Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07BAGHDAD1924
2007-06-11 07:53:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Baghdad
Cable title:  

DAWA LEADER HOPEFUL PROVINCIAL ELECTION DATE CAN

Tags:  PGOV PREL PINR IZ 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO1123
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #1924/01 1620753
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 110753Z JUN 07
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1630
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 001924 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/11/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR IZ
SUBJECT: DAWA LEADER HOPEFUL PROVINCIAL ELECTION DATE CAN
BE SET SOON

Classified By: Deputy Political Counselor Robert Gilchrist for reasons
1.4 (b) and (d).

--------------------------------------------- ---
Dawa Would Like to See Provincial Elections Soon
--------------------------------------------- ---

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 001924

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/11/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR IZ
SUBJECT: DAWA LEADER HOPEFUL PROVINCIAL ELECTION DATE CAN
BE SET SOON

Classified By: Deputy Political Counselor Robert Gilchrist for reasons
1.4 (b) and (d).

-------------- ---
Dawa Would Like to See Provincial Elections Soon
-------------- ---


1. (C) In a June 9 meeting with Acting Pol Couns, Dawa
leader and deputy Chair of the Shi'a Coalition Ali al-Adeeb
said the provincial powers law was "almost done" and that
when it was done a date for provincial elections could be
set. There was no need to revise the elections law, al-Adeeb
continued, simply to set a date that could be as soon as four
months from passage of the provincial powers law. Al-Adeeb
said that most Shi'a parties wanted provincial elections in
the near future, "except perhaps the parties that have power
in the provinces (e.g., ISCI)." He acknowledged that
security issues could present technical obstacles in "hot"
places like Baghdad and Diyala. Al-Adeeb said he supported
an open list system as more democratic but noted it would be
"harder to count" the returns. He identified Mosul as an
area likely to see a particularly hard struggle over
elections and suggested that the various parties might want
to agree on an outcome beforehand "like the two Kurdish
parties did in their elections" so that the vote would be
accepted by all.


2. (C) Acting PolCouns told al-Adeeb that the USG considered
holding provincial elections, particularly in some of the
"hot" provinces, as a key step in reconciliation. The
earlier elections were held, he continued, the greater force
MNF-I could bring to bear to ensure security during the
elections. Al-Adeeb conceded these points, agreeing that
MNF-I help in providing election security would be welcome
and urging that the elections plan take into account IDPs'
rights (he gave the example of Shi'a from Diyala now living
in Karbala or Wasit).

--------------
Article 140 Implementation Must Be Delayed
--------------


3. (C) On the constitutional review process, al-Adeeb said
that the committee had done good work and that the serious
issues remaining needed to be resolved by bloc leaders. He
said that Dawa supported the CRC's recommendations to

increase the power of the federal government vis-a-vis the
regions and provinces (Articles 110-115),arguing that the
provinces did not currently have the capacity to handle
increased powers. Al-Adeeb said that a compromise on the
issue of personal status (Article 41) was in the works that
would allow each sect or group to choose the codes for its
members. On Article 140, he noted that Dawa fully supported
implementation of the constitution but that "the reality on
the ground" did not allow for implementation of some
provisions. For Article 140 to be implemented, he continued,
there would need to be a census, but that was impossible
given the current security situation. He therefore supported
a delay in Article 140 implementation.

--------------
Fallout from the Cairo Declaration
--------------


4. (C) Acting PolCouns raised the "Cairo declaration,"
saying he hoped the storm it had created would quickly die
down so that Iraqi leaders - Shi'a, Sunnis, and Kurds - could
continue with pressing business. He noted the U.S.'s firm
support for the Maliki government and for participation in
the political process in Iraq. Al-Adeeb said that the Shi'a
concern was not Allawi, "who has spent all his political
capital," or the front specified in the declaration, "which
has already failed." The Shi'a concern, he said, was that
the Arab countries "pushing" this initiative would continue
to look for other horses to back. While he acknowledged and
appreciated U.S. support for the Maliki government, he
continued, the U.S. had not convinced its Arab allies. He
also claimed that the incident showed "the problem with
reducing the restrictions on the return of ex-Baath party
members."

--------------
Bio Note
--------------


5. (C) Ali Mohammed Al-Hussein Ali Al-Adeeb was born in
Karbala on September 5, 1944. He graduated from the
University of Baghdad in 1964 with a degree in Education and
Psychology. He taught in several teaching institutes in Abu
Ghraib (1965) and Karbala (1965-1973),worked as an assistant
researcher at the Ministry of Education in Karbala
(1971-1973),and then taught at two middle schools in Karbala

BAGHDAD 00001924 002 OF 002


(1973-1980). He left Iraq for Abu Dhabi in 1980, serving as
an employee at Fajr newspaper (1980) and then as the director
of the Educational Compound of the Martyr Sadr (1980-1982;
NFI). He moved to Tehran and worked as a director of several
SCIRI bureaus from 1982-1986 and then taught at the Institute
of Imam Rida (in Qom); the Qom Institute of the Prophet; and
the University of Imam Sadiq (in Tehran) from 1986-1990. He
became director of Dawa's political bureau in Tehran in 1990
and held that post until 2003, when he returned to Iraq. He
has since served in Iraq's parliamentary assemblies and is
currently the deputy Chairman of the Shi'a coalition. He
attends the CoR regularly. He is a gentleman toward
visitors, gracious, polite, and attentive. His
interpretation of events is often quite sectarian: he once
indicated that he believed reports that U.S. helicopters were
resupplying al-Qaeda fighters at night in towns on the
outskirts of Baghdad. Though one of the top three members of
the Dawa party, he does not have the trappings of an
organizational leader. He works with only one assistant;
neither he nor his assistant speaks English, and neither
appears technology-savy. Al-Adeeb is married to Kelod
Mohammed Hussein (b. July 1, 1948). End bio note.
CROCKER