Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07BAGHDAD2400
2007-07-18 15:13:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Baghdad
Cable title:  

BADR HEAD ACCUSES COALITION OF TARGETING ISCI

Tags:  IZ MARR MCAP MOPS PGOV PINS PNAT PTER 
pdf how-to read a cable
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OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #2400/01 1991513
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 181513Z JUL 07
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2334
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 002400 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/17/2017
TAGS: IZ MARR MCAP MOPS PGOV PINS PNAT PTER
SUBJECT: BADR HEAD ACCUSES COALITION OF TARGETING ISCI

REF: A. BAGHDAD 1837

B. BAGHDAD 1742

C. BAGHDAD 1882

D. BAGHDAD 2282

Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Patricia Butenis for reasons 1.4
(b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 002400

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/17/2017
TAGS: IZ MARR MCAP MOPS PGOV PINS PNAT PTER
SUBJECT: BADR HEAD ACCUSES COALITION OF TARGETING ISCI

REF: A. BAGHDAD 1837

B. BAGHDAD 1742

C. BAGHDAD 1882

D. BAGHDAD 2282

Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Patricia Butenis for reasons 1.4
(b) and (d).


1. (C/REL-MNF-I) SUMMARY AND COMMENT: The continued detention
of persons affiliated with the Supreme Islamic Council of
Iraq (ISCI) dominated discussion in joint ISCI-US Security
Committee meetings (ref). In an effort to bolster our
relationship with ISCI, at the 9 July Committee meeting,
General Lacquement (DCS Intel) briefed the Committee members
on the Coalition's decision not to release eleven detainees
personally requested by ISCI Leader Abdul Aziz Al-Hakim.
Badr head Hadi Al-Ameri argued strongly against the continued
detention of three on the list, claiming Sunnis and the MEK
were feeding the Coalition faulty evidence, and contested
several others. He blamed the Coalition for targeting ISCI
members because of the organization's historic ties with
Iran. The US attendees took Hadi Al-Ameri's statements to be
an opening salvo and attempted to gain some bargaining
leverage. END SUMMARY AND COMMENT.


2. (C/REL-MNF-I) The Joint ISCI-US Security Committee met on
9 July at Vice President Adil Abd Al-Mahdi's residence in the
International Zone. ISCI participants included Badr
Organization leader Hadi Al-Ameri, and Badr members Tahseen
Al-Azawi and Khadum Al-Jabery. U.S. attendees included
Pol-Mil Counselor Marcie Ries, MNF-I Deputy Chief of Staff
for Intelligence Brigadier General Lacquement, and MNF-I
Deputy Chief of Staff for Strategic Effects Major General
Scott.

-------------- --------------
General Lacquement Explained MNF-I Position on Detainees
-------------- --------------


3. (C/REL-MNF-I) ISCI Leader Abdul Aziz Al-Hakim several
months ago requested information on twenty-seven
ISCI-affiliated detainees held by the Coalition. MNF-I

replied by letter that several did not appear in our detainee
system, some had already been released or turned over to the
GOI, and eleven were in Coalition custody but would not be
released for security reasons. The issue remains a
contentious subject and often dominates ISCI Security
Committee meetings. In an effort to bolster our relationship
with ISCI, Brigadier General Lacquement briefed the Committee
members during the 9 July meeting on the Coalition's decision
not to release the eleven detainees and allowed ISCI to
review a releasable version of each detainee's case.


4. (C/REL-MNF-I) Lacquement explained that a review board
consisting of three Iraqi officials and two coalition
officers carefully reviewed each case and then provided a
recommendation to Task Force 134's Commander, Major General
Stone, who makes final decisions on detainees' status. In the
case of these eleven, both the review board and Stone
concluded there was too much incriminating evidence and that
they should remain in Coalition custody, to be reevaluated
within the next 6 months.

-------------- --------------
Al-Ameri Dismisses Coalition Evidence Against Detainees
-------------- --------------


5. (C/REL-MNF-I) The Iraqis said they found the evidence
offered unconvincing and pointed out what they asserted to be
logical flaws in the Coalition's presentation. One detainee
was convicted of planting IEDs in a Sunni neighborhood in
Najaf. Al-Ameri quickly shot back that there are no Sunnis
in Najaf and demanded the name of the neighborhood. Al-Ameri
then oddly asserted that Shia insurgents do not use IEDs,
claiming that IEDs are traditionally used by al-Qaida.


6. (C/REL-MNF-I) Al-Ameri claimed that two of the detainees
had been conducting arrests and surveillance activities as
legitimate functions of their law enforcement positions
within the provincial governments. In another case, he
asserted the only evidence MNF-I offered against one young
detainee was that his father and two older brothers were
alleged to be insurgents. (Note: Lacquement noted that
TF-134's commander was personally looking into the
possibility of releasing this detainee because of a lack of
direct evidence and his young age. End Note.)

BAGHDAD 00002400 002 OF 002



-------------- --------------
Al-Ameri Claims U.S. Intentionally Targeting ISCI
-------------- --------------


7. (C/REL-MNF-I) Noting that almost all the detainees were
alleged to have Iranian ties, Al-Ameri accused the Coalition
of believing all Shia were Iranian spies. Al-Ameri focused
on the personal story of one detainee, Sadun Ibrahim Rashid
al Hamdani, whom he said the Coalition claimed had been
kidnapped by Iran and then released on the promise he would
work for them. Al-Ameri claimed Sadun had in reality been
imprisoned under Saddam for five years before escaping to
Iran in the mid-1980's. According to Al-Ameri, Sadun later
joined the Badr Corps and worked closely with both Al-Ameri
and Vice President Adil Abd al-Mahdi. Following the fall of
Saddam, Sadun came back to Iraq with Madhi and took over
Diyala security before Diyala had a governor. After the
Coalition's arrival, Sadun was "unjustly" arrested several
more times but remained committed to Diyala and worked as a
member of its Provincial Council. Al-Ameri insisted Sadun
was a peaceful person who did not resent the Coalition and
would not have taken part in any attacks against them. Of
the nine reports the Coalition claimed to have against him,
Al-Ameri claimed five must be from the Sunni Iraqi Islamic
Party and four from the Mujahedin e-Khalq (MEK).

--------------
Detainees "Only Acting in Self Defense"
--------------


8. (C/REL-MNF-I) Al-Ameri claimed to personally know 5 of the
11 detainees, and he insisted the 5 were only doing what was
necessary to protect themselves and their neighborhoods.
There is no functioning Iraqi government, he asserted
angrily, and the Coalition is not protecting the people;
therefore, the Shia must defend themselves against terrorists
and militias. He announced that because the Coalition had
tied the hands of the Shia, many were fleeing the growing
sectarian violence in Diyala.

--------------
INIS and MEK the Source of "Lies"
--------------


9. (C/REL-MNF-I) Al-Ameri adamantly asserted any evidence
against the detainees had been concocted by the Iraqi
National Intelligence Service (INIS) or the MEK. He claimed
that although he could bring Lacquement "one hundred sources"
accusing Sunni Tawafuq member Adnan al-Dulaymi of crimes, the
Coalition won't arrest him. Likewise, he could find "one
hundred sources" blaming the U.S. for perpetrating terrorism,
but he would not believe it. This relationship requires
"thinking together and trusting each other," he stressed.
Lacquement said the decision to arrest and hold any detainee
is carefully made and based on several sources not
necessarily listed on the slides, including U.S. intelligence
sources.

-------------- --------------
Al-Ameri Demands Detainees Are Turned Over to the GOI
-------------- --------------


10. (C/REL-MNF-I) Al-Ameri said that if the Coalition has
such confidence in its evidence against these detainees, it
should hand them over to the Iraqi Criminal Court. ISCI
would hire them a lawyer. He asserted that he was tough on
criminal behavior among his party members, even those who
target Sunnis. If the evidence is convincing, they will be
appropriately prosecuted; as Hakim has noted many times,
ISCI does not harbor criminals or terrorists.

-------------- --------------
Focus on Common Vision for a Safe and Secure Iraq
-------------- --------------


11. (C/REL-MNF-I) Al-Ameri stressed the most important issue
is the joint Committee's common vision for security in Iraq.
The detainee issue will continue to be a problem, he
concluded, but more importantly, both sides must learn to
trust the other.

CROCKER