MALIKI CAUTIOUS ABOUT BASRAH AND MOSUL SECURITY;

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 003180

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/21/2017
TAGS: MARR MOPS MCAP PGOV PTER PINS PNAT IZ
SUBJECT: MALIKI CAUTIOUS ABOUT BASRAH AND MOSUL SECURITY;
DESIRES ACCOMODATION WITH MODERATE SADRISTS

Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Patricia A. Butenis for reasons
1.4(b) and (d).


1. (S) SUMMARY: Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki told MNF-I
Commanding General David Petraeus and Charge d,Affaires
Patricia Butenis that he was cautious about the security
conditions in Basrah and Mosul, but contended that Basrah
could come under Iraqi Provincial Control (PIC) by December.
He was less optimistic about Mosul, where al-Qaeda has
increased its presence and the local tribes are split. On
the other hand, Maliki claimed he was close to a breakthrough
with moderate Sadrist elements and some Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM)
in Sadr City. As he has done previously, he called for
Coalition Forces restraint when apprehending rank-and-file
JAM members. During a discussion about the FY2008 Iraqi
defense budget, PM Maliki told General Petraeus he was
scrubbing the figures closely looking for savings. PM Maliki
concluded the meeting with a quick synopsis of his upcoming
trip to the United States and the UN. END SUMMARY.


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Basrah Provincial Iraqi Control (PIC)
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2. (S) At their weekly scheduled security meeting on
September 20, Prime Minister Maliki told MNF-I Commanding
General David Petraeus and Charge d,Affaires Patricia
Butenis that Provincial Iraqi Control (PIC) could occur in
Basrah by December or even sooner if three things happen:
Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) have control over armed groups
and militia activity, citizens have basic security, and the
current provincial governor is replaced. (Note: the governor
was fired by the provincial council but has remained in
office while he contests its jurisdiction in court. End
note.) PM Maliki said Commander of Joint Forces Babakir and
National Security Advisor (NSA) Rubaie had visited Basrah two
weeks ago and both recommended a strong military response to
the local violence, which they described as more criminal
than political. Maliki said this new assessment meant that
political reconciliation was less likely to attenuate the
violence; therefore he tasked the ISF to develop military and
police contingency plans for securing the province. General
Petraeus noted that a militia presence remained in Basrah
that also was a contributing factor beyond that of criminal
activity and tribal feuding. Regarding the fired but
still-serving provincial governor, PM Maliki revealed the
governor may resign within a few days and accept a
face-saving position as a senior Fadhila party advisor.


3. (S) General Petraeus urged PM Maliki to continue political
reconciliation efforts in Basrah, which have worked well in
other provinces like Anbar. He also suggested that senior
border security commanders get briefings and instruction in
the latest security technologies. Maliki cautioned that
Basrah had a more complicated security environment than
Anbar--it does not have a homogeneous Sunni population, the
tribal families are in disarray, and its border with Iran is
quite porous. Maliki concluded that political reconciliation
in Basrah would be much more difficult than Anbar.

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Concerns about Mosul
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4. (S) PM Maliki expressed concern about what he perceived as
the deteriorating security situation in Mosul which had signs
of an emerging ethno-sectarian conflict. He assessed the
provincial governor, the local police chief, and the regional
military commander as weak. If the situation worsened, he
proposed establishing and activating a provincial operational
command center which would reduce the governor,s control
over local security forces. He also intended to replace the
current military commander with a stronger Sunni Arab officer
who had ties to the Mosul area. Regarding emerging ethnic
problems, he complained that some Kurdish militias were
aggressively intimidating the regional ISF, which made the
other local sheiks very nervous.


5. (S) General Petraeus agreed that al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI)
were making a strong effort to move into the Mosul area and
re-establish control, but assured Maliki that Coalition
Forces (CF) were effectively targeting their operations. He
urged Maliki to bring the sheiks together and try to develop
some kind of coalition or awakening, much like the CF had
done in Anbar. He suggested that Joint Forces Commander
General Babakir -- who is a Kurd -- might be a very useful
asset in assuaging the concerns of the local sheikhs about

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Kurdish encroachment.

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Attracting Moderate Sadrists
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6. (S) Reiterating previous remarks he made following the
Sadr cease-fire pledge in late August, PM Maliki asked
General Petraeus for Coalition Force restraint during
detention operations of rank-and-file Jaysh al-Mahdi(JAM)
army. He claimed he was close to a &breakthrough8 political
settlement with JAM forces in Sadr City and needed some
breathing room to conclude the agreement. Maliki said many of
these residents had mistakenly put their faith in rogue JAM
factions, but were tired of the violence and were now ready
to cooperate with the GOI. Maliki requested General Petraeus
share with the GOI the addresses of known JAM criminal
elements whose names the CF had already provided to the GOI.
PM Maliki said the ISF would arrest them and turn them over
to MNF-I control. This would get these criminal elements off
the street but would be an ISF operation, rather than a CF
action.


7. (S) General Petraeus responded that the CF were trying to
&cool down8 their operations against JAM, but insisted on
reciprocity. For example, the CF were still taking casualties
from explosively formed projectiles (EFPs) and rocket
attacks, which were almost certainly launched by JAM or rogue
JAM elements. If they really wanted a cease-fire, concluded
General Petraeus, they will have to deliver honestly on their
pledge.

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Developing Security Infrastructure
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8. (S) Regarding security infrastructure, General Petraeus
pointed out that senior U.S. officials were currently
reviewing Iraqi Security Force (ISF) budget requirements for
FY2008 which amount to almost $16 billion. Of that figure,
the Iraqi government had already approved about $7.5 billion
and the USG $2.0 billion in Foreign Military Sales (FMS).
This left about $6.5 billion unfunded. Although CENTCOM had
recommended an additional $3.5 billion FMS in an amendment to
the President,s FY2008 budget, General Petraeus said it
would be difficult to get without a matching increase from
the GOI -- at least up to $10 billion total.


9. (S) Prime Minister Maliki acknowledged that point, but
said he was looking into other alternatives like reducing
overall defense expenditures. He wanted the National Security
Advisor, plus the Ministers of Finance, Defense, and Interior
to scrub the numbers closely and trim every bit of fat from
the $16 billion requirement. This would allow additional
spending for agriculture, infrastructure, and citizen
services. General Petraeus cautioned the Prime Minister that
the most important citizen service in the near-term is
security.

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Upcoming Trip to the United States and UN
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10. (S) When the Charge asked the Prime Minister about his
upcoming trip to the United States and the UN, he said he had
no major concerns. He added that discussions at the UN would
provide a good opportunity for him to correct some
misperceptions of Iraq and he intended to use it fully.
During his visit to Congress, he said he intended to echo the
themes Ambassador Crocker and General Petraeus voiced during
their recent congressional testimony. He also said he planned
to visit the World Trade Center site to deliver remarks about
the current threat of al-Qaeda in Iraq.

CROCKER