Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07BAGHDAD1996
2007-06-17 18:22:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Baghdad
Cable title:  

THE DEPUTY SECRETARY'S MEETINGS WITH KRG PRESIDENT

Tags:  PREL PGOV PINS PTER TU IZ 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO7586
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #1996/01 1681822
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 171822Z JUN 07
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1734
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 001996 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/17/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINS PTER TU IZ
SUBJECT: THE DEPUTY SECRETARY'S MEETINGS WITH KRG PRESIDENT
MASSOUD BARZANI AND PM NECHIRVAN BARZANI

Classified By: Ambassador Ryan Crocker for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 001996

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/17/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINS PTER TU IZ
SUBJECT: THE DEPUTY SECRETARY'S MEETINGS WITH KRG PRESIDENT
MASSOUD BARZANI AND PM NECHIRVAN BARZANI

Classified By: Ambassador Ryan Crocker for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: During June 13-14 meetings in Erbil with
Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) President Massoud Barzani
and Prime Minister Nechirvan Barzani, Deputy Secretary
Negroponte urged strong and visible KRG action against the
terrorist Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) to prevent Turkish
military action prior to Turkey's upcoming elections. The
Deputy Secretary stressed that the tense political
environment in Turkey could easily lead to an attack on the
Kurdistan Region, particularly if KRG leaders fail to make
statements or take visible actions against the PKK. Both
Kurdish leaders claimed to have taken many actions against
the PKK, but complained of Turkish rebuffs to their attempts
to establish direct relations with the Turkish government.
Massoud said he was "ready to help" in response to the
Deputy's request that he make a public statement against the
PKK. Nechirvan committed to reaching a compromise on draft
hydrocarbons legislation such that a deal could be finalized
by June 17. The Deputy Secretary emphasized similar
criticality in reaching agreement on other key reconciliation
measures such as Constitutional Review, de-Baathification
reform, and provincial elections. Massoud acknowledged the
importance of preparing the Kurdish street for the likelihood
that a referendum on Kirkuk would not happen in 2007. End
Summary.


2. (C) Accompanying the Deputy Secretary on his trip to
Erbil were S/I David Satterfield and the DCM. At various
points, the Deputy Secretary met individually with Massoud
and Nechirvan, as well as with both of them together.
Throughout the conversations, the Deputy Secretary referenced
the June 12 telephone call from President Bush to President
Barzani. He stressed that President Bush hoped to see clear
progress on key issues such as hydrocarbons legislation and
reducing tensions with Turkey over the Kurdistan Workers
Party (PKK) terrorist organization.


--------------
Turkey and PKK
--------------


3. (C) The Deputy Secretary repeatedly emphasized to Massoud
and Nechirvan the critical importance of KRG actions and
statements against the PKK. Cross-border attacks by the PKK
against Turkey were playing heavily in the Turkish political
debate in the lead-up to elections. The KRG should do
everything possible to try to calm the situation. S/I
Satterfield reiterated the Deputy Secretary's remarks,
stressing that it was critical that the KRG gave the Turks no
excuse to attack. Describing the PKK as similarly an enemy
of the KRG, Massoud replied that the KRG had taken and would
continue to take "the actions it could" against the PKK.
However, there was no military solution to the PKK problem.
Massoud asserted that "everyone would lose" if Turkey
attacked across the border. He described the difficulty for
both Turkey and the KRG in going after the group, as the PKK
"has no headquarters" and operate with great flexibility in
the mountains. At the same time, both Massoud and Nechirvan
said they believed that true Turkish motivations were not
against the PKK, but rather against the KRG -- "they are
unhappy with what we have gained here." Massoud described the
duality of the KRG's complex relationship with Turkey, noting
the contradiction of extensive Turkish investment in the KRG
with what he characterized as "threats from Ankara."


4. (C) Massoud said that the previous day the PKK had
declared a ceasefire. This had been discussed before with
General Ralston and he thought it was a good idea. However,
the ceasefire had been rebuffed by the Turks. S/I
Satterfield stated that the situation with regard to the PKK
was tense when he had visited Turkey the month before --
"anything could send the Turks over the edge." He noted
positive statements by some Turkish leaders, including FM
Gul, stating that an attack on the KRG would be "bad for all"
and that the fight against the PKK should be in Turkey, not
Iraq.


5. (C) The Deputy Secretary noted the existence of political
organizations affiliated with the PKK, including the Kurdish
Democratic Society Party (KDSP). Massoud said that during
elections his Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) opposed
participation by the KDSP, but was overruled by electoral
officials in Baghdad. Massoud described Turkey's
relationship with the KRG as paradoxical, noting the high
level of Turkish investment in the KRG mixed with "threats
from Ankara." He complained that the Turks had canceled a
planned trip by KRG Prime Minister Nechirvan to Ankara.
Nechirvan stated that the "U.S. had to help the KRG with
Turkey." Nechirvan contrasted the Turkish position with that
of the Iranians, who "do not threaten the KRG" despite the
presence of a significant Kurdish population in Iran. S/I

BAGHDAD 00001996 002 OF 002


Satterfield replied that the U.S. had urged the Turks to
receive Nechirvan and that the U.S. and the Kurds should look
for an opportunity after elections for the Turks and KRG to
meet, perhaps at a quiet level.


6. (C) Massoud asked what the KRG could further do to calm
the current situation with Turkey. The Deputy Secretary
suggested a public statement by Massoud saying he had met
with the Deputy Secretary and that he had stated in the
conversation that he and the KRG neither supported the PKK
nor approved of its using Iraq as a sanctuary. Massoud said
that remained the KRG's policy and there was no evidence
otherwise. S/I Satterfield emphasized that the Turks pay
close attention to "every word" coming from Erbil on this
issue and that the U.S. position would be in a stronger
position to help the KRG in Ankara if such a statement were
made. Massoud replied that the U.S. had "the KRG's support"
on this and that he was "ready to help."

-------------- --------------
Hydrocarbons Legislation, Reconciliation Goals, Article 140
-------------- --------------


7. (C) In conversations with Massoud and Nechirvan, the
Deputy Secretary noted Iraqi progress on hydrocarbons revenue
sharing legislation. He stressed the importance of reaching
a final deal soon, urging that it be completed by the time he
met with President Bush on June 18. It remained important
for Iraqi leaders to demonstrate progress both to their own
people and to the international community. Both Kurdish
leaders stated that their primary concern remained where and
how oil revenues were distributed to the regions -- the KRG
sought a transparent and detailed system for disbursement of
revenues. Nechirvan committed to negotiating with the other
Iraqi parties throughout the weekend with the goal of
achieving a compromise in the next several days.


8. (C) The Deputy Secretary similarly stressed the importance
of progress on other key political steps for reconciliation.
He expressed concern about what appeared to be slow movement
toward finalizing the Constitutional Review process,
de-Baathification reform, and provincial council elections.
He noted that the Kurds shared responsibility for this slow
movement; it remained absolutely imperative that the GOI and
Council of Representatives begin to show results on the goals
that Iraq had set for itself.


9. (C) The Deputy Secretary raised with both leaders the
issue of Article 140, and that a referendum on Kirkuk and
other disputed territories would be impossible to hold in
2007 given that few steps had been taken toward this goal,
nor had any side developed a workable solution. Massoud
acknowledged that a referendum was unlikely this year and the
importance of preparing the Kurdish street for this outcome.


--------------
Golden Mosque Bombing
--------------


10. (C) The Deputy Secretary raised with Massoud the issue of
the June 13 bombing of the Golden Mosque in Samarra. He
expressed concern about heightened sectarian violence in
response to the attack. Massoud agreed that Sunni-Shia
violence could rise in wake of the attack, and pinned
responsibility on Al-Qaeda Iraq (AQI),likely foreign
fighters. He noted that a recent car bombing in Erbil had
been carried out by AQI -- the Saudi born perpetrator died in
the attack, but the KRG arrested the mastermind of the
operation. Massoud also commented that one of the most
dangerous AQI members had been killed in Mosul the day
before. Massoud said that nearly all the "major bombings" in
Iraq are carried out by AQI, while former Baathists were
responsible for most sniper attacks.

--------------
U.S. Assistance to the Peshmerga
--------------


11. (C) During the Deputy Secretary's meeting with Nechirvan,
KRG Deputy Prime Minister Omar Fatah asserted that, while
Kurdish forces "share U.S. values" and "you can count us as
your own," they needed even more training and material
support. He specifically pointed to needs for the Kurdish
border police and internal police -- "honesty and integrity
are not enough."


12. (U) The Deputy Secretary has cleared this reporting
message.
CROCKER