MALIKI ON DIPLOMACY WITH TURKEY, STRATEGIC

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 003563

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/26/2017
TAGS: MARR MCAP MOPS PGOV PINS PNAT PTER IZ
SUBJECT: MALIKI ON DIPLOMACY WITH TURKEY, STRATEGIC
PARTNERSHIP DECLARATION, AND BASRAH SECURITY LEADERSHIP


Classified By: Charges D'Affaires Patricia A. Butenis for reasons 1.4(b
) and (d)


1. (S) SUMMARY: Prime Minister Maliki told the Ambassador and
General Petraeus that the door remains open to dialogue with
Turkey concerning the recent attacks by the Kurdish Workers
Party (PKK) on Turkish Army units. He said it was important
to include members of the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG)
as part of his delegation to Ankara to give them a stake in
any potential agreements. Maliki expressed pessimism about
deterring Turkish cross border operations (CBO) because of
the intense pressure by the Turkish military on the GOT. In a
short discussion about the U.S.-Iraqi Strategic Partnership
Declaration, the Ambassador reiterated the strong support for
the declaration by President Bush. Maliki replied that the
GOI had carefully studied the draft SPD, agreed with its
principles, but did not want it to include specific details.
Responding to the Ambassador,s question, PM Maliki expressed
confidence that the Accountability and Justice Law
(&De-Baathification Law8) would be passed very soon by the
Council of Representatives (CoR). Regarding the Expanded
Neighbors Ministerial in November, Ambassador Crocker
convinced Maliki to accept an invitation by the Turkish PM to
attend. The Ambassador, General Petraeus, and PM Maliki also
discussed alternative employment opportunities for Concerned
Local Citizens (CLC),and Maliki,s disappointment in Basrah
security force leadership. END SUMMARY.

Iraqi Delegation to Turkey on PKK Issues
--------------


2. (S) During the weekly security meeting on October 25 with
Ambassador Crocker and MNF-I Commanding General Petraeus,
Prime Minister Maliki said he had just given final
instructions to his delegation prior to their departure to
Ankara for talks precipitated by PKK attacks on Turkish
forces. First and foremost, he said he wanted to keep
dialogue open. He described the Turkish relationship with the
GOI as one of mutual understanding and expressed his belief
that the GOT recognized Maliki,s government had little or no
power to control the actions of the PKK. Regarding the
composition of his delegation to Ankara, he said it had been
important to include members of the Kurdish Regional
Government (KRG) so they could hear first-hand details of any
agreements the GOI concluded with Turkey and their
requirements for implementation. He said this would give them
a stake in the process and their implementation of any
agreements.

Maliki Pessimistic on Deterring Turkish CBO
--------------


3. (S) Maliki said he was pessimistic about the GOT
restraining their military from cross border operations
(CBO). He described the GOT as under enormous pressure from
the Turkish military to resolve the PKK issue by force
because of two recent &humiliations8: the election last
month of Prime Minister Erdogan--whom they opposed--and the
kidnapping last week of their soldiers by the PKK. Maliki
also expressed concern that in their anger, the Turkish Army
would destroy badly-needed infrastructure in northern Iraq
while hunting for PKK terrorists. He asked General Petraeus
about USG intentions if actionable intelligence was developed
against the PKK.


4. (S) General Petraeus answered that senior USG leadership
would make the decision about any possible USG military
operations against the PKK and he emphasized that no decision
had yet been made. General Petraeus added that &MNF-I should
not be engaged in any military action against the PKK.8 In
order to deter a Turkish CBO, General Petraeus said he
believed the PKK must immediately release its hostages,
maintain a cease fire, and engage in negotiations. In any
case, General Petraeus called it unlikely that a Turkish
incursion would go very deep into Iraqi territory since the
terrain in the far north is extremely poor for conducting
military ground operations and the Turkish Army would need to
keep their supply lines short. General Petraeus noted that
Saddam Hussein had not been able to conquer the Kurds there
even after three decades of fighting. General Petraeus noted
there was over ten billion dollars of Turkish investment in
the region which would mitigate any desire by the Turkish
military to destroy infrastructure.


5. (S) Maliki responded that he knew northern Iraq well,
first as a soldier in the Army and then as a Peshmerga
fighter against Saddam, knowledge which made him aware of his
limited options. Although he had ordered the KRG to cut off

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supply routes to the PKK, he recalled that Saddam had tried
to do the same thing but the Kurds always managed to get food
to him and his fellow fighters.

Making a Concrete Offer to Turkey
--------------


6. (S) Despite the limited options available, Ambassador
Crocker urged Maliki to give his delegation in Ankara
something concrete to offer the GOT. As a start, they should
make the GOT aware of his orders to shut down PKK supply
routes. The Ambassador added that other measures--even if
symbolic--would relay Maliki,s seriousness of intent; for
example, he could clamp down on Irbil airport to greatly
restrict the flow of PKK fighters into the region. (Note:
Irbil airport has direct links to Europe. End note.) PM
Maliki agreed and added that he would be willing to surrender
PKK terrorists directly to the GOT without going through
intermediaries like Interpol as another good-faith gesture.

Strategic Partnership Declaration
--------------

7. (S) The Ambassador told PM Maliki that President Bush
considered the Strategic Partnership Declaration (SPD) a very
important step forward in the US-Iraq relationship and would
be willing to host a signing ceremony. Maliki responded that
the GOI had studied the draft SPD closely, and while they
accepted its principles, they had made some modifications. He
said it would be transmitted to the USG in a few days. In
particular, Maliki noted that the U.S. draft of the SPD
called for a &Declaration of Principles8--which the GOI
accepted--but that it also included many additional details
that the GOI preferred to exclude from the SPD itself, and to
reserve for future agreements and negotiations.

De-Baathification Law Progress
--------------


8. (S) Concerning the Accountability and Justice Law (Note:
also known as the &De-Baathification law8 End Note),the
Ambassador noted that while PM Maliki had agreed to specific
language on August 26, the issue was not yet under Council of
Representatives (CoR) consideration. He strongly urged the
Prime Minister to use all his efforts with the CoR to push it
through, saying the that US Embassy would vigorously assist
in the effort. He emphasized that the purpose of the
legislation was to advance national reconciliation and should
be a top priority.


9. (S) PM Maliki replied that he had already discussed the
issue with Supreme Islamic Council of Iraq (ISCI) party
representatives and would talk with the Kurdish parties later
in the day. He said they all agreed to the August 26
language with one modification. He said he expected to get a
clear majority on the vote during the coming week. He
remarked that the delay was his fault which came as a result
of his efforts to get complete consensus. He lamented that
it had not happened, but still expected to get some Sunni
votes for the measure.

Employment Alternatives for Concerned Local Citizens
-------------- --------------


10. (S) Responding to concerns by PM Maliki that too many
Concerned Local Citizens (CLC) were going into the police
forces rather than other employment alternatives, Ambassador
Crocker agreed on the need for vigorous jobs creation
programs. He told Maliki that program managers at the U.S.
embassy were searching extensively throughout Baghdad to find
new employment opportunities and would work closely with the
central government to expand the program. Maliki said he
fully supported those efforts and asked for USG assistance at
state-owned industries especially with product marketing.
Maliki said that his Government now has a clear vision and
that jobs are important but equally important is the need to
be cautious about security force growth through CLCs.


Maliki to Attend Expanded Neighbors Ministerial
-------------- --


11. (S) Turning to the Expanded Neighbors Ministerial in
Istanbul on November 2, PM Maliki reported that the Turkish
Prime Minister had personally invited him to attend, but that
he had not made up his mind as yet. Ambassador Crocker
described the invitation as a very good sign and urged Maliki
to accept. He added that it would set the stage for more
fruitful discussions with the attending foreign ministers;

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further, it would have a good effect on Turkish-Iraqi
relations. Maliki said he would attend.

Maliki Disappointed in Basrah Security Force Leadership
-------------- --------------


12. (S) PM Maliki voiced serious concerns about the outbreak
of violence in Basrah during the past week. He said he was
particularly disappointed in the leadership of Generals Mohan
and Jalil, the Basrah military commander and the Provincial
Chief of Police. Maliki said he could not understand why over
30 policemen had so quickly surrendered to Jaysh al-Mahdi
(JAM) forces; he called them cowards and vowed to arrest them
himself, if JAM ever released them. Maliki said that Mohan
and Jalil were sent to Basrah not to be diplomats, but to
crack down hard on the militias there; clearly exasperated,
Maliki threatened to arrest them as well if they remained
derelict in their duties.
BUTENIS