SURGE STAFFING II: MINISTERIAL CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT

C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 003322

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR S/I, NEA AND NEA/EX

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/05/2017
TAGS: AMGT APER IZ
SUBJECT: SURGE STAFFING II: MINISTERIAL CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT

Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker for reasons
1.4 (b) and (d)

CONFIDENTIAL

SIPDIS

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Summary
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(C) 1. The success or failure of the Iraqi government will
depend in large part on its ability to function well and to
deliver services to Iraqi citizens. That makes ministerial
capacity building an essential part of our strategy. In
August 2007, we determined that we needed a total of 214
people, working in many of the Mission's sections, to do
ministerial capacity building, 75 more than our staff at the
time. Since then, we have increased our staff by 36 to a
total of 175. We are awaiting the arrival of an additional 39
people. Current action for 18 of those rests with the Energy
Fusion Cell (EFC); 8 with our Political Section and NEA/I; 7
with DOD; 3 with our Rule of Law Office; 2 with our
Agricultural Attache's Office; and 1 with our Health
Attache's Office - in coordination with their home agencies.
USAID and its contractors have been playing a key role in
recruiting and hiring.

(C) 2. Correct staffing is only one step. In September 2007,
we created a Ministerial Engagement Coordinating Committee
(MECC),comprising USM-I, USAID, MNF-I, MNC-I, GRD, DFID (the
UK's development agency) and other international donors. The
MECC is co-chaired by USAID and ITAO. Its task is to develop
common assessments, performance goals, policy objectives, and
to coordinate USG engagement with the Iraqi government.

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Ministerial Capacity Development Staffing
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(C) 3. "Ministerial Capacity Development" is an umbrella term
that covers a variety of Mission activities ) some ongoing,
some new. Some projects, such as improving procurement
methods, clearly fall under the rubric of ministerial
capacity building. Others, such as work with the Ministry of
Electricity on improving power generation at plants, have the
effect of improving ministerial capacity without having that
as their main objective. We also draw a distinction among:

-- (a) "ministerial capacity building" which is a long-term
(several year) project

-- (b) "ministerial performance" which is focused on
assisting ministries in their immediate workings, and

-- (c) "ministerial engagement" which refers to our internal
coordination to ensure that we are engaged with key
ministries at every appropriate level and that we are
coordinated in our approach towards them (e.g. sparing Iraqi
officials from dealing with several Embassy and MNF-I
officials on the same subject).

(C) 4. Retrospectively, we estimate that in April 2007, U.S.
Mission Baghdad had 139 people working on Iraqi ministerial
capacity development (64 from USAID and 75 from other Mission
elements, primarily ITAO). Following the August 2007
decision to review our overall ministerial capacity building
effort, we decided to increase this number to 214. Since
then, 36 additional staff members have arrived in Baghdad
bringing the total to 175.

(C) 5. The original number established in August for our
ministerial capacity staffing was 220 (an additional 81).
The reduction by six (from 81 to 75) was the result of: one
position which was mistakenly double-counted, four that were
slated to be part of a contracted ministerial assessment
project which has been terminated, and one which the Rule of
Law Office determined was redundant with existing work. We
now intend for the ministerial assessment project to be
conducted by our new Ministerial Engagement Coordinating
Committee (MECC) (see below).

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Current Staffing Status
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(C) 6. Therefore, 75 people in addition to our April 2007
staffing numbers are needed to work on ministerial capacity
development. Of these:

-- 36 have arrived in Iraq (32 USAID contractors to work in
key ministries, 1 Health position to work with the Ministry
of Health, 2 Treasury positions to support the Ministry of
Finance, and 1 DOS Energy Fusion Cell position to work with
the Ministry of Oil and others on mines and unexploded
ordnance).

-- Hiring is being carried out for five personnel: the Rule
of Law office (3 to support the Ministry of Justice),USDA (2
to support the Ministry of Agriculture),and Health Attache
(1 to support the Ministry of Health.

-- USAID and its contractor are prepared to recruit 18
positions to support the Ministries of Oil and Electricity.
USAID,s contractor is working with the MNF-I's Energy Fusion
Cell (EFC) for final determination of job descriptions. The
requirement is for technical and contractual skill sets.
Logistics arrangements for supporting the new personnel are
being reviewed with the Management Section.

-- DOS requested that DOD provide 6 military officers to
support our ministerial performance and capacity development
efforts. These positions are intended to support the Rule of
Law office, the Political Section, and ITAO. Our latest
knowledge is that this request has recently been approved.
DOD has offered one additional EFC position to work on
unexploded ordnance.

-- NEA is in the process of approving and recruiting the
other 8 positions for Embassy POL. We intend to devote all 8
to the legislative process but the exact disposition to the
Prime Minister's office, Deputy Prime Ministers' offices, and
Council of Representatives is under discussion.

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The Ministerial Capacity Engagement Committee (MECC)
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(C) 7. In September 2007, we established a "Ministerial
Engagement Coordinating Committee" (MECC) including members
from the U.S. Mission, MNF-I, MNC-I, GRD, DFID (the UK's
development agency),and other international donors. MECC's
purpose is to establish shared ministry engagement
objectives, to reduce duplication of requests to key Iraq
ministry interlocutors, and to coordinate USG engagement with
senior ministry officials. The MECC is co-chaired by USAID
and ITAO.

(C) 8. The MECC's work plan includes conducting rapid
ministry assessments to determine priority actions to improve
the ministries' performance; developing plans to assist the
ministries to achieve performance benchmarks; and developing
potential demarches for senior USG officials to deliver to
senior GOI officials, if needed, to overcome obstacles that
cannot be surmounted at working levels.

(C) 9. As a historic note, the May 2007 Kennedy Report on
Mission staffing reflected the abolition of 26 ministerial
capacity building positions as the mission transitioned the
Iraq Reconstruction and Management Office (IRMO) into ITAO.
The current and ongoing surge of 75 staff will yield a net
increase to the Mission of 49 people working on the issue.

(C) 10. Comment: As with the staffing problems with the
Provincial Reconstruction Teams (septel),the difficulties in
staffing the ministerial capacity building positions have
been reviewed by the interagency process this past week. The
guidelines post and Washington have agreed to should make the
staffing process more reliable, efficient and faster. End
comment.
CROCKER