
triggered a useful internal debate on Iran,s interests.

4.(S) Adams claimed that from the U.S., Iran wants respect --
&at least on par with Turkey8 as one interlocutor put it to
him. In light of this, Adams believed that the largest
carrots the U.S. holds in its dealings with Iran remain
security guarantees and acceptance of the legitimacy of the
Islamic government.


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5.(S) At the same time, Adams said, Iran sees Iraq as a tool
in its broader strategy to counteract the U.S. threat, by
seeking to exploit perceived U.S. vulnerability there. Adam
noted that Iran calibrates its tactics to protect its
interests without compromising its broader strategic goals.
(Comment: Although it is often said that the U.S. did Iran a
favor by ridding it of the Taliban and Saddam Hussein, Iran
actually views the U.S. as a bigger threat than either of
these. Iran is likely prioritizing its threats. It is
therefore willing to deal with groups it considers enemies in
order to counter its perceived most significant threat, the
U.S., with the expectation that it can handle the lesser
threats down the road. End Comment.)

6.(S) When asked if they do not see that if we fail in Iraq
they also fail, Adams replied that Iran believes it is more
important to avoid a situation where the U.S. withdraws from
Iraq with a plausible claim of success, believing that would
be perceived as an Iranian failure. He also said that
despite Iran,s public statements demanding a withdrawal of
foreign forces from Iraq, Iran fears a quick withdrawal could
lead to chaos. He added that does not believe the Iranians
took seriously their Istanbul proposal on Iraq. Adams said
that Iran,s obsession with the West ) particularly the U.S.
and the UK ) can blind Iran to its own interests. He
recommended that in the trilateral talks, the U.S. try to
stir internal debate by asking whether it truly serves
Iran,s strategic goals to link itself with Al Qaida,
Taliban, and Arab Shia extremists that have given it trouble
in the past.

7.(S) Because of this linkage between Iraq and other
strategic interests, Adams noted the possibility that the
nuclear issue, as well as the upcoming parliamentary
elections in Iran, could negatively impact the course of the
Iraq trilateral talks. (Note: Adams did not think that the
replacement of Ali Larijani by Saeed Jalili as nuclear
negotiator was a good sign. He said in his conversations
with Jalili, who served in the IRGC and was wounded during
the Iran-Iraq war, Jalili would lecture on the theological
and ideological basis of foreign policy in a very academic,
but pointless, manner. End Note.)

Distrust, Misreading of the West
--------------

8.(S) Adams underscored the ongoing impact on the Iranian
psyche of the Iran-Iraq war. Those in power today in Iran
think they are operating from lessons learned from the war.
In Iran,s view, after the Iranian people succeeded in
casting off their dictator, the world -- namely the West --
tried to strangle their revolution by supporting Saddam
Hussein against them and imposing sanctions. Iran,s success
came from relying on traditional Shia virtues, such as
sacrifice. Because of this experience, Iranians concluded
they could not trust the West and have to rely on themselves.

9.(S) Adams added Iranians are prone to miscalculate and
misread the U.S., largely because of their lack of
understanding and exposure to the country. Asked how they
are currently misreading the U.S., he said that the Iranians
are overestimating the political difficulties facing the Bush
Administration. Some are convinced, he said, that a military
attack is not possible because President Bush is too weak.
Others within power circles are arguing internally that this
may not be the case, and Iran must be careful to avoid
missteps. A third group believes that attack is inevitable,
no matter what the U.S. says about seeking a diplomatic
solution, because they believe that regime change remains the
primary U.S. objective.

Dealing with Iran
--------------

10.(S) To change Iranian behavior, Adams said that the
international community,s best tools were &unanimity and
uncertainty.8 He thought that the unanimity of the first
two UNSCRs regarding Iranian nuclear activity had a
tremendous impact. On the other hand, the U.S. Executive
Order designations of the IRGC and the IRGC Qods Force made
less of an impact because they were unilateral and had been
previewed in the press for some time. He underscored that
Iranians want predictability in their strategic environment.
To keep them off-balance and reassessing their interests, it
is sometimes useful to leave them unclear on consequences.
For instance, when queried about the possibility of US

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military action due to Iran,s nuclear program, his standard
response is that Iran,s refusal to comply with UNSCRs are
putting it in &the danger zone,8 and he doesn't know what
will happen. Adams recommended that in talks with Iran, the
U.S. be firm and steady, determined, with hand extended. He
said that based on his experience, the negotiating team would
be on a very short leash and would not have authorization to
go beyond talking points, but that they would take our
questions and points back to Tehran, where they would
stimulate new discussion of Iran,s interests.

11.(S) Adams said that the Iranian system of
consensus-seeking makes a bold policy change difficult to
achieve. That said, when the Iranians decide that something
is in their interest, they will change course. He added that
Iranians can justify any means to the desired end, and they
have a &high threshold on embarrassment.8 (Comment: This
means they can both justify a negative action, as well as
find a way to do a complete about-face on an issue. End
Comment)

12.(S) He also said Iranians try to convey messages in
various subtexts and assume we are doing the same. At the
same time, because much of their rhetoric is only for
propaganda purposes, they assume this is true for other
countries as well, meaning they discount much of what other
countries say. For instance, Adams said he believed that
Iran no longer has as its goal exporting the revolution,
saying that this line of rhetoric now only serves propaganda
goals. Additionally, he said, Iran probably intended its
proposal on Iraq put forward at the Istanbul Conference
merely as a means to &muddy the waters.8

Strategic Goals in Iraq
--------------

13.(S) Adams described in the course of several meetings that
in his view, Iran,s first priority in Iraq is to prevent any
future threats from Iraqi soil -- from the Iraqi government,
the U.S., or terrorist groups. While Iran sees it in its
strategic interest to maintain a degree of instability in
Iraq, it does not want a precipitous withdrawal of foreign
forces, fearing a complete meltdown and perhaps the return to
power of Baathists. It also uses the U.S. presence next door
as a lever, as well as a scapegoat on which to blame Iraqi
violence in its propaganda. Iran also wants a politically
subservient Basra and access to religious sites. Adams said.
Among its tactics to advance these strategic interests were
providing support for certain groups, keeping up pressure for
the dismantling of the MEK, and inflicting damage to
Coalition Forces.

14.(S) The MEK holds a mythic image in Iran, Adams said, not
necessarily in line with its current capacities. The Iranian
government and the people remember the spectacular attacks
the group launched after it was ousted from the ranks of the
new revolutionary government. Among those injured by MEK was
Supreme Leader Khamenei. Adams noted that he had not heard
of any negative repercussions to former MEK members who have
returned to Iran. He stressed that the act of &recanting8
is very important in Iran. He added that the Iranians made a
big show of introducing some former MEK members to the recent
delegation of British MPs, in an attempt to counter-balance
pro-MEK sentiment in the British Parliament.

15.(S) As opposed to MEK, Adams said, he hears very little
about Iranian concerns regarding PJAK. Although he said PJAK
is a very sensitive issue, he sees no real danger of Kurdish
independence in Iran.

16.(S) Adams believes that the IRGC -- probably IRGC-Qods
Force leader Soleimani -- leads Iraq policy, with instruction
from the Supreme Leader. He is not sure of other influences
on Iraq policy. President Ahmadinejad and others from his
administration likely seek to influence the policy. The
Supreme National Security Council serves in general as the
policy clearinghouse, but he did not know if the SNSC had
taken up the Iraq issue recently. MOIS likely also plays a
role.

17.(S) Adams did not think that Iran would expect thanks for
the recent decline in violence in Iraq as it has not sought
credit. In public comments, Iran has credited the Iraqi
government, while continuing to blame the presence of foreign
troops as the cause of violence. In Adams,s view, Iran
likely calibrated its support of Shia groups in recent months

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because its strategic interests were crossed, fearing an
approaching meltdown in Karbala and Najaf. Intra-Shia
killing likely crossed redlines and generated push-back from
the clerics in Qom.

Public Sphere
--------------

18.(S) Adams said there was very little detailed information
in the Iranian press on the ongoing situation in Iraq.
Furthermore, while the IRGC as a whole plays a very prominent
role in Iran, there is very little knowledge by the general
public of the Qods Force or its activities outside the
country. The government has not sought to create national
consensus behind its involvement in Iraq and publicly denies
any interference, taking a very different tack to its
position on the nuclear issue in which it seeks public
support. Adams agreed that the result of this secrecy could
be greater room for maneuverability on the Iranian part,
should it decide to change course.

19.(S) Asked about public perceptions regarding Iraqis, Adams
said he had expected to find enmity toward the former enemy
but felt that actually, Iranians distinguish between Saddam
Hussein and the Iraqi people. He said the permeability
between the two countries, in terms of kinship, trans-border
tribes, as well as travels of pilgrims, helped forge ties
between the two peoples. On the other hand, he said,
businessmen with whom he talks never mention much interest in
trade with Iraq. Their focus is usually on other countries
such as Turkey, Kazakhstan, etc. That said, it was clear
there was a substantial black and gray market with Iraq, much
of it controlled by the IRGC.

Other issues
--------------

20.(S) Adams said the Majles elections will be an important
barometer of Ahmadinejad,s popularity and could mark the
beginning of his decline. Economic problems are hurting the
president,s popularity. In addition, urban Iranians with
access to internet and satellite TV are very aware of the
global reaction to Iran,s nuclear policy and are worried
about the threat of war. Those Iranians without outside
access tend to believe the government statements that the
U.S. will not attack, he said.

21.(S) Adams said there is some evidence (not described) that
Ahmadinejad was gunning for Foreign Minister Mottaki, who
Adams described as a loose cannon. Adams confirmed the press
report that Deputy Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi has been
named ambassador to Japan, which Adams saw it as an attempt
to sideline elements in the Foreign Ministry who were not
clearly aligned with the president. He said when he asked
Araghchi about the assignment, Araghchi look none too pleased.

22.(S) Adams also noted that Iran sees Saudi Arabia as a
long-term threat to manage, because of its economic power,
its religious credentials, and its closer relationship with
the West.

His Working Environment in Tehran
--------------

23.(S) Adams noted that working as a Western diplomat in
Tehran is somewhat similar to serving behind the Iron Curtain
during the Cold War: cold, hostile relations with the
government, with restrictions on operations, contrasted with
friendly relations with the people. Diplomats can travel
outside Tehran, but sometimes the Iranian government will
prevent trips, such as a recent one in which they intended to
visit reform-minded clerics in Qom.

24.(S) Adams said that the British have no choice but to deal
with the stereotype they have in Iran as all-knowing and
manipulative. The upside is that it puts the UK in a
position of strength because Iranians believe that the
British are important. They also assume that the British and
the U.S. coordinate on all positions. (Comment: this feeds
the conspiracy theory in Iran that the British work &behind
the curtain8 to keep the U.S. out of Iran, out of concern
they would lose relevance. End comment)
BUTENIS