Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07BAGHDAD2029
2007-06-20 05:43:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Baghdad
Cable title:  

SENATORS MCCASKILL AND CARPER MEETING WITH DEPUTY

Tags:  ECON ENRG IZ PREL 
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VZCZCXRO0233
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #2029/01 1710543
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 200543Z JUN 07
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1781
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 002029 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/17/2017
TAGS: ECON ENRG IZ PREL
SUBJECT: SENATORS MCCASKILL AND CARPER MEETING WITH DEPUTY
PRIME MINISTER BARHAM SALEH


Classified By: AMBASSADOR RYAN C. CROCKER FOR REASONS 1.5 (b) and (d)

SUMMARY: On June 16, 2007, Senators Claire McCaskill (D-Mo.)
and Thomas Carper (D-Del.),Lieutenant General Ann Dunwoody,
Deputy Chief of Staff G-4 (Logistics),and Patrick
Fitzgerald, Auditor General of the Army, met with Deputy
Prime Minister Barham Saleh (DPM). While the group discussed
a variety of issues, much of the discussion involved the
status of Iraq,s efforts to achieve stability and the level
and length of the United States, commitment in Iraq.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 002029

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/17/2017
TAGS: ECON ENRG IZ PREL
SUBJECT: SENATORS MCCASKILL AND CARPER MEETING WITH DEPUTY
PRIME MINISTER BARHAM SALEH


Classified By: AMBASSADOR RYAN C. CROCKER FOR REASONS 1.5 (b) and (d)

SUMMARY: On June 16, 2007, Senators Claire McCaskill (D-Mo.)
and Thomas Carper (D-Del.),Lieutenant General Ann Dunwoody,
Deputy Chief of Staff G-4 (Logistics),and Patrick
Fitzgerald, Auditor General of the Army, met with Deputy
Prime Minister Barham Saleh (DPM). While the group discussed
a variety of issues, much of the discussion involved the
status of Iraq,s efforts to achieve stability and the level
and length of the United States, commitment in Iraq.


1. Sen. McCaskill first inquired about the DPM,s
perspective of the American public,s frustration with
progress toward stability in Iraq. The DPM responded that
when he first returned to Iraq, he was shocked at the level
of devastation he observed after thirty-five years of neglect
and Saddam,s rule. He stated that reconstruction and
reconciliation in Iraq is being "burdened" by a "sea of
change" in the region as it deals with terrorism and radical
Islamic forces. He also stated that Iraq is subject to the
dynamics of other countries, including the internal dynamics
of the United States.


2. The DPM observed that U.S. forces under General Petraeus
were doing a good job and he was seeing significant changes
in Baghdad. He, however, recognized that the "Surge" can not
be sustained in the long-term, but needed to last long enough
to allow political remedies to take hold. The DPM stated
that these remedies had to include strategic, collective
leadership that involves Sunni interests.


3. The DPM stated that the Government of Iraq (GoI) was
working hard to pass certain "bench mark" legislation
including the Hydrocarbon and De-Baath'ification Laws. He
observed that such major pieces of legislation would take
many months to complete in the United States. He also
observed that Iraq had been working on the Hydrocarbon law
for six month and that the De-Baath'ification law was still
being drafted.


4. The DPM stated that the current effort in Iraq could not
be allowed to fail; that just after returning from a visit to
Iran, he recognized that Iraq is where the "new Middle East"
begins. He observed that the battle in Iraq is a struggle
between radical Islam and those who want to live in a
peaceful society. In his opinion, the struggle was a
"generational" struggle very much like the Cold War. He also
stated that al-Qaeda was not an isolated phenomenon, that it
was a "unique problem in an interconnected world." The DPM
also stated that, while he understood America,s frustration,
the battle for Iraq was a battle that could not be lost. The
DPM stated that Iraq needed long-term and sustainable
American help, and that if milestones were missed, America
could not just leave.


5. Sen. McCaskill asked if there were individuals in the
Iraqi Government who wanted to see the government fail. The
DPM responded by stating that there were those who had their
own agenda and wanted more power, but that the challenge was
to arrive at a power-sharing arrangement. He observed that,
last year when the al-Askari shrine was bombed in Sammara,
there were many problems, but that there were very few
problems as a result of the most recent bombing of the same
mosque.


6. Sen. Carper asked if there were "problem areas" where the
USG could place "constructive pressure?" The DPM stated
financial support for Iraq should require that Iraq be
accountable for the expenditure of those funds. Sen. Carper
also stated that America did not want to "police a civil war."


7. Sen. McCaskill asked if it were true that the Iraqi
people wanted the Americans to leave. The DPM responded by
stating that, while no one wants foreign troops to occupy
Iraq, every key political Iraqi political leader except
Moqtada al-Sadr, wanted the Coalition Forces to stay. He
observed that while Iraqis in the south of the country are
"uncomfortable" with Americans, they recognized the need for
an American presence in order to have freedom.


8. Sen. McCaskill observed that even Iraqi newspapers and
media do not publish good news stories, making it difficult
for the American public to see a benefit to America,s part
in the conflict. The DPM observed that this was part of a
free society, that American news media also do not publish
good new stories.


9. Sen. McCaskill asked the DPM,s opinion about a dialogue
with Syria and Iran. The DPM stated that Iran is very
patient, that Syria is a "bad actor" and that we needed to
get Syria "off the backs of Lebanon and Iraq." He also
stated that America should not reward bad behavior by those

BAGHDAD 00002029 002 OF 002


countries.


10. CODEL McCaskill did not have an opportunity to clear
this cable.
CROCKER