SADRISTS RETURN TO IRAQ'S COUNCIL OF

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 000224

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/20/2017
TAGS: PGOV IZ
SUBJECT: SADRISTS RETURN TO IRAQ'S COUNCIL OF
REPRESENTATIVES; QUORUM ACHIEVED

REF: A. 2006 BAGHDAD 4721

B. 2006 BAGHDAD 4461

C. 2006 BAGHDAD 4405

Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Daniel Speckhard for reasons 1.4
(b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary: The Sadrists ended their "temporary
withdrawal" from Iraq's Council of Representatives (CoR) on
January 21. Their return coincided with the first quorum
since December 10. While the exact circumstances of their
return are still unclear, it appears that after a round of
negotiations that took place January 20, they forwarded a
series of demands for consideration by a committee of CoR
members, who will in turn present them in the form of a
resolution that will be voted on by the CoR at an unspecified
future date. This deal represents a clear pulling back from
their earlier demand for the establishment of a timetable for
coalition withdrawal as a condition for their return, and
several CoR members suggested that the Sadrists came away
almost empty-handed. The fact that the CoR achieved quorum
only once during their absence, however, may empower the
Sadrists in further negotiations with CoR leadership. End
summary.

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Sadrist MPs Return
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2. (C) On January 21, Sadrist MPs returned to the assembly
room in the CoR for the first time since November 28. They
"withdrew temporarily" from the CoR and Council of Ministers
(CoM) to protest Prime Minister Maliki's November 30 meeting
with President Bush in Amman. The CoR met 17 times during
the period of the Sadrists' "temporary withdrawal," achieving
a quorum only on December 10. The CoR achieved quorum on
January 21, with approximately 175 members signing in.
(Note: A quorum is 138 members. The Sadrists control 30
seats. The CoR does not publish attendance records, so it is
impossible to know how many Sadrists attended the January 21
session. End note.)

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Sadrists Reduced Demands
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3. (C) The Sadrists' return to the CoR represented the
culmination of lengthy negotiations between the Sadrists and
various CoR blocs (particularly the Shi'a coalition, and
within the Shi'a coalition particularly Dawa; ref A). The
Sadrists appear to have lowered their conditions for return
during the period of their temporary withdrawal. What began
as a threat for a complete boycott with no clear conditions
for return became a "temporary withdrawal" with return
contingent on the establishment of a timetable for coalition
withdrawal. The Sadrists then reduced their stated demands
to the CoR leadership forwarding to the floor a resolution
setting a timetable for coalition withdrawal.


4. (C) What the Sadrists actually achieved for their return
is unclear. CoR Speaker Mahmoud Mashhadani announced on
January 18 that a committee was in the final stages of
negotiations with the Sadrists on their return. Abdulkarim
al-Anzy (Dawa Tanzim),one of the committee's members, said
that the Sadrists were going to present their demands to the
committee for consideration by the CoR. Sunni IIP's Salim
Jabbouri told poloff January 18 that the Sadrists' conditions
included: returning Iraq's sovereignty; strengthening the
ISF; the passage of a resolution calling for MNF-I withdrawal
from Iraq; and non-renewal of any UNSCR legalizing MNF forces
in Iraq. According to Jabbouri, the committee would then
present a resolution that will be voted on the CoR at a
future unspecified date. Jabbouri opined that the Sadrists'
conditions were really "non-conditions" in that everyone
wants to strengthen Iraqi sovereignty and ISF. He argued that
any politically viable resolution calling for MNF-I
withdrawal would call for a "gradual" withdrawal once Iraqi
forces had become self sufficient. On January 21, Shi'a
coalition members Rida Jawad Taqi (SCIRI) and Hassan
al-Shammari (Fadila) also downplayed the significance of the
Sadrists' conditions for return. Taqi suggested that the
committee's work would be "nothing more than a piece of
paper", and al-Shammari said that the Maliki government and
other CoR members had convinced the Sadrists to return
without achieving their desired objectives by emphasizing
that the MNF was necessary to train ISF and that no one
wanted the MNF to stay longer than necessary.

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Sadrist Ministers' Status Unclear
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5. (C) The status of the three Sadrist Ministers (health,
transportation, and agriculture) and two Sadrist Ministers of
State is also unclear. While government spokesperson Ali
al-Dabbagh told the DCM that the Sadrists are returning to
the Council of Ministers, there is every indication that
Prime Minister Maliki intends to replace them in his
long-anticipated cabinet reshuffle, and he has named "acting"
ministers in place of the three full ministers. Official
replacement of these ministers, however, would require a yes
vote from an absolute majority of CoR members.

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Comment
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6. (C) Had the CoR achieved quorum with regularity between
the beginning of the Sadrist "temporary withdrawal" and their
return, the "temporary withdrawal" episode would have
represented a major defeat for the Sadrists in that they
gained little of practical value for their return. The deal
under which they returned offers the prospect, albeit in a
way not yet fully defined, for them to present their views to
the CoR. However, they have always used the CoR floor as a
soapbox to demand the withdrawal of coalition forces. (Note:
In the Sadrists' absence, the CoR scarcely registered the
passage of UNSCR 1723; had the Sadrists been present, they
would have made an impassioned statement denouncing it at the
very least. End note.) Furthermore, according to the CoR's
bylaws, ten members of the CoR can submit legislation to the
CoR presidency for consideration. The Sadrists, despite
their numbers, have never managed to get legislation through
the presidency and committees for consideration by the CoR.
Yet although the Sadrists appear to have gained little of
practical value, they did demonstrate that their attendance
is an important factor in the CoR achieving a quorum. This
fact may give them additional bargaining power in presenting
their demands to the CoR leadership in the future.


7. (C) We do not have a clear read on why the Sadrists
decided to return to the CoR with little to show for their
"temporary withdrawal." CoR members have repeatedly noted to
us that many of the Sadrist MPs disagreed with the decision
to withdraw. Muqtada al-Sadr, who according to Ali
al-Dabbagh ordered the return, may be feeling pressure from
these CoR members, and more importantly responding to calls
from senior Shi'a leaders to support, or at least not
obstruct, the Shi'a-led Iraqi government. He may also be
feeling pressure from recent operations carried out by MNF
and ISF against Sadrists and JAM members suspected of
involvement in sectarian and anti-ISF and MNF violence. We
plan to explore these hypotheses with our contacts over the
next several weeks. End comment.
KHALILZAD