AMBASSADOR'S JUNE 21 MEETING WITH VICE PRESIDENT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 002070

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/23/2017
TAGS: ECON ENRG IZ PLO
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S JUNE 21 MEETING WITH VICE PRESIDENT
TARIQ AL-HASHIMI

Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

(C) SUMMARY: The Ambassador and other senior Embassy staff
members met with Vice President Tariq al-Hashimi to discuss a
number of topics including security, hydrocarbon legislation,
the "three plus one" effort, and the effectiveness of the
Ministry of Interior. While the Vice President reported
progress on the negotiations related to the de-Baathification
effort, he expressed concerns regarding security and the
effectiveness of the law enforcement and paramilitary
activities of the Ministry of Interior. END SUMMARY.


1. (C) On June 21, 2007, the Ambassador, Meghan O'Sullivan,
the Economic Minister-Counselor, and others met with Vice
President Tariq al-Hashimi (VP) to discuss a range of topics.
The Ambassador expressed some frustration with so many
senior officials from the Government of Iraq (GOI) traveling
out of the country for lengthy periods of time, and welcomed
al-Hashimi's decision to cancel a planned trip to Austria.
The Ambassador asked about progress on the three plus one
effort (an executive committee comprised of the Prime
Minister, the President, and the two Vice Presidents),
particularly in light of President Jalal Talabani's trip to
China.


2. (C) The VP reported that he and President Talabani had
been discussing the effort and had exchanged competing
proposals, but in Talabani's absences, he had Talabani's
authority to proceed with the process of resolving all
outstanding issues. The draft text of an agreement was with
Vice President Adil Abd al-Mahdi, who had promised comments
within days. The Ambassador pressed the VP noting that it
was in the best interest of the GOI to resolve the
outstanding issues without delay. The VP stated that while
the three plus one group has not been functioning formally,
the Prime Minister, the President, and both Vice Presidents
have met to discuss issues.


3. (C) The Ambassador informed the VP that negotiators from
the GOI and Kurdistan Regional Government have agreed upon a
draft Revenue Management law, and expressed the need to have
it approved by the Council of Ministers and sent to the
Council of Representatives (COR). The Ambassador also stated
that the COR should act swiftly and decisively. The VP
responded that while he had not seen the draft law in its
final form, he did not expect major issues to arise.


4. (C) The Ambassador also asked if an effort was underway
to promote more moderate groups. The VP responded that there
was a systematic effort of meetings, though no concrete
objective had been identified. He also stated that the
efforts would continue.


5. (C) The VP then stated that he was primarily concerned
how the GOI will serve the needs of the Iraqi people.
O'Sullivan observed that passage of the Revenue Management
law would benefit all Iraqis, and she encouraged the VP to
publicly take credit for its passage. The Ambassador also
noted that the Revenue Management law provides transparency
and accountability for funds accrued from petroleum
production activities, that the law will have to be properly
implemented, and that the law will give the Iraqi people the
ability to hold the GOI accountable for the use of the funds.

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SECURITY
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6. (C) The VP observed that no one had dreamed that the
liberation from the previous regime would have resulted in
the current security situation. He stated that there are
signs of Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM) mobilization. The Ambassador
also observed that JAM is a particularly difficult issue in
the south and that Coalition Forces (CF) are watching Baghdad
for indications of JAM activities. The VP stated that if the
CF and the Iraqi Army (IA) are unable to address JAM
aggression, the GOI and CF should consider arming
neighborhood self-defense organizations, as has occurred in
the al-Anbar province.


7. (C) The Ambassador noted that the Prime Minister has
acknowledged the problem and considers it an appropriate
topic for discussion. The idea of neighborhood self-defense
organizations may be viable if they are linked to the
Government; no one wants the formation of groups that may
become a problem later. The Ambassador noted that the Prime
Minister wants to form a committee to address the
self-defense idea in an organized fashion. The Ambassador
also stated that there are major actions underway against JAM
and al-Qaeda and asked the VP about problems with the
Ministry of Interior (MOI).


8. (C) The VP stated his concern that some Iraqi Security

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Forces (ISF) are still behaving along sectarian lines, but he
has observed some improvement. He stated that the GOI and
the CF need to be partners in addressing security issues.
O'Sullivan suggested that the security matters and issues
related to the performance of the ISF be addressed by the
three plus one group. The VP stated that the Minister of
Interior has been threatened and that coordination between
the MOI and the VP's office has deteriorated. Al-Hashimi
asserted that there were 15,000 people in uniform who were
criminals.


9. (C) The VP asked for the Ambassador's help with issues
associated with the MOI and in reforming MOI. He stated that
the GOI has prepared memoranda to discuss the issues, but
that no decisions had been made. The Ambassador agreed to
assist where and when appropriate.

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DE-BAATHIFICATION
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10. (C) O'Sullivan asked about progress on the
de-Baathification effort. The VP stated that the issues in
this arena were between the Sunnis and the Shia and that
there appeared to be an agreement to allow higher level
former Baath Party members to participate in the government.
He noted that President Talabani had been lobbying for some
flexibility in this regard. The VP stated that Vice
President Adil Abd al-Mahdi had a draft of the law. The VP
also stated that he did not object to senior Baath Party
members being part of GOI security organizations; he wanted
to leave the past in the past and focus on the future to
avoid a breakup of the country.

CROCKER