Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07BAGHDAD3341
2007-10-07 18:51:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Baghdad
Cable title:  

FIRST MEETING OF THE JOINT COMMISSION ON PSD ISSUES

Tags:  AMGT ASEC PREL APER IZ 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHGB #3341/01 2801851
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 071851Z OCT 07
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3745
C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 003341 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/06/2017
TAGS: AMGT ASEC PREL APER IZ
SUBJECT: FIRST MEETING OF THE JOINT COMMISSION ON PSD ISSUES

REF: A. BAGHDAD 03307

B. BAGHDAD 03257

Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Patricia A. Butenis for reasons
1.4 (b) and (d)

CONFIDENTIAL

SIPDIS

-------
Summary
-------

(C)
C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 003341

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/06/2017
TAGS: AMGT ASEC PREL APER IZ
SUBJECT: FIRST MEETING OF THE JOINT COMMISSION ON PSD ISSUES

REF: A. BAGHDAD 03307

B. BAGHDAD 03257

Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Patricia A. Butenis for reasons
1.4 (b) and (d)

CONFIDENTIAL

SIPDIS

--------------
Summary
--------------

(C) 1. The first meeting of the Joint Commission on Private
Security Detail (PSD) issues was held on October 7 at the
Ministry of Defense, co-chaired by the Deputy Chief of
Mission (DCM) and the Minister of Defense (MOD). The Iraqi
participants gave the impression that they intend to use the
commission as a vehicle for fact finding on the September 16
incident and for imposing discipline on what they see as
excessive measures by Embassy PSDs. The MOD reported that the
GOI investigation into the incident was incomplete as they
had not had access to the Americans involved in this
incident, but said the findings indicated that the PSD
response was disproportionate and that there was no evidence
that the PSD had been attacked. The DCM explained the status
of the U.S. investigations, the review of PSD operations in
general by the Review Panel headed by Ambassador Kennedy, and
suggested specific steps the Embassy was ready to implement
regarding PSD operations. The co-chairs discussed the scope
of the commission's inquiry and some of the desired outcomes,
upon which both sides seemed to be in general agreement. The
commission agreed to release only limited information to the
press at this early stage in the commission's activities, per
the Iraqis' request. End Summary

--------------
Joint Commission Co-Chairs Hold Pre-meeting
--------------

(C) 2. The DCM and Embassy Legal Adviser met with the MOD
before the full Joint Commission meeting to discuss goals and
terms of reference. The DCM said that the Embassy was ready
to discuss PSD operations in general within the scope of the
commission. The DCM expressed concern that GOI reports of
alleged PSD incidents were not reaching the Embassy and noted
that one specific outcome from the commission should be the
creation of a mechanism through which the GOI could share
information and concerns about PSD incidents directly with

the Embassy.

(C) 4. The DCM explained that the United States was
considering condolence payments and would welcome the views
of the MOD and commission on this topic. The MOD cautioned
that some Iraqis had exaggerated ideas about compensation.
They also discussed a draft press statement for joint release
after the commission's meeting.

--------------
Joint Commission Meeting
--------------

(C) 5. The Iraqi Commission members present were the MOD, the
Kharakh Operations Commander, two advisors from the State
Ministry for National Security Affairs, the Deputy Chief of
the National Agency for Information and Investigation, and an
advisor from the Prime Minister,s Office. The USG was
represented by the DCM, the Acting Political Military
Counselor, the Regional Security Officer, the Deputy Chief of
Staff of MNF-I's Strategic Operations, the Deputy Commanding
General of 1st Cavalry Division Multinational Corps Iraq, the
Embassy Legal Adviser, The Staff Judge Advocate of MNF-I, and
the Director of the Embassy's International Narcotics and Law
Enforcement office.

(C) 6. The MOD opened the meeting by describing the results
of the Iraqi investigation into the September 16 incident.
This investigation included only the accounts of those
injured in the incident and of Iraqi witnesses, and evidence
about the types of weapons used. The investigation found no
evidence that the PSD was attacked and that the reaction of
the PSD was in any event disproportionate. The MOD also said
the findings show that some PSDs do not have adequate
procedures to give warning during escalation of force
incidents, such as the use of flash-bangs, firing rubber
bullets, or using compressed air horns. The MOD said the
committee tried to meet with Blackwater representatives and
employees, but was not able to and that therefore the
committee's findings represent only the accounts of those
injured and of witnesses. He emphasized his hope that the
Joint Commission will provide the missing information
necessary to know the full truth about the incident. He said
that he had personally briefed Prime Minister Maliki on the
results of the report on October 6.
(C) 7. The DCM emphasized the seriousness with which the U.S.
Government takes this incident, as demonstrated by the
agreement between Secretary Rice and Prime Minister Maliki
which led to the formation of the Joint Commission. She said
the goal of the commission was to review not only this
incident but PSD operations in general with the goal of
protecting the Iraqi public and preventing similar incidents
from occurring in the future, while permitting Embassy
personnel the security required to do their jobs. She
emphasized that the Embassy is committed to complying with
Iraqi laws to the extent possible, but that much of Iraq
remains dangerous and requires the use of PSDs, and that the
need for this support will continue, even as changes are made
to how they operate.


(C) 8. The DCM provided a brief overview of the various
inquiries into the incident (RSO, MNFI and FBI),and
explained that the review panel led by Ambassador Patrick
Kennedy is charged with looking at overall PSD operations in
Iraq rather than focusing on the specific incident, and has
already provided recommendations to Secretary Rice. The DCM
explained that the FBI investigation is just getting underway
and that while the USG is committed to sharing the results of
its investigation with the GOI, results from the FBI
investigation may not be available because of limits on what
can be released in cases where there may be criminal
culpability. She said that the Embassy would consider what
information could be shared at this stage in the
investigation and report to the commission as much
information as possible. The co- chairs agreed that once the
USG had considered what information could be shared with the
commission, the next meeting of the commission would be
scheduled.

(C) 9. The DCM said that in addition to the specific incident
she hoped the commission could look at broader issues,
including a) PSD licensing, b) reliable reporting of alleged
incidents involving PSDs, and c) condolence payments.

a) Licensing: The MOD said that Blackwater had a license but
that it expired about 4-5 months before the September 16
incident. He said that there is a new piece of legislation
making its way through sub-committees in the Council of
Representatives (COR) regarding security contractors,
including licensing and rules of engagement, and that the MOD
would give a copy of this law to the Embassy. (Note:
According to information obtained from the Council of
Representatives (COR) Legal Committee Chairman, in January
2007 the COR worked on a draft to rescind CPA order 17
altogether, but this was abandoned. The Legal Committee is
now working on a draft which would eliminate immunities for
private security companies. End note.)

b) Reporting Channel: The DCM and MOD discussed the need for
a regular reporting channel for PSD incidents and agreed that
an Embassy representative would attend an existing weekly
GOI/MNF-I meeting on security, at which such events were
discussed.

c) Condolence Payments: The DCM asked how incidents involving
claims for injury or death are usually handled, including
those involving PSDs. The MOD cautioned that condolence
payments must be considered carefully, as the result could be
an unlimited number of claims. In this case, the GOI has a
definitive list of those harmed in the incident, but in other
cases it may be more difficult to obtain reliable
information. The MOD declined to suggest an appropriate
payment amount.

(C) 10. As a matter of procedure, the DCM offered to provide
the MOD with draft minutes and action items after each
meeting, which once agreed upon, will provide direction for
their staffs at the working level.

--------------
Press
--------------

(C) 11. While the MOD was reluctant to release too much
detail about the Joint Commission's work, he agreed to the
release of a joint statement drafted by the Embassy and MOD's
press spokesperson. The text of this announcement, released
on the evening of October 7, is repeated below:

(U) "Joint Announcement by the Iraqi Ministry of Defense and
the Embassy of the United States in Baghdad on the Joint
Commission of Inquiry on Protective Security Detail Operations

-- On October 7, the Iraqi Ministry of Defense Abdulqadir
Mohammed Jassim and the U.S. Embassy Deputy Chief of Mission
Ambassador Patricia A. Butenis co-chaired the first meeting
of the Joint Commission of Inquiry on Protective Security
Detail Operations.

-- The Minster and Ambassador Butenis expressed the mutual
commitment of the Iraqi Government and the U.S. Government to
work together to evaluate issues of safety and security
related to personal security detail operations in Iraq.

-- The Commission will issue a report containing joint policy
recommendations to the Governments of Iraq and the United
States, including specific suggestions for improving Iraqi
and U.S. procedures, with the goal of ensuring that personal
security detail operations do not endanger public safety.

-- The two sides agreed to continue their coordination and to
complete the process of inquiry in order to prevent the
recurrence of any incidents in the future".

--------------
Comment
--------------

(C) 12. The Iraqi commission members' tone was appropriately
sober but positive. We will consult with the Department
regarding how much information we may share with the
commission, and other issues, as we seek to be as responsive
as possible in addressing the GOI and the Iraqi public's
concerns.
CROCKER