Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07BAGHDAD2182
2007-07-02 08:01:00
SECRET
Embassy Baghdad
Cable title:  

ISCI STRATEGIC DIALOGUE: JUNE 30 MEETING

Tags:  PREL PGOV IZ 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO0697
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #2182/01 1830801
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 020801Z JUL 07
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1994
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 002182 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/03/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV IZ
SUBJECT: ISCI STRATEGIC DIALOGUE: JUNE 30 MEETING

Classified by Deputy Political Counselor Charles O. Blaha,
reasons 1.4(b) and (d)

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 002182

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/03/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV IZ
SUBJECT: ISCI STRATEGIC DIALOGUE: JUNE 30 MEETING

Classified by Deputy Political Counselor Charles O. Blaha,
reasons 1.4(b) and (d)


1. (S) Summary: The fifth meeting of the political
committee of the USG/Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI)
strategic dialogue met for two hours on June 30. Embassy
Political Counselor headed the USG team, which included
Deputy Political Counselor, Embassy Legal Adviser, and ORA
representative. Vice President Adil Abdel Mehdi headed the
ISCI team, joined by ISCI Council of Representatives (CoR)
members Humam Hammoudi and Jalaladin al-Sagheer. ISCI is
unhappy about what they perceive to be continuing USG
"doubts" about them evidenced by continuing Coalition Force
detentions of ISCI and ISCI-affiliated Badr Corps members.
All three believe they have expended political capital to
bring ISCI closer to the U.S. but have nothing to show for
it. ISCI wants the U.S. to deal with them in Shia-dominated
areas the way it deals with the Kurds in the north. ISCI
representatives welcomed Political Counselor's proposal to
consider focused, joint U.S./ISCI efforts in specific
locations in Iraq to advance stability and promote
redevelopment, and to use the political committee as a "think
tank" to develop actual plans for cooperative action. End
Summary.

ISCI Complains About USG "Doubts" and Detentions
-------------- ---


2. (S) VP Abdel Mehdi emphasized that ISCI is a disciplined
party with a vision and defined program. However, relations
between ISCI and the USG are suffering from U.S. doubts about
ISCI's independence from Iran; the VP denied that ISCI's
"friendship" with Iran affects its independence. The VP
noted that the USG had quickly opened relations with Sunni
tribes in Anbar that promised to fight al-Qaeda, and he
claimed the U.S. had supplied them with arms and other
benefits. However, the U.S. military continues to target the
ISCI-affiliated Badr Corps. "This pains us," said Abdel
Mehdi, and strengthens extremists. The VP also called for
discussion of what federalism vision each side has for Iraq.


3. (S) Hammoudi highlighted Coalition Force (CF) detentions
of ISCI members. Many are security detainees held without
charges. Al-Sagheer said the U.S. has an interest in good

relations with ISCI because of its strong influence in Iraq,
but the U.S. still doubts ISCI's intentions, based on
"exaggerated" reports. Both Hammoudi and al-Sagheer implied
that they, as moderates, had expended political capital
within ISCI to bring it closer to the USG, but had not seen
any benefit from it. Al-Sagheer also mentioned CF detentions
of ISCI members and contrasted the U.S. supposedly arming
Sunni Anbar tribes with what he portrayed as inadequate
equipping of security forces in Najaf, an ISCI stronghold.
VP Abdel Mehdi complained that detainee cases should be
reviewed more frequently than every six months. The VP hoped
that the USG would explain to ISCI the reasons for detentions
of ISCI members and would bring to ISCI information about
suspect ISCI members before detaining them so ISCI could
purge its own ranks.


4. (S) Political Counselor noted that the CF power to detain
derives from UNSCR authority, and that the CF treat all
detainees equally. It is not possible to resolve the
situation by simply having CF rely on ISCI's word; working
this out is complex and will take time.

Militias
--------------


5. (S) Political Counselor noted that the USG and ISCI had
the same overall strategic vision for Iraq as a democratic,
stable country. However, this did not immediately translate
into cooperation on the street level. Overwhelmingly-Sunni
Anbar does not present the complexities of sectarianism
present in provinces like Baghdad and Diyala, which have
multiple Sunni, Shiite and al-Qaeda-linked groups. Without
uniforms, all armed men look alike, and the goal is to get
armed men off the streets. ISCI's expectation is that
strategic dialogue would result in no detentions of those
affiliated with ISCI, but it is difficult to translate
political dialogue into dealings with armed men on the street.


6. (S) VP Abdel Mehdi said that Shiite-dominated southern
Iraq is similar to Anbar in terms of the absence of sectarian
conflict. The VP argued that it is inconsistent for the U.S.
to target Badr while (he claimed) arming Sunni Anbar tribes
and tolerating the Kurdish peshmerga. Even the Shiite Jaysh
al-Mahdi (JAM) militia, he claimed, could act freely. "ISCI
should be rewarded, not punished," the VP said.

Reconciliation and Benchmarks
--------------


BAGHDAD 00002182 002 OF 002



7. (S) The VP complained that USG political benchmarks for
Iraq are one-sided, only favoring Sunnis. Political
Counselor explained that Iraq's Sunnis feel excluded from the
GOI and if not made to feel included, would continue to be a
problem for Iraq and the region. The process behind recent
GOI political appointments has not been transparent and has
fueled perceptions of sectarianism. VP Abdel Mehdi defended
current appointments as only a re-balancing of a system in
which Sunnis for years enjoyed disproportionately high
numbers of appointees.


8. (S) Al-Sagheer said his understanding of reconciliation
is different that the USG's. For example, in his view,
de-Ba'athification has nothing to do with reconciliation;
"many Ba'ath are already back."

Way Forward on USG/ISCI Relations
--------------


9. (S) The VP said that ISCI seeks the same type of
relations with the U.S. that the Kurds have. Both he and
al-Sagheer said ISCI is not one side among many, but rather,
the dominant Shia faction both prior to the U.S. invasion of
Iraq and in the current Iraqi political scene, and the "main
component" of the GOI. The USG should consider ISCI's
messages "essential."


10. (S) Political Counselor said the USG and ISCI should
work toward political cooperation in specific geographic
areas, and use the political leg of the strategic dialogue as
a "think tank" to develop joint ideas and plans on large
strategic issues including federalism, reconciliation, rule
of law, elections and de-Ba'athification.


11. (S) The VP welcomed both ideas. He suggested an area
where ISCI has "political weight," such as the southern
cities of Nasariyah, Kut, or Diwaniyah. Al-Sagheer suggested
Baghdad's Saidiya district.
CROCKER