Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07BAGHDAD211
2007-01-19 17:58:00
SECRET
Embassy Baghdad
Cable title:
IRAQI PM ON BAGHDAD SECURITY, PROPOSED BORDER
how-toVZCZCXRO3254 OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHIHL RUEHKUK DE RUEHGB #0211/01 0191758 ZNY SSSSS ZZH O 191758Z JAN 07 FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9178 INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUMICEA/USCENTCOM INTEL CEN MACDILL AFB FL//CCJ2// PRIORITY RHEHWSR/WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC//NSC// PRIORITY
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 000211
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/18/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV MOPS PTER PBTS IZ IR SY
SUBJECT: IRAQI PM ON BAGHDAD SECURITY, PROPOSED BORDER
CLOSURES WITH IRAN AND SYRIA
Classified By: Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad, reasons 1.4
(b) and (d).
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 000211
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/18/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV MOPS PTER PBTS IZ IR SY
SUBJECT: IRAQI PM ON BAGHDAD SECURITY, PROPOSED BORDER
CLOSURES WITH IRAN AND SYRIA
Classified By: Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad, reasons 1.4
(b) and (d).
1. (S) Summary: In a January 17 meeting with MNF-I
Commanding General (CG) Casey and the Ambassador, Iraqi PM
Maliki agreed to proposals for traffic controls in Baghdad to
prevent suicide and vehicle borne improvised explosive device
(VBIED) attacks. The CG told the PM he is satisfied so far
with Iraqi Baghdad commander General Aboud; the PM asked the
CG to inform him if there are any problems with Aboud. The
PM approved temporary closure of border points of entry
(POEs) with Iran and Syria; the POEs will be re-opened
gradually, as better inspection procedures and equipment are
put in place. The Ambassador raised the Council of
Representatives' (CoR) persistent failure to achieve quorum.
The PM said he had called CoR Speaker Mashadani into his
office, blamed him for the problem, and the PM will address
the CoR on this issue and on security, but has not yet set a
date. The PM told the CG and Ambassador it would have been
better if the GOI had been informed beforehand about the
January 16 detention of two Wasit Provincial Council (PC)
members. End Summary.
--------------
Baghdad Security
--------------
2. (S) CG Casey showed PM Maliki a map of suicide and VBIED
attacks in the center of Baghdad since July, noting that most
occurred in mixed Sunni/Shiite neighborhood of east Baghdad
between the army canal and the Tigris River. This is the
place to take action, the CG said, including traffic control
measures, checkpoints on bridges, and some street closures.
The PM agreed; "if this is necessary for the plan, we will do
it."
3. (S) The PM suggested that all checkpoints include armored
vehicles not possessed by militias, such as tanks or humvees,
so that real checkpoints could easily be distinguished from
illegal militia checkpoints. The CG agreed to work the idea.
4. (S) The CG informed the PM that Iraqi Baghdad commander
General Aboud's headquarters would reach an initial
capability by February 1 and five districts would be occupied
by February 5. The PM asked the CG whether he was satisfied
with Aboud. The CG replied that so far there had been no
problem; the PM asked the CG to inform him if there are any
problems.
5. (S) The PM noted that the Iraqi National Police had some
personnel shortages and suggested 9700 extra police could be
brought in from Diwaniyah. The CG replied that it would be
difficult to ascertain whether they were reliable without
inspecting them; they could be infiltrated by militia. He
agreed to work with the MOI on it.
--------------
Border Closings
--------------
6. (S) The CG raised the proposed plan for border point of
entry (POE) closings. The idea, being worked with the MOI
and MOD, he explained, would be to close all POEs with Iran
and Syria, but not Jordan, for 72 hours and re-open them
gradually as they became prepared with better inspection
procedures and equipment. The PM approved of the idea. The
Ambassador urged that consideration be given to the effect
POE closure would have on the economy and on pilgrims,
especially as the Ashura holiday approaches.
7. (S) The PM noted the difficulty of closing Zurbatiyah POE
between Iraq and Iran; this is the POE from which Iraq
receives a great deal of kerosene needed to heat homes in the
winter. The PM also noted that, in the north, most of the
kerosene for the Mosul area comes through the Rabea'a POE,
which he proposed only be open to fuel tankers.
8. (S) The CG asked the PM to consider a closure from
January 28 to February 1; this would be after Ashura pilgrims
had entered Iraq but before they would leave. The PM said
the Ministry of Interior (MOI) wanted to close most POEs
permanently, pending improvements in security and
anti-smuggling efforts. It would do little good, the PM
added, to re-open POEs without scanning equipment; he asked
the CG to facilitate the arrival of scanning equipment.
9. (S) On POEs bordering Iran, the PM confirmed that the
policy would be that people and cargo would have to switch
BAGHDAD 00000211 002 OF 002
from Iranian to Iraqi vehicles; no Iranian vehicles would be
permitted to enter Iraq. The PM expressed concern over the
possible Kurdish reaction to the POE closures; the CG
recommended the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) be
notified of the proposed closure.
--------------
CoR Failure to Achieve Quorum
--------------
10. (C) The Ambassador asked the PM about his plans for
addressing the CoR about their persistent failure to achieve
quorum. The PM said he had not yet set a date but had called
in CoR Speaker Mashadani and "blamed him and held him
accountable" for CoR inactivity which, the PM noted, is
delaying key legislation. The PM said he would address the
CoR on both the quorum issue and on security; Mashadani
should announce the date when it was decided. Ambassador
will meet Mashadani on January 18 to finalize the date.
--------------
Wasit Detentions
--------------
11. (S) The CG raised the January 16 detentions of two Badr
Corps-affiliated Wasit PC members, saying MNF-I had good
intelligence that both belong to a network responsible for
financing, importing and distributing materiel for
explosively formed projectiles (EFPs) used against Coalition
Forces (CF). The two also have connections with Iran's Qods
Force (QF). The CG told the PM that one detainee had
telephone contact with a supposed Iranian "diplomat" detained
in December for EFP activity. In fact, Badr is using the
Zurbatiya POE to smuggle EFP materiel into Iraq.
12. (S) The PM replied that killing CF is "a violation" no
different that killing Iraqis. However, the PM added, it
would have been better if MNF-I had notified the GOI about
the Wasit operation beforehand. The Ambassador and CG took
the PM's point. The CG noted this was an Iraqi Army
operation using MNF-I intelligence, but nonetheless the GOI
should have been notified.
--------------
MOD/MOI Operational Reserve Ready
--------------
13. (C) The CG informed the PM that the MOD and MOI
operational reserve battalions are now assembled, trained,
and had performed an operation.
KHALILZAD
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/18/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV MOPS PTER PBTS IZ IR SY
SUBJECT: IRAQI PM ON BAGHDAD SECURITY, PROPOSED BORDER
CLOSURES WITH IRAN AND SYRIA
Classified By: Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad, reasons 1.4
(b) and (d).
1. (S) Summary: In a January 17 meeting with MNF-I
Commanding General (CG) Casey and the Ambassador, Iraqi PM
Maliki agreed to proposals for traffic controls in Baghdad to
prevent suicide and vehicle borne improvised explosive device
(VBIED) attacks. The CG told the PM he is satisfied so far
with Iraqi Baghdad commander General Aboud; the PM asked the
CG to inform him if there are any problems with Aboud. The
PM approved temporary closure of border points of entry
(POEs) with Iran and Syria; the POEs will be re-opened
gradually, as better inspection procedures and equipment are
put in place. The Ambassador raised the Council of
Representatives' (CoR) persistent failure to achieve quorum.
The PM said he had called CoR Speaker Mashadani into his
office, blamed him for the problem, and the PM will address
the CoR on this issue and on security, but has not yet set a
date. The PM told the CG and Ambassador it would have been
better if the GOI had been informed beforehand about the
January 16 detention of two Wasit Provincial Council (PC)
members. End Summary.
--------------
Baghdad Security
--------------
2. (S) CG Casey showed PM Maliki a map of suicide and VBIED
attacks in the center of Baghdad since July, noting that most
occurred in mixed Sunni/Shiite neighborhood of east Baghdad
between the army canal and the Tigris River. This is the
place to take action, the CG said, including traffic control
measures, checkpoints on bridges, and some street closures.
The PM agreed; "if this is necessary for the plan, we will do
it."
3. (S) The PM suggested that all checkpoints include armored
vehicles not possessed by militias, such as tanks or humvees,
so that real checkpoints could easily be distinguished from
illegal militia checkpoints. The CG agreed to work the idea.
4. (S) The CG informed the PM that Iraqi Baghdad commander
General Aboud's headquarters would reach an initial
capability by February 1 and five districts would be occupied
by February 5. The PM asked the CG whether he was satisfied
with Aboud. The CG replied that so far there had been no
problem; the PM asked the CG to inform him if there are any
problems.
5. (S) The PM noted that the Iraqi National Police had some
personnel shortages and suggested 9700 extra police could be
brought in from Diwaniyah. The CG replied that it would be
difficult to ascertain whether they were reliable without
inspecting them; they could be infiltrated by militia. He
agreed to work with the MOI on it.
--------------
Border Closings
--------------
6. (S) The CG raised the proposed plan for border point of
entry (POE) closings. The idea, being worked with the MOI
and MOD, he explained, would be to close all POEs with Iran
and Syria, but not Jordan, for 72 hours and re-open them
gradually as they became prepared with better inspection
procedures and equipment. The PM approved of the idea. The
Ambassador urged that consideration be given to the effect
POE closure would have on the economy and on pilgrims,
especially as the Ashura holiday approaches.
7. (S) The PM noted the difficulty of closing Zurbatiyah POE
between Iraq and Iran; this is the POE from which Iraq
receives a great deal of kerosene needed to heat homes in the
winter. The PM also noted that, in the north, most of the
kerosene for the Mosul area comes through the Rabea'a POE,
which he proposed only be open to fuel tankers.
8. (S) The CG asked the PM to consider a closure from
January 28 to February 1; this would be after Ashura pilgrims
had entered Iraq but before they would leave. The PM said
the Ministry of Interior (MOI) wanted to close most POEs
permanently, pending improvements in security and
anti-smuggling efforts. It would do little good, the PM
added, to re-open POEs without scanning equipment; he asked
the CG to facilitate the arrival of scanning equipment.
9. (S) On POEs bordering Iran, the PM confirmed that the
policy would be that people and cargo would have to switch
BAGHDAD 00000211 002 OF 002
from Iranian to Iraqi vehicles; no Iranian vehicles would be
permitted to enter Iraq. The PM expressed concern over the
possible Kurdish reaction to the POE closures; the CG
recommended the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) be
notified of the proposed closure.
--------------
CoR Failure to Achieve Quorum
--------------
10. (C) The Ambassador asked the PM about his plans for
addressing the CoR about their persistent failure to achieve
quorum. The PM said he had not yet set a date but had called
in CoR Speaker Mashadani and "blamed him and held him
accountable" for CoR inactivity which, the PM noted, is
delaying key legislation. The PM said he would address the
CoR on both the quorum issue and on security; Mashadani
should announce the date when it was decided. Ambassador
will meet Mashadani on January 18 to finalize the date.
--------------
Wasit Detentions
--------------
11. (S) The CG raised the January 16 detentions of two Badr
Corps-affiliated Wasit PC members, saying MNF-I had good
intelligence that both belong to a network responsible for
financing, importing and distributing materiel for
explosively formed projectiles (EFPs) used against Coalition
Forces (CF). The two also have connections with Iran's Qods
Force (QF). The CG told the PM that one detainee had
telephone contact with a supposed Iranian "diplomat" detained
in December for EFP activity. In fact, Badr is using the
Zurbatiya POE to smuggle EFP materiel into Iraq.
12. (S) The PM replied that killing CF is "a violation" no
different that killing Iraqis. However, the PM added, it
would have been better if MNF-I had notified the GOI about
the Wasit operation beforehand. The Ambassador and CG took
the PM's point. The CG noted this was an Iraqi Army
operation using MNF-I intelligence, but nonetheless the GOI
should have been notified.
--------------
MOD/MOI Operational Reserve Ready
--------------
13. (C) The CG informed the PM that the MOD and MOI
operational reserve battalions are now assembled, trained,
and had performed an operation.
KHALILZAD