Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07BAGHDAD2145
2007-06-29 13:35:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Baghdad
Cable title:  

READ OUT FROM JUNE 26 MCNS

Tags:  IZ MARR MOPS PINR PINS PNAT PREL 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO9602
RR RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #2145/01 1801335
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 291335Z JUN 07
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1939
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 002145 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/28/2017
TAGS: IZ MARR MOPS PINR PINS PNAT PREL
SUBJECT: READ OUT FROM JUNE 26 MCNS

Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 002145

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/28/2017
TAGS: IZ MARR MOPS PINR PINS PNAT PREL
SUBJECT: READ OUT FROM JUNE 26 MCNS

Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C/REL MNF-I) SUMMARY: Prime Minister Maliki presided
over the June 16 meeting of the Ministerial Committee for
National Security, during which:

--Commander in Chief Joint Forces General Babakir al-Zebari
gave an operational update on Baquba. Commanding General
MNF-I David Petraeus expanded on the summary, providing an
update on the surge offensive ongoing throughout Iraq against
Al Qaeda. Petraeus pressed the need for the Government of
Iraq to follow through on non-security lines of operation for
the cleared communities.

--National Security Advisor Mowafak al-Rubaie asked General
Petraeus the status of Maliki's request at the June 19 MCNS
to use Iraqi forces to secure the Mujahedin e-Khalq (MeK) at
Ashraf.

--Minister of State for National Security, Shirwan Waeli said
his staff had completed a study on improving communications
security through better regulation of mobile phone companies
and distribution of SIM cards, as well as through the
monitoring customer usage.

--Rubaie announced that the two committees established to
investigate the Samarra bombing had completed their work and
handed the written reports to Maliki for review.

--Maliki said the Iraqi Security Forces sent to Samarra were
in dire straits due to increased attacks by well-armed
terrorists and inadequate life support and logistics.
Petraeus advised Maliki to direct the relevant commanders to
take more responsibility for improving the situation and that
the forces in Samarra were also confused from the lack of a
clear mission and inadequate command-and-control mechanisms.

--Maliki announced that he would request the Sadrists delay
their planned July 5 march to Samarra by sixty days because
of the current danger and lack of adequate ISF to protect the
marching Iraqis.

--National Security Advisor Rubaie announced the formation of
two separate committees for National Reconciliation. DPM

Zoubai objected to the "Technical Committee" in favor of
keeping just the "Political Committee."

--Maliki told Petraeus that the Ministry of Finance had
already transferred funds to cover both the continued
operation of the Rule of Law Complex in Rusafa and the 5000
new corrections guards for the Iraqi prison system.

--Deputy National Security Advisor, Dr. Safaa summarized a
proposal that would create an overarching coordination
committee for the national security structure. END SUMMARY.

Military Progress
--------------


2. (C/REL MNF-I) Commander in Chief Joint Forces General
Babakir summarized the military operations over the past week
in Baquda. General Petraeus stressed that Baquba is just
part of the overall intensified campaign against Al Qaeda.
He said Coalition forces were taking down "the enemy" all
over Iraq, including in Baghdad and its suburbs, north and
south of Fallujah, and throughout the Euphrates River Valley.
He said these operations have yielded substantial gains,
including a reduction in the number of car bombs. Petraeus
then emphasized that the GOI must do its part on the
non-security side by ensuring basic services are provided and
reconstruction is carried out in cleared areas. Maliki
agreed, pointing out that the he is working closely with the
Minister of Trade to ensure deliveries of basic food stuffs,
such as flour, get to communities affected by military
operations. Maliki went on to predict that Baquba
revitalization might occur quicker than Anbar because of
existing local organizations.

MeK
--------------


3. (C/REL MNF-I) National Security Advisor Rubaie asked
General Petraeus if he had a response to Maliki's request to
turn security responsibility of the MeK in Camp Ashraf over
to the Iraqi Security forces. General Petraeus said that
prior to this meeting he had provided a letter responding to
Maliki's overall concerns with the MeK. Petraeus recommended
a discussion be postponed until Maliki had reviewed the
letter.

BAGHDAD 00002145 002 OF 003



Regulating Cell Phones
--------------


4. (C/REL MNF-I) Minister of State for National Security,
Shirwan Waeli said his staff had completed a study on
improving communications security through better regulation
of mobile phone companies and the distribution of SIM cards,
strict checking of buyer ID cards, as well as through
monitoring of customer usage. Waeli stressed that these
measures would disrupt terrorist activity. Deputy Prime
Minister Barham Saleh stressed that any new regulations,
including government monitoring of cell phone conversations,
would need to be consistent with Iraqi law.

Samarra Bombing Investigation Completed
--------------


5. (C/REL MNF-I) Rubaie passed out copies of the findings
from two committees established to investigate the Samarra
mosque bombing. Maliki said he understood that the
investigation had determined that the Facility Protection
Service was responsible for the bombing and that four members
were arrested for their role. Rubaie said that only one of
the four had been arrested because three were fugitives.
Maliki questioned the role of the local police who were
patrolling the street outside of the mosque. Rubaie
responded that the committees' reports answer this question.
Saleh asked if the commission had investigated the
intelligence failure associated with the bombing, noting that
the intelligence community had warned of a plot to blow up
the mosque's minarets two weeks prior to the attack. Rubaie
said he believed the committees did examine this issue.

Maliki Reports Trouble for ISF in Samarra
--------------


6. (C/REL MNF-I) Maliki complained that the Iraqi Security
Forces in Samarra were "suffering", arguing that if their
situation did not change, they will be destined for defeat,
making the Government look weak. The forces, he said, are
outgunned by the enemy, are taking significant casualties,
and are not receiving adequate logistical support. Maliki
gave an example of a VBIED that hit an IP station and killed
seven police because there were no concrete barriers. He
turned to General Petraeus for assistance, particularly
asking for aerial support and vigorous offensive operations.
Petraeus assured Maliki that the Coalition forces were always
willing to provide military support. He added, however, that
they needed actionable intelligence upon which to act.
Petraeus also stressed that, while coalition forces would do
all they could to assist with logistics, it was critical for
security force commanders in Samarra to take more
responsibility to ensure their troops obtain food, water,
shelter, and adequate w
eaponry -- a point vocally supported by Deputy Prime Minister
Zoubai. Petraeus said he was also concerned that the
missions of the various Iraqi units in Samarra were not
clear. The US forces in the area had reported these
deficiencies to Petraeus, noting that they had "no idea who
is in charge" in Samarra and that no Iraqi seemed to know
what they were to do on a daily basis. (Note: These issues
have been largely resolved since the MCNS. End Note.)

Samarra March to be Delayed by Sixty Days
--------------


7. (C/REL MNF-I) Maliki announced that he would request that
the Sadrists delay their July 5 march to Samarra by sixty
days. He said the road to Samarra is too dangerous and that
the GOI does not have sufficient force to protect the crowds
that such an event would attract.

National Reconciliation
--------------


8. (C/REL MNF-I) NSA Rubaie announced that the PM had formed
two committees to foster national reconciliation. One would
be headed by himself and be called the "Political Committee"
and the second (to be headed by Dr. Bassima of OCINC though
this was not stated) would be called the "Technical
Committee." Both committees would work in close coordination
with MNF-I to take advantage of the "golden opportunity" to
reconcile tribes and former armed groups. DPM Zoubai said
that the Technical Committee might make "mistakes" and urged
the MCNS to drop this committee entirely in favor of only the
Political Committee. (Note: Zoubai is concerned that the
Technical Committee would inhibit reconciliation with Sunni
tribes and armed groups. End Note.)

BAGHDAD 00002145 003 OF 003



Iraqi Detainee Operations
--------------


9. (C/REL MNF-I) Petraeus reiterated that the Rule of Law
Complex would be funded by MNF-I only through July and that
the Prime Minister must act quickly to ensure it keeps
operating. Maliki said that Ministry of Finance had already
transferred ID63 billion for the ROL Complex support and
another ID64 billion for the hiring of the needed 5000 Iraqi
Corrections Service Guards.

Intelligence National Security Legislation
--------------


10. (C/REL MNF-I) Deputy National Security Advisor, Dr. Safaa
summarized a proposal that would create an overarching
coordination committee for the national security structure.
This committee would be in line with the national
constitution and laws. The committee would not be an
executive body, serving instead as an advisory and
coordination cell for all intelligence entities within the
Iraqi government. All attendees seemed a bit confused by the
plan and asked for time to review and comment on the
proposal. Saleh said the overall intelligence structure was
already too complicated, and that adding another entity would
only add to the disarray. He stressed the current system was
comprised of too many organizations with overlapping
responsibilities and unclear missions. Zoubai supported
Saleh's assessment, stressing that developing a well-defined
and coordinated intelligence system was critical to Iraq's
long-term success.

CROCKER