SURGE STAFFING I: PRT STAFFING

C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 003321

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR S/I, NEA AND NEA/EX

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/05/2017
TAGS: AMGT APER IZ
SUBJECT: SURGE STAFFING I: PRT STAFFING

Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker for reasons
1.4 (b) and (d)

CONFIDENTIAL

SIPDIS

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Summary
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(C) 1. Despite the efforts of all involved, we did not meet
the September 30, 2007 deadline to staff all 133 specialist
positions for Provincial Reconstructions Teams (PRT) in Phase
II. The result was a deficit of seven USAID specialists,
seven Department of State (DOS) 3161 hires, and eight other
DOS positions that were diverted from Phase II to newly
established ePRTs. One DOD surge position will be filled in
October. The Office of Provincial Affairs (OPA) has taken
the lead in addressing the issues that caused the missed
deadline for Phase II by establishing clear guidance that
demands accountability in every step of the hiring and
staffing process; centralizing our tracking and evaluation
efforts; and updating the manning document twice daily. All
partners in the staffing process will keep OPA informed as
soon as decisions are made or personnel actions occur that
effect our personnel numbers. With the proper coordination
among stakeholders and sound internal controls, we will
complete all required staffing for both Phase II and Phase
III, by December 30, 2007.

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What didn,t work and what has been done to correct it
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(C) 2. Candidates for Phase II specialist positions were
qualified professionals who responded to ads on USAJOBS.GOV
and USAID,s ads via Research Triangle Institute. Their
applications were screened in Washington, sent to OPA and
USAID in Baghdad, and then transmitted by email to the team
leaders. Several problems have been identified. In a number
of instances, PRT leaders failed to select candidates in a
timely manner or did not respond. To remedy this, in late
August 2007 OPA management established a timeline that
required the team leaders to respond within 48 hours.
Unfortunately, personnel in the Surge office did not strictly
enforce compliance of the timeline. The 48 hour selection
timeline is critical to the integrity of staffing efforts and
new OPA policy requires that if a decision is not made within
48 hours by the team leader, it will be made by the OPA
Director. In other instances, resumes were not passed from
OPA to the team leaders expeditiously. When OPA receives a
selection package it is now sent to the team leader on the
same business day that it is received in order to avoid any
of the bottlenecks that we experienced in the past.

(C) 3. The dynamic on-ground situation has also impacted the
staffing effort. Practically all PRT team leaders and deputy
team leaders turned over during the recruiting process and
perceptions of what skills were needed often changed
drastically. This led to revised position descriptions and
requirements, in some cases candidates being rejected, which
necessitated the search for new candidates against the
revised requirements. In a number of cases, particularly for
DOD personnel in the early stages of the surge, the
candidates were assigned to teams without benefit of resume
review or prior approval of the team leader. As noted, team
leaders now see resumes and are able to approve the
selection. In addition USAID is providing the PRTs two
candidates rank ordered for their consideration and review
rather than one as was previously the practice. Team leaders
are now required to review their staffing complements to
determine if changes are needed in skill sets or if the
position descriptions require specific adjustments to meet a
changing assessment of operational needs.

(C) 4. As noted above, team leaders rejected a significant
number of candidates and OPA failed to deal with this issue
until late August. Further, resumes returned from the field
were sitting at OPA and the candidates were not reassigned to
teams where their skill sets could be utilized. The current
policy requires that if a team leader refuses to take one of
the offered candidates, an action memo will go forward to the
Ambassador for approval to keep the assignment or place the
candidate with another team. Under no circumstances will a
position not be filled or diverted without the express
permission of the Ambassador.

(C) 5. There were several cases of candidates being rejected
by team leaders due to a lack of suitable life support to
accommodate additional staff. For example, there were
instances where the PRT advised that it neither had vehicles
to transport any additional team members nor staff to provide
interpretation and translation services; others lacked
billeting for new team members. Unfortunately, the team
leaders were not raising these concerns with OPA in a formal
manner, nor were alternatives explored. We now require all
team leaders who have unfilled positions to complete a
life-support survey monthly to assure that housing, office
space and logistical support are available when needed.

(C) 6. In several cases hiring was delayed after the team
leaders/OPA selected a candidate because of the extended
processing time in Washington. DOS 3161 candidates now have
five work days to accept an offer and submit the necessary
documentation.

(C) 7. Furthermore, various offices in Iraq and Washington
were keeping their own tallies of surge staffing that were
often inconsistent and resulted in confusion. To address
this problem, OPA now has a single transparent manning
instrument that is maintained by one person, with a back-up,
and accounts for the status of each position in each phase as
well as the staffing of the new ePRTs.

(C) 8. Additionally, USAID recruitment was slowed down
because of the inability to obtain CAC cards. This is still
a problem that has not yet been resolved in Washington.
CAC-card-related problems resulted in delays in getting
advisors deployed from the United States. Some advisors have
voluntarily agreed to come to Iraq on MNF-I badges instead of
the CAC card they should travel on, which means they are held
up in Baghdad while their applications for MNF-I badges are
processed. MNF-I card privileges are also less extensive that
those provided by CAC cards which can complicate the work of
the advisors.

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Our Successes
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(C) 9. OPA met the September 30, 2007 deadline to identify
the core members of the new ePRTS. All positions are filled
with personnel now in Iraq except for three USAID officers
who will arrive at post by October 20, 2007. We used eight
Phase II positions for the new ePRTs that will require
backfills and it is expected that we will use some Phase III
positions and personnel, which will need backfills, to fill
out the remaining non-core positions on the teams established
post-surge.

(C) 10. USAID now has five of twelve Phase II individuals
against positions on the ground and has identified advisors
for the other seven. The PRTs have accepted six of the seven
proposed advisors and one advisor is still being considered
by the PRT. OPA is engaging on the seventh advisor with the
PRT. It will take 15 - 45 days for advisors to get on the
ground from the date the advisor is accepted by the PRT.

(C) 11. USAID now has nine of twenty-six Phase III positions
on the ground and has identified candidates for eight other
positions, seven of which have been accepted by the PRTs.
USAID,s contractor has a solid pipeline of candidates for
the other nine positions and will fill them and have them on
the ground by the end of Phase III.

(C) 12. OPA is taking action to ensure that we do not have a
shortfall with Phase III which closes on December 31, 2007.
The requirement of this final phase is to add 111 positions
to the 37 of Phase I and the 133 of Phase II for a total of
281 specialists entering the PRT program since the President
announced the Surge on January 10, 2007. 18 specialists for
Phase III have arrived in Iraq and we anticipate the other 93
to be here by December 31, 2007.

(C) 13. Comment: During the past week the staffing process
has been addressed by the inter-agency community. We believe
the procedures we and Washington are now putting in place
will eliminate the problems and establish accountability. End
comment.
CROCKER