IRAQI POLICE PERFORMANCE IN BAGHDAD

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 002220

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/03/2017
TAGS: IZ MCAP MOPS PGOV PINS PNAT PTER
SUBJECT: IRAQI POLICE PERFORMANCE IN BAGHDAD

Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C/REL MNF-I) SUMMARY: According to the May assessments
from U.S. police transition teams in eleven Baghdad districts
and municipalities, the Iraqi police show signs of progress
in leadership and operational capability, especially in
neighborhoods where Joint Security Stations have been
established. The major hindrances to continued progress
across all eleven districts surveyed are: acute manpower
shortages, a nearly non-existent logistical system, and Shia
militia influence. These shortcomings severely challenge
progress and, ultimately, the long term sustainability of the
service. According to some of our troops, if the embedded
teams were not in place, police services in parts of Baghdad
would likely collapse. MNF-I leaders are aware of and
concerned by the police shortcomings and by their inability
to contribute more effectively than they do to the Baghdad
Security Plan. GEN Petraeus has directed a "Police Summit"
meeting to be held in mid-July to review the vision for
police in Baghdad and to determine the way ahead. END
SUMMARY.

Positive: Leadership
--------------


2. (C/REL MNF-I) Of the eleven districts and municipalities
assessed by U.S. police transition teams, eight have some
effective leaders who work hard, coordinate closely with the
Coalition and Iraqi Army, and try to remain non-sectarian.
Overall, the surveyed districts on Baghdad's west and south
sides, comprised of; Abu Ghraib, Kadhamiyah, Rasheed,
Mahmudiyah, and Mansour seem to be the weakest in leadership,
with Abu Ghraib ranked as the worst due to a district
headquarters commander who is "disinterested in (Police
Transition Team) PTT support." Kadhamiyahdistrict also
received low marks on leadership, with a number of commanders
suspected of involvement in or passivity toward militia
activity. In general, while we have a few good leaders in
most districts, all districts need more, particularly at the
deputy and middle-management level. The situation appears
somewhat better in the Rusafa Command on Baghdad's east side
which includes the districts and municipalities of Al Thawra
(Sadr City),Adhamiyah, Bab Sheikh, Karada, Salhiya, New
Baghdad, and Doura.

Positive: Joint Security Stations
--------------


3. (C/REL MNF-I) The PTT team leaders believe that Joint
Security Stations contribute strongly to the overall
performance of the Iraqi police. Ten of the eleven
assessments mention having Joint Security Stations within
their districts and eight single them out as agents for
progress. It appears that Abu Ghraib did not have a JSS at
the time the report was filed. The Joint Security Stations
in Kadhamiyah district, specifically in the neighborhoods in
Hurriya and Kadhamiyahand the "several Joint Security
Stations" in New Baghdad have led to an improvement in
communication among the ISF. They also report that police
response time has "decreased dramatically" with the
establishment of Joint Security Stations. Mahmudiyah uses
its JSS for training drills and has attributed its set up to
an increase in tips from local residents. Eight districts
report the Joint Security Stations have improved overall
force protection in the area.


4. (C/REL MNF-I) The Coalition reports that many Joint
Security Stations will continue to operate as local police
stations once Fardh al Qanoon ends and the Coalition and
Iraqi Army units leave the urban areas. With this in mind,
the Coalition is strategically placing the Joint Security
Stations in neighborhoods. They are located among the
residents and around key public institutions.

Positive: Operational Capability
--------------


5. (C/REL MNF-I) Iraqi police operational capability
continues to improve in eight districts: Al Thawra (Sadr
City),Adhamiyah, Karada, Salhiya, New Baghdad, Kadhamiyah,
Doura, and the city of Mahmudiyah. This progress is largely
attributed to Coalition mentorship and Iraqi National Police
and Army support. The PTT in New Baghdad attributed success
to experience noting "many have been police for several
years." Reports on Mansour and Bab Sheik did not discuss
operational capability other than to rank the Iraqi police as
two on a scale from one to four, meaning the police need
minimal Coalition or other ISF assistance. Abu Ghraib police
were considered "completely ineffective" with the only

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security in the area provided by the Iraqi Army.


6. (C/REL MNF-I) Militia influence and intimidation are the
primary obstacles to improving police operational capability
and reliability in most eastern districts including Sadr
City, Adhamiyah, and Bab Sheik, and Doura. PTTs reported
from two areas -- the city of Mahmudiyah and district of
Kadhamiyah -- that constant Coalition supervision is needed
to ensure the police do not engage in ethno-sectarian
motivated operations or detentions. PTTs also noted that
police in JAM-infiltrated portions of Adhamiyah, Salhiya, and
Bab Sheik have been more willing in the past month to go
after rogue elements and JAM militias - resulting in
increased retaliatory attacks against the police and their
facilities. After police arrested a JAM leader, Maj Awad,
the Ur station was attacked three times in two weeks by RPGs
and small arms fire. Prior to the detention, the station had
not experienced an attack in over a year. Embeds report
Doura-based police who are largely Shia refuse to patrol or
respond to incidents in Sunni neighborhoods for fear of
attack by AQI elements. As for Southern Baghdad Province,
the Mahmudiyah city police performance seems to suffer the
most from militia influence and intimidation.


7. (C/REL MNF-I) PTTs report minimal training opportunities
in nine of the eleven districts. They attribute this
deficiency to personnel and resource shortage as well as a
lack of Iraqi police interest. Embeds, however, report good
training programs in Adhamiyah and New Baghdad. In the near
term, it is projected that on-the-job training and
interaction with Coalition and other Iraqi security forces,
rather than training, will further police operational
capability.


Weakness: Severe Police Shortage, Especially in Sunni Areas
-------------- --------------


8. (C/REL MNF-I) Reports indicate all districts suffer from
serious personnel shortages, particularly the Sunni areas.
The primary reasons for deficiencies are the high levels of
chronic absenteeism; high rates of unplanned police
transfers; and low recruitment/hiring efforts by MOI,
especially in Sunni areas. In May, the average police daily
strength in Abu Ghraib was 31 percent. This shortage seemed
to only benefit the district commander, who allegedly pockets
the salaries of the AWOL police and charges any AWOL who
wants to return to service a USD 500 fee. The Mahmudiyah
district reported a 75 percent shortfall in authorized
strength. Mansour and Doura, both extremely volatile areas
were operating with 32 percent and 39 percent of their
assigned strength respectively in May. The PTT in Doura
reports only 14 percent of police conduct daily patrols in
the Sunni neighborhoods. On the east side, the Adhamiyah PTT
concluded that about 30 percent of the police are present on
a daily basis. Kadhamiyah, Sadr City, and Karada also report
serious police shortages.


9. (C/REL MNF-I) Some Sunni neighborhoods within Mansour
such as Ameriya and Gahzaliyah have no local police while the
Sunni enclave of Kadra has a paltry force of 50 police. The
police shortage in Ameriya has led, in part, to the
development of a Coalition-supported locally armed group to
fight Al Qaeda. While it may seem at first glance that the
uprising of locals to fight Al Qaeda is positive, in the long
term what is needed is a sufficient locally-recruited police
force, trained and equipped by the Ministry of Interior.
(NOTE: Post understands from the U.S. commanders in Western
Baghdad that the MOI has not acted on repeated requests from
the Coalition and the Iraqi police commander to hold
recruitment drives in Sunni neighborhoods. Sunni
neighborhoods in Doura do not have an active police service
because, according to the PTT, the Shia-dominated police
service fear AQI and thus refuse to operate in the area. END
NOTE.)

Weakness: Logistics
--------------


10. (C/REL MNF-I) All eleven districts suffer from acute
logistics and sustainment problems. Abu Ghraib and Mansour
district logistic system is described as "slow or
non-existent" and Karada is said to have "almost a complete
lack of logistical support from the MOI headquarters." The
report leads one to conclude that there is no established
logistic supply chain to meet resource and funding needs at
the local level from headquarters. Formal requests are
repeatedly made by commanders but remain unfulfilled. Fuel
shortages are described as serious in all districts,

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impacting operational capabilities. The deficiency limits
police planning and patrolling activities. One district
attributes the rise in IEDs along a main road to the shortage
in fuel because police has had to stop actively patrolling
the vicinity. The Bab Sheik district reported that for the
winter months, the 400 assigned police received one winter
coat and four shirts.


11. (C/REL MNF-I) The Coalition, and to some extent the
Iraqi Army, contribute where they can to the police
deficiencies. This is especially the case where Joint
Security Stations are up and running. The logistic problem,
however, if not remedied will ultimately lead to the downfall
of the police service. In the near term, it appears they
will be able to limp along because the Coalition is around to
provide them the needed support to survive, but without
Coalition presence sustainability is clearly in jeopardy
until MoI logistics systems improve.

Weakness: Militia and AQI Influence
--------------


12. (C/REL MNF-I) Eight of the eleven embedded teams
report that militia influence is hampering performance of the
police. Within the Rusafa area command, four of six
districts report substantial influence of JAM on the police.
Many police are members of, complicit in, or intimidated by
JAM elements, notably in Sadr City. Embeds report, however,
that in the three of these areas -- Adhamiyah, Salhiya, and
Bab Sheik -- police have been more willing in the past month
to take on JAM elements. Retaliatory attacks, however, have
been the consequence. And despite this stepped up action,
JAM-suspected crime remains high in these areas with high
rates of kidnapping, Extra-Judicial Killings (EJKs),and IED
attacks. The Adhamiyah wall has disrupted both AQI and JAM
elements, but dead bodies are on the rise from April to May
and are attributed to be JAM-affiliated crime.


13. (C/REL MNF-I The PTTs did not mention JAM or other
militia influence in Salhiya and New Baghdad in Eastern
Baghdad in their May assessment. The lack of mention of JAM
influence in Salhiya is interesting given that the previous
month's assessment stated "I think the only people safe in
this district will be Shia, due to JAM infiltration. Most
Sunnis have dislocated or have been targeted as Sunni
terrorists. Shia targeting is rare... ISF target only AQI and
Sunnis." The PTT in Doura attributes poor police performance
to their valid fear of AQI attacks and the largely Sunni
population's distrust of them. The Sunni population believes
all ISF are JAM members, except for the IA units from the
north operating in their territory.


14. (C/REL MNF-I) In Western and Southern Baghdad, two of
the districts and municipalities surveyed -- Mahmudiyah and
Kadhamiyah -- discuss the negative influence of militia on
the police. Whereas Mahmudiyah used to be a hotbed for AQI,
it is now reported as a JAM-riddled city in which the police
are unable to counter because of intimidation and active
participation. Kadhamiyah embeds say that militia influence
is the biggest concern, and they have received "significant
reporting" linking police and station commanders to militia
activity. Mansour reported no JAM complicity among police
but noted AQI attacks are on the rise due to the low number
of local police patrolling the area. Abu Ghraib does not
mention militia or terrorist influence on the police.

CROCKER