Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07BAGHDAD3776
2007-11-16 20:35:00
SECRET
Embassy Baghdad
Cable title:  

NSA RUBAIE RESISTS BASRA'S GOVERNOR SIGNING PIC MOU

Tags:  PGOV PREL MOPS MARR IZ UK AS 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO8768
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #3776 3202035
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 162035Z NOV 07
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4396
INFO RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL IMMEDIATE
RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
S E C R E T BAGHDAD 003776 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/01/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL MOPS MARR IZ UK AS
SUBJECT: NSA RUBAIE RESISTS BASRA'S GOVERNOR SIGNING PIC MOU

Classified By: Pol-Mil Minister-Counselor Marcie B. Ries for reasons
S E C R E T BAGHDAD 003776

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/01/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL MOPS MARR IZ UK AS
SUBJECT: NSA RUBAIE RESISTS BASRA'S GOVERNOR SIGNING PIC MOU

Classified By: Pol-Mil Minister-Counselor Marcie B. Ries for reasons 1.
4 (a),(b) and (d)


1. (S REL UK AS) MNF-I Deputy CG LTG Rollo (UK) and
Political-Military Minister-Counselor (PMMC) Ambassador
Marcie Ries met November 14 with National Security Advisor
(NSA) Muwaffaq Rubaie to discuss the modalities of Provincial
Iraqi Control (PIC) for Basra. Rubaie,s opening position was
that the GOI did not recognize Mohammed Waeli as the governor
of Basra, and was not happy that the U.S. and the UK were
dealing with him. The security file for Basra would be
passed directly from the PM to Iraqi Army General Mohan with
the PM providing the civilian authority. This state of
affairs could continue until provincial elections. Mohan,
and his Iraqi Police counterpart MG Jallil, had been further
extended in their posts, he added.


2. (S REL UK AS) PMMC and LTG Rollo pressed the US/UK view
that the principle of handing over provincial control to a
duly elected civilian was important. There was no extant
legal challenge to Waeli - he was therefore the governor.
The political parties in Basra, including ISCI, had accepted
Waeli and were prepared to work with him. The outcome of the
court case leaving Waeli in office had given the GOI an
opportunity to move forward on PIC. The outcome we wanted in
Basra was a good PIC and a political arrangement in Basra
that would allow further local political and economic
progress. Alternatives that did not provide this were
unsatisfactory for everyone, nor did we want a broken
administration in the province until provincial elections.


3. (S REL UK AS) Rubaie, who did not appear particularly
well-briefed, initially responded that one alternative would
be to delay PIC until provincial elections. He later said,
however, that if the Provincial Council voted by a majority
to retain Waeli, the PM might accept it, and that there might
be other options (though none of these are without difficulty
for us). He agreed to consult his own lawyers and to talk to
the PM in preparation for a further meeting at the end of
next week. (Note: Rubaie's attorneys had supported the
option of the governor of Basra signing the PIC MOU earlier
that day in a meeting of the Joint Committee to Transfer
Security Responsibility (JCTSR). End note.)


4. (S REL UK AS) UK Ambassador Christopher Prentice noted
that other avenues to pursue this with the PM also exist. He
understands that Vice President Adl Abd al-Mahdi has
indicated that he would be willing to speak to PM Maliki to
encourage him to work with Waeli.


5. (S REL UK AS) Meanwhile further work continues to
establish the exact legal position. After the meeting,
Prentice went to see the Chief Justice on another matter.
The Chief Justice told Prentice that the Chief Justice was
due to review the issue of whether the decision to replace
Waeli was legal. The Chief Justice said that he expected to
hear the case in two weeks.
CROCKER