U.K. CHARGE D'AFFAIRES DISCUSSES BASRA, LEADERSHIP

C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 002829

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/22/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL UK IZ
SUBJECT: U.K. CHARGE D'AFFAIRES DISCUSSES BASRA, LEADERSHIP
CONFERENCE WITH THE AMBASSADOR

Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker for reasons 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: U.K. Charge d'Affaires (CDA) Matthew Lodge
alerted the Ambassador to negative publicity in the British
press over the U.K. withdrawal from Basra, and stated that
the PIC process was on track for August 29. The Ambassador
then shared with Lodge his impressions to date of the leaders
conference. End Summary.


2. (C) CDA Lodge brought to the Ambassador's attention that
the British government is getting negative publicity in their
Sunday press. "We are getting a kicking in the British
media," he said. The story is the perceived split between
the U.K. and the U.S. evidenced by the U.K. withdrawal from
Basra, which is scheduled for August 29. "The suggestion of
an independent British policy is not true," said Lodge, "we
are fully coordinated with you and are looking for
opportunities to demonstrate that publicly."


3. (C) The Ambassador cautioned that we should not comment
too much on Basra until we know it is a success, and
emphasized that the transfer to Provincial Iraqi Control
(PIC) must remain condition-based. "We should not transfer
it if we think the palace protection force will simply turn
it over to JAM three days later," he said. "Is it going to
be a PIC to get the hell out, or a serious process against
objective criteria?" Lodge assured the Ambassador that the
transfer to PIC process was fully transparent and that the
conditions "looked good."


4. (C) Lodge asked for our perceptions on the string of
governor assassinations. The Ambassador said that "we see
the hand of Iran behind it - they are co-opting the JAM
extremists." If ISCI and Badr realize it is Iran, they may
react in a calculated manner. But if they think it is
mainstream JAM, then they will start an ugly survival fight.


5. (C) Lodge asked for an overview of the leaders process.
The Ambassador said that everyone seemed to be on their best
behavior and were spending many hours together without losing
their tempers and walking out. The discussions focused on
power sharing mechanisms, de-Ba'athification, provincial
powers, and detainees. It is not clear that they will all
come together on these issues, said the Ambassador. Turning
to Towafuq, the Ambassador said that his impression is that
they would not return to the government, but that Vice
President Tariq Al-Hashimi would continue to participate in
the Presidency. This gives Hashimi the best of all worlds,
noted the Ambassador, as he is both "in" for decision-making,
but also "out" with respect to accountability.


6. (C) Lodge asked how long the leaders process could go on.
The Ambassador said he thought perhaps another week, after
which travel plans would bring the meetings to an end. There
is some utility, noted the Ambassador, in having them simply
meet and get used to talking to each other. If they get
momentum going and the deputies do the proper preparatory
work, it is even possible that they could resume later in
September.
CROCKER