KURDS STILL STANDING BY MALIKI GOVERNMENT - FOR NOW

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 002184

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/29/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL IZ
SUBJECT: KURDS STILL STANDING BY MALIKI GOVERNMENT - FOR NOW

REF: BAGHDAD 2115

Classified By: Deputy Political Counselor Charles O. Blaha, reasons 1.4
(b) and (d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: Former Prime Minister Ibrahim Ja'fari is
trying to cultivate support and position himself as an
alternative to Prime Minister Maliki. He claims to have
assembled an informal group that has backing from some Shi,a
and Kurdish Council of Representatives (CoR) members. The
extent of this group,s support is hard to ascertain. While
one Kurdish CoR member claims some Kurdish CoR members favor
Ja'fari, neither Kurdish leaders nor the rank-and-file
currently favor Maliki's removal - until there is a plan that
can succeed. END SUMMARY.

Former PM Ja'fari Makes His Pitch
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2. (C) In a June 25 meeting with Meghan O,Sullivan, Former
Prime Minister Ja,fari claimed that Council of
Representatives (CoR) members from the Dawa Party, Tawafuq
Front, Fadhila, along Sadrist bloc and the Kurdish Alliance
members, had created a new political "alliance" and hoped to
form a new government. Ja,fari cited the current
government,s sectarian make-up as a major obstacle to
efficiency and said the new group would only appoint
"technocrats" to the cabinet. Ja,fari claimed 40-60 CoR
members meet "every other Tuesday" to discuss a single policy
theme, but deflected direct questions about the group,s
leadership. He provided O,Sullivan with an English-language
version of the alliance,s program entitled "Rescue of Iraq"
which calls for removing the Maliki government through a
no-confidence vote in the CoR. O,Sullivan strongly
reiterated U.S. support for Prime Minister Maliki and
underscored how damaging delays attendant on any change of
government would be for Iraq.

Kurdish CoR Member Claims a Political Alliance Led by Ja'fari
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3. (C) On June 27, Kurdish CoR member Abdullah Saleh said
that members of the Kurdish Alliance, with Dawa and ISCI
elements, had been meeting for "several months" and named
Ja'fari as the group,s leader. Saleh said Ja,fari was a
natural choice because his leadership style was more
inclusive, and because he had more pan-Arab credentials than
the current PM. Saleh claimed the new alliance already had
enough members to form a majority in the CoR. Asked about
overall Kurdish support for the Ja,fari group, he answered
that his association was "personal" and admitted that this
did not have buy-in from top Kurdish leadership.


4. (C) Saleh expounded on Ja'fari's comments on the make-up
of the new government, saying that when it was formed, the
alliance would give the Arab Sunnis 20 percent of the
ministerial positions. Using the phrase "they are either
with us or against us," he added these positions would not go
to Sunnis in Baghdad, but to Sunnis who were working against
al Qaeda in the provinces and had proven that they had real
influence with the people. The alliance would present their
program to these tribal leaders and if the leaders accepted
the program they would be asked to join the government.
Saleh said sectarian divisions were paralyzing the current
government, with disastrous consequences for the country.

Ja'fari Group Reaching Out to Sadrists
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5. (C) Saleh told PolOffs he would travel as part of a
Kurdish group on June 28 to Najaf to engage with Muqtada al
Sadr on linking a timetable for the withdrawal of coalition
forces from Iraq with the progress of the Iraqi Security
Forces (ISF). According to Saleh, as the ISF reach certain
benchmarks for numbers trained and demonstrate their
competence and effectiveness, Coalition Forces would rotate
to support roles and eventually rotate out of the country.


6. (C) Saleh said Sadr was the "most important" political
player in Iraq and could be a constructive force if
"approached properly" (NOTE: Saleh has known Sadr since he
was a child and was a friend of both his father and his
uncle. END NOTE.) Although Saleh initially denied the plan
to change the government would be on the agenda, he said he
would raise several of the group,s ideas, including
peshmerga protection of the Samarra,s Golden Mosque, which
he thought might placate Sadr and perhaps "bring him along."
Saleh underscored that he was not traveling as the
representative of the Kurdish leadership.

Currently Little Kurdish Support for Ja'fari
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7. (C) Despite Saleh's position, other Kurdish CoR contacts
said that neither senior Kurdish leadership nor rank-and-file
Kurdish Alliance members support removing the Prime Minister,
nor did they think Ja'fari would be the right person to
replace him. Some suggested this position might change,
particularly if the Prime Minister,s Da'wa party began
calling for Maliki,s removal, but underscored any support
for changing the government would come at a price, probably
involving Article 140. Others dismissed the movement as
merely the Baghdad manifestation of the struggle for
political power in the southern part of Iraq between Sadrists
and Abdul Aziz al Hakim,s ISCI.


8. (C) Respected Kurdish independent Mahmoud Othman told
Poloff June 28 that the Kurdish leadership would not openly
back a plan that replaced the Maliki government -- until it
was clear it could succeed. He observed that, while the PM
is weak and ineffective (as was the rest of the government),
finding a candidate to replace him would be very difficult.
He did say that plans were in the works to replace all of the
ministers with those that were competent and could work
together - not those that simply fill a party quota - and to
shrink the number of ministers to 20.


9. (C) Othman also condemned the Group of Four's (KDP, PUK,
ISCI, Da'wa) efforts to form a moderate front and former
Prime Minister Allawi's efforts to form an opposition front
with the Sunnis, saying that this was exactly the wrong thing
to do to encourage reconciliation. Two opposing sides were
forming instead of working together to break down sectarian
barriers, and nothing good would come of it, he said.

Da'wa-ISCI Push Back Against Ja'fari, Hatch their Own Plots
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10. (C) Othman pointed out that Da'wa and ISCI had formed a
strategic council without Ja'fari (reftel) consisting of
senior members of both parties to facilitate cooperation and
(he claimed) to stave off Ja'fari's attempts to regain the
position of prime minister. Maliki, Ali Adeeb and two others
would represent Da'wa, while VP Adel Abdel Mehdi, Humam
Hammudi and two others would represent ISCI.

Comment
--------------


11. (C) Saleh took care not to suggest senior Kurdish
support for Ja'fari's group or for Maliki's removal, but
Kurdish leaders are aware of Saleh's involvement and have not
forbidden his participation. Over the last few months,
Kurdish CoR members have consistently asked about continued
U.S. support for the Maliki government.
CROCKER