COR SPEAKER MASHADANI WEARY BUT NOT LETTING GO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 002099

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/26/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV IZ
SUBJECT: COR SPEAKER MASHADANI WEARY BUT NOT LETTING GO

REF: A. BAGHDAD 1935


B. BAGHDAD 1934

Classified by PolCouns Scobey for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: Departing PolCouns paid a farewell call on
the embattled Council of Representatives (CoR) Speaker June
25, hearing his side of a political struggle that continues
to threaten his job. The Speaker lamented the loss that his
departure would mean for the Sunnis and complained of Iran's
dominance of Baghdad politics. In spite of internal rifts in
most of Iraq's political blocs, he said new alliances and an
apolitical cabinet could help improve the policy landscape.
He continues to argue that his ouster is inappropriate
without a reconsideration of the overall political agreement
by which the PM and President were also chosen. When the
Speaker called for a slower timeline on benchmark legislation
and cited U.S. ambivalence for Sunni causes, PolCouns
reminded him of our robust efforts, both rhetorically and
practically, to assure Sunni issues received consideration
and to encourage Sunni participation within the context of an
open political process in which we hoped all parties would
participate actively. End summary.


2. (C) Prior to her departure from Baghdad, PolCouns paid a
farewell call on the embattled CoR Speaker Mahmoud Mashadani
on June 25, asking his thoughts on the current situation in
Baghdad. Rather than address the question directly, the
Speaker lamented the image of a Sunni speaker being pressed
to resign, yet another loss for the "Arab Sunni" in Iraq who
are unable to "maintain their pride" in the face of "illegal"
Shia excesses. He said Iran's national security relies on a
strong Shia coalition in Iraq. (Note: Recent sessions have
been chaired by Deputy Speaker Khalid al-Attiya, an
independent Shia, often with Mashadani in the CoR building
but avoiding the session room because his entry would spark a
Shia walk-out. The Sunni bloc boycotted the June 24 and 25
sessions in protest of the Speaker's absence. End note.)


3. (C) Citing internal rifts in most of Iraq's political
coalitions, and toying rhetorically with a number of
theoretical alliances between these somewhat fractured blocs,
the Speaker said the Sunni (Tawafuq) group could work with
Fadhila and those Sadrists who resist Iranian influence more
than it could cooperate with others in the Shia coalition.
He promoted his oft-cited desire for a cabinet of technocrats
not allied with any party, stressing that the parliament
(CoR) should be the political arbiter while the executive
branch should focus on professional administration of
executive functions. The cabinet needs to be independent of
politics to be effective, he argued, suggesting that PM
al-Maliki has "turned the GoI into Dawa." He complained that
the PM was not an honest broker and that an "explosion" was
coming unless the GoI gained more balance.


4. (C) Returning to his own fate as Speaker, Mashadani said
his appointment was part of a broader political equation and
that the PM and Presidency should be reconsidered if he was
to be removed. All had agreed that "one plus one equals two"
and now some were suggesting that "one plus one equals ten,"
he insisted, citing the unconstitutional nature of the effort
to oust him. (Note: The Speaker cited Article 49-5 of the
constitution which calls upon the CoR to "promulgate a law
dealing with the replacement of its members on resignation,
dismissal, or death." A Tawafuq CoR member told PolOff later
that evening that just such a law was under consideration and
might pave the way for the Speaker's resignation. The idea
was to forward the law quickly and allow the Speaker to chair
one or more sessions before his actual resignation. End
note.)


5. (C) Mashadani said U.S. pressure on the CoR to produce
laws on oil and other key benchmarks was working against
"both our interests." A strong GoI is a clear U.S. goal, he
said, and pressure to produce an oil law quickly makes the
GoI look weak. He argued for a six-month timeline ("what is
six months between friends?"). Security also needs time to
succeed, he said, and would not be improved by quick passage
of an oil law.


6. (C) The Speaker said the USG stood by as if it were
unconcerned while the Shia pressed forward with
constitutionally questionable activities. He said the U.S.
is too comfortable with Iran's influence on the GoI and
resists Sunni efforts to seek help from its Arab neighbors.
The GoI has lost the trust of the Iraqi people, he lamented,
as too many operational functions of the GoI were "under
Iranian rule." PolCouns reminded the Speaker of our
oft-stated and very evident support for the GoI, an open
political process, and participation by all parties in Iraq.
Mashadani appreciated the expression of solidarity with the
Iraqi people but remained skeptical of the depth of U.S.
engagement in behalf of Sunni causes.

BAGHDAD 00002099 002 OF 002




7. (C) Before the meeting closed, Mashadani's mood became
temporarily angry as he also complained that the U.S. was
doing nothing to help its friends, clearly suggesting that
the U.S. should intervene to save his job. Pol/C made clear
that the U.S. supported the current government, respected the
right of the members of the Council of Representatives to
exercise their constitutional rights, and hoped that the
current crisis in the CoR would be solved on the basis of
what was in Iraq's interests. She added that she hoped
Mashadani would continue his role as a Sunni political leader
and to work toward reconciliation. The meeting ended on a
cordial note.
CROCKER