Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07BAGHDAD2158
2007-06-30 14:18:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Baghdad
Cable title:  

PRT TIKRIT: BAYJI REFINERY SHUTS DOWN AMID RISING

Tags:  ECON EIND ENRG EPET IZ KCOR 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO0228
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHGB #2158/01 1811418
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 301418Z JUN 07
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1965
INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE
RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 002158 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/01/2017
TAGS: ECON EIND ENRG EPET IZ KCOR
SUBJECT: PRT TIKRIT: BAYJI REFINERY SHUTS DOWN AMID RISING
TENSIONS

REF: A. A. BAGHDAD 677

B. B. BAGHDAD 682

C. C. 06 BAGHDAD 4535

Classified By: Classified by Christian Redmer, PRT Iraq Provincial Acti
on Officer (IPAO),for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 002158

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/01/2017
TAGS: ECON EIND ENRG EPET IZ KCOR
SUBJECT: PRT TIKRIT: BAYJI REFINERY SHUTS DOWN AMID RISING
TENSIONS

REF: A. A. BAGHDAD 677

B. B. BAGHDAD 682

C. C. 06 BAGHDAD 4535

Classified By: Classified by Christian Redmer, PRT Iraq Provincial Acti
on Officer (IPAO),for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (U) This is a PRT Tikrit, Salah ad Din cable.


2. (C) This cable has been cleared by the intelligence
section, 3 BCT, 82nd Airborne Division.


3. (C) SUMMARY. The Bayji oil refinery closed its
distribution gates on June 25 in accordance with the
qada-wide general movement curfew decreed by the Governor of
Salah ad Din, Hamad Hamoud al Shakti. Coupled with a
production shutdown due to concurrent power failures, the
three day curfew ) imposed by al Shakti in response to the
devastating car bomb attack upon the Bayji IP (Iraqi Police)
station ) had the effect of turning the facility into a
ghost-town, according to onsite CF (Coalition Forces)
reporting. While the June 25 attack appears to be unrelated
to the refinery, its repercussions interrupted the steady )
if inconsistent ) improvement in refined fuel production and
distribution. Even before the attack, apprehensions seem to
be rising about the possibility of an AQIZ (Al Qaeda in Iraq)
strike upon the ISF (Iraq Security Force) and/or CF forces at
the facility. END SUMMARY.

--------------
Some Hands Honest
--------------


4. (C) Five months after the order by PM Maliki to mount a
&military invasion8 (reftel A) of the Bayji refinery, a
number of positive indicators are seen in Bayji and Salah ad
Din. For example, average gasoline production increased from
2021 cubic meters from February 13-18 to 2851 cubic meters
during June 17-23 (two periods unmarked by facility
shutdowns). According to atmospheric reports, the average
wait at fuel stations in Tikrit decreased from 8-10 hours in
January to 2-4 hours in June.


5. (C) In addition, the improved onsite security ) largely
due to greater CF presence as well as the 8th Strategic

Infrastructure Brigade (SIB) ) resulted in an apparent
reduction (although certainly not elimination) of corruption
within the refinery gates. During interviews conducted in
April, May, and June, residents of Tikrit consistently told
IPAO that they saw improvements in the supply of fuel
reaching the streets. (NOTE: Severe fuel shortages remain -
especially in the southern areas of the province such as
Samarra and Balad ) however, Operation Honest Hands thus far
appears to be partially succeeding in strict fuel
distribution terms. END NOTE.) While increased production
helped to alleviate the severe shortages throughout northern
Iraq, fuel distribution is largely a zero-sum game; the
increased amount of fuel sold at fuel stations is derived not
only from surplus production but also from onsite smuggling
operations, some of which are operated by AQIZ.

--------------
Leaving the Faucet Intact...
--------------


6. (C) During a confidential interview on April 18, the
Director General of the North Refineries Company, Ali
Al-Obeydi, told IPAO that he was regularly threatened by AQIZ
through text messages. According to Al-Obeydi, AQIZ
operatives were ¬ happy8 with the increased security
measures and were demanding that he comply with their demands
to steal fuel. In particular, Al-Obeydi mentioned that AQIZ
insisted that he leave the tunnel road valves ) the pipeline
which runs south to the propane distribution facility - open
so that the excess fuel could be siphoned by their
operatives. In contrast to the area ex-Baathists, whom he
said that he was &taking care of8 ) through his tribal
relationships ) Al-Obeydi left no doubt that he believed
that AQIZ was the chief threat to the refinery security.


7. (C) Nonetheless, Al-Obeydi strongly emphasized that AQIZ
would not attack the refinery production complex for two
reasons: the immense profits flowing back to the organization
from fuel smuggling, and the great value the local Sunni
tribes placed on the refinery and their own smuggling
operations. According to Al-Obeydi, direct or tacit support
currently enjoyed by AQIZ from many quarters would quickly
evaporate after any kind of attack on the refinery facility
itself.

--------------

BAGHDAD 00002158 002 OF 003


...But Tightening the Spigot?
--------------


8. (C) While the Bayji refinery still suffers from various
technical challenges; inadequate HFO disposal consistently
ranks as the most significant impediment to greater
efficiency (reftel B). Capitalizing on this situation, AIF
may have terrorized HFO (Heavy Fuel Oil) tanker drivers )
threatening to blow up their tankers ) in order to end
production temporarily when it suited their political
purposes (reftel C). During the second half of June,
according to Bayji contacts, HFO tanker drivers reported
increasing intimidation on the highway ) especially in the
vicinity of El-Amin, a trucker restaurant on the road to Ash
Sharqat, with &mujahedin8 warning drivers not to drive HFO
that &would be sold to the Zionists.8 Due to increased
security measures and better coordination amongst tanker
drivers, this latest effort appears to have been less
successful than in the past. Although HFO distribution
ceased temporarily, refinery officials were able to maintain
production through the crisis. A potential next step - an
attack on the facility periphery, such as damage of the
distribution gate or the SIB command post ) could more
effectively halt fuel distribution but leave the vital
infrastructure intact.

--------------
&Crafty Like a Fox8
--------------


9. (C) During an interview conducted on June 22, the
Governor,s cousin and long-time insider (and fellow al Qaisi
member),Kheralla Essa Turuk, told IPAO that he and the
Governor were both &fearful8 about the possibility of an
imminent AQIZ attack at the distribution gates. When queried
about specific measures the Governor would take to address
the situation, however, Kheralla did not have a response.
(NOTE: The Governor appears to arbitrarily assign fellow al
Qaisi members to the refinery from time to time. This is as
much related to an internal power struggle as well as simple
nepotism than to a genuine attempt to improve security,
reftel. END NOTE.)


10. (C) Turuk told IPAO that he was being sent to the
refinery by the Governor to &clean out8 the OPF and remove
the AQIZ influence in the organization. Turuk said that the
Governor was concerned about the security situation and
needed a &good man8 onsite. When asked about the current
director of OPF (Oil Protection Forces),Amar Sawadi, Turuk
replied that he was not trustworthy. Specifically, Turuk
said that Sawadi was allowing AQIZ infiltration of the
facility and that he was &crafty, like a fox.8 Although he
would not specify his role within the complex (he said he
would be a &facility security expert8),Turuk indicated to
IPAO that he would provide a list of all of the AQIZ
operatives working within the refinery to CF; however, this
list is still forthcoming.

--------------
Obeydi, Samir, Walid Gone Simultaneously
--------------


11. (C) Three of the most influential officials at the
refinery, Director General of Distribution, Samir Abbas,
Director General of Distribution for Salah ad Din Province,
Walid Murshed, and Al-Obeydi are currently absent from the
facility. While Al-Obeydi is in Baghdad for consultations
and Abbas is on a regularly scheduled vacation, Murshed left
suddenly - ostensibly for emergency leave. Before leaving,
Murshed told a CF contact that &things were getting too
hot.8

--------------
Comment
--------------


12. (C) COMMENT. The Bayji oil refinery and its environs
never lack drama, and the devastating attack on the IP
station clearly exacerbated local apprehensions. However, in
addition to mounting CF intelligence and the recent uptake in
AIF (Anti Iraq Forces) attacks in and around the facility, a
number of subtle recent changes may suggest that AQIZ may be
planning a spectacular attack upon the refinery periphery.
Considered by many to be untouchable, the refinery is the
&prize jewel8 to most SaD Sunnis (CF-friendly and
unfriendly alike) ) given the common perception of GOI here
- and a direct AQIZ attack upon refinery infrastructure which
would lead to a prolonged or permanent shutdown of the
facility appears unlikely. However, AQIZ has demonstrated a
willingness to impede fuel production and distribution via
intimidation of HFO drivers to achieve its political ends. A

BAGHDAD 00002158 003.2 OF 003


spectacular attack upon the distribution gates or another
peripheral target at the refinery could be merely an
escalation of a previous strategy. It could also serve
multiple AQIZ aims in one deft blow: increased intimidation
of the ISF, disruption of the steadily improving ) and
hard-earned - fuel distribution situation (with the resulting
negative political and economic effect),and a powerful
demonstration of AQIZ,s continued potency. Most important,
the currently feeble reaction of local leadership to this
threat ) in and out of the refinery - also casts doubt on
their ability to effectively counter the AQIZ menace in the
long-term. END COMMENT.


13. (U) PRT Tikrit thanks the soldiers of the 1st Battalion,
505th Paratroop Regiment, 82nd Airborne Division for their
invaluable contributions and support that make this reporting
possible.


14. (U) For additional reporting from PRT Tikrit, Salah ad
Din, please see our SIPRNET reporting blog:

http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Tikrit.

CROCKER