Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07BAGHDAD2282
2007-07-10 09:16:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Baghdad
Cable title:  

ISCI SECURITY COMMITTEE STRESSES TRIBAL

Tags:  IZ MARR MCAP MOPS PGOV PINS PNAT PTER 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO7786
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #2282/01 1910916
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 100916Z JUL 07
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2129
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 002282 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/09/2017
TAGS: IZ MARR MCAP MOPS PGOV PINS PNAT PTER
SUBJECT: ISCI SECURITY COMMITTEE STRESSES TRIBAL
ENGAGEMENT, ISCI DETAINEES

Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 002282

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/09/2017
TAGS: IZ MARR MCAP MOPS PGOV PINS PNAT PTER
SUBJECT: ISCI SECURITY COMMITTEE STRESSES TRIBAL
ENGAGEMENT, ISCI DETAINEES

Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: During the fifth meeting of the Supreme
Islamic Council of Iraq (ISCI) Security Committee meeting on
July 2, Vice President Adel Abdel Mehdi reemphasized the
importance of tribal engagement, popular committees, and
detainee issues. Badr Organization Secretary-General Hadi al
Ameri described a recent tribal conference he said ISCI had
sponsored in Najaf as "disciplined and peaceful," with over
3,500 tribal leaders and scholars from across Iraq gathering
to promote peace and security. Abdel Mehdi claimed popular
committees could take advantage of the tribal system without
turning tribes into another militia force. He asserted that
"political forces" can serve as essential interlocutors
between the local tribal groups and the Government of Iraq
(GoI). The ISCI delegation manifested strong dissatisfaction
with recent answers to their inquiry concerning ISCI
detainees, demanding evidence of wrongdoing and transparency
in the detention process. MG Scott (MNF-I/STATEFF) asked for
ISCI's support in halting publication of false articles in
pan-Arab papers regarding recent operations in Diyala. END
SUMMARY

--------------
Ameri Discusses Tribal Engagement
--------------


2. (C) During the fifth meeting of the ISCI Security
Committee on July 2, Badr Organization Secretary-General Hadi
al Ameri described the recent tribal conference in Najaf as
"disciplined and peaceful." He asserted that over 3,500
tribal leaders and scholars from all over Iraq, including
Sunni and Kurdish provinces, participated in the gathering to
promote peace and security. Following the conference, the
leading Sheikhs issued statements pledging support to the
government and asking for help from the GoI in creating
security and stability as has been done in al Anbar.



3. (C) Acting Pol-Mil Counselor Sidhu noted that while we are
benefiting from the tribal action against Al Qaeda in al
Anbar, neither the Iraqi government nor the Coalition
initiated the movement. Anbari sheikhs had taken great
personal risks to stand against Al Qaeda. He observed that if
ISCI had the ability to bring tribes together to reach common
ground, it might be useful to gather information on the
attendees for possible engagement initiatives.

--------------
Popular Committees Based on Tribal Alliances
--------------


4. (C) Vice President Adel Abdel Mehdi stressed the
historical importance of tribal groups, recalling that in
2003, when Iraq had no constitution and no ISF, local groups
maintained peace and security in their own neighborhoods.
Popular committees could take advantage of this natural
tribal order, noted Ameri, by organizing people to secure
local roads and infrastructure while employing
disenfranchised youths who might otherwise turn to militias
or terrorist activities.


5. (C) Abdel Mehdi emphasized that these tribal forces should
not be given precedence over the ISF, adding that the Iraqi
government should always maintain command and control of the
committees to make sure that they don't become another
militia force. He also noted that while tribal forces can
coalesce to protect local areas, they often "disappear" when
faced with larger problems. He concluded that a strong ISF
force was, therefore, still very important for Iraq's overall
security.

--------------
Importance of "Political Forces"
--------------


6. (C) Abdel Mehdi asserted that "political forces" could
serve as essential interlocutors between the local groups and
the GOI. He explained there were five or six "real" political
forces in Iraq that truly had the ear of the Iraqi people.
The Badr Corps, he noted, became the Badr Organization
because its leadership anticipated the necessity of reforming
from a rogue group outside of the government to an active
political force for fermenting legitimate change. Abdel
Mehdi encouraged Scott to engage the Badr Organization,
promising they can provide important information regarding

BAGHDAD 00002282 002 OF 002


the facts on the ground. Abdel Mehdi warned that when the
Coalition only interacts with the high levels of the Iraqi
Government, "you don't arrive at the right conclusions or
solutions." He noted President Bush had dealt openly with
Abdul Aziz al-Hakim, Grand Ayatollah al-Sistani, and other
political forces.

--------------
Popular Committees Approved Under PM Jafari
--------------


7. (C) Abdel Mehdi grew exasperated at the question as to
whether the idea of popular committees had been addressed
with other Iraqi government officials. He claimed the
security committee under the al Jafari government approved
the use of popular committees, even agreeing that popular
committee members could carry pistols. He said the current
government had been elected before the decision could be
implemented. Abdel Mehdi expressed understanding of MNF-I's
reluctance to create auxiliary forces outside of the ISF, but
also argued that the whole country could not join the police
force. He said local groups should remain localized but
coordinate their actions with the ISF or Coalition forces in
the area. The heaviest weapon he would recommend they be
allowed to carry is an AK-47. He said they should least be
allowed a pistol.


8. (C) Abdel Mehdi promised to provide the US delegation with
written answers to all their questions at the next meeting,
but stressed that action must be taken soon. He noted this
had become "a tiring process" because he had answered all
these questions to various US and Coalition officials in the
past. Scott promised more continuity in ISCI's
interlocutors, adding that the U.S. was committed to moving
forward with this dialogue.

--------------
ISCI Detainees "Top Priority"
--------------


9. (C) The ISCI delegation then turned its attention to a
letter MNF-I Commanding General Petreaus had provided to ISCI
leader Abdul Aziz al-Hakim in response to Hakim's inquiry
concerning twenty-seven detained ISCI members. The
delegation expressed its dissatisfaction with the letter,
demanding to see evidence against the ISCI members and
arguing for transparency in the detention process. Abdel
Mehdi claimed that ISCI was working hard to build a strategic
relationship with the U.S. and provided the Coalition with
threat information. He argued that therefore, ISCI members
should not be detained. Deputy Badr member Tahssen al Azawi
asked the U.S. delegation, "This is how you treat your
friends?" Abdel Mehdi also read from a unidentified document
stating that names of ISCI members acting badly would be
passed to Mahdi for the party to deal with internally. He
insisted this should happen, or ISCI will have to seriously
reconsider its friendship with the U.S.


10. (C) Scott said he appreciated the Vice President's
frankness and said he understood ISCI's position, but
acknowledged that he did not have any further information on
the issue and would have to look into it.

--------------
Diyala Operations Going "Very Well"
--------------


11. (C) Scott asked for ISCI's support in preventing the
publication of negative articles in pan-Arab papers that were
undermining ISF activities in Diyala. He showed the Iraqi
delegation a story board on recent operational successes
there, highlighting progress in security and food shipments.
Ameri was unaware of any negative press from ISCI-affiliated
outlets and stressed the Coalition must stop listening to
"bad information" from sources such as the MEK. He added
that operations in Diyala were, in his view, going very well.

CROCKER