Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07BAGHDAD190
2007-01-17 18:47:00
SECRET
Embassy Baghdad
Cable title:  

COR MEMBER QASEM DAOUD DISCUSSES TEHRAN, POTUS

Tags:  PGOV IR IZ 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO0543
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #0190/01 0171847
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 171847Z JAN 07
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9144
INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE
RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
RHEHWSR/WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 000190 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/13/2017
TAGS: PGOV IR IZ
SUBJECT: COR MEMBER QASEM DAOUD DISCUSSES TEHRAN, POTUS
SPEECH

Classified By: Political Counselor Margaret Scobey per 1.4 (b) and (d)

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 000190

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/13/2017
TAGS: PGOV IR IZ
SUBJECT: COR MEMBER QASEM DAOUD DISCUSSES TEHRAN, POTUS
SPEECH

Classified By: Political Counselor Margaret Scobey per 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: Unified Iraqi Alliance (UIA) independent
Qasem Daoud discussed with the Political Counselor on January
12 his recent trip to Tehran and the Iranian reaction to the
late December detention of Iranian diplomats in Iraq. Daoud
was shocked by how much influence he felt the Iranians
demonstrated over Iraq,s political scene. He called the
U.S. President,s new strategy on Iraq "promising" and
thought it was possible the GOI and Coalition forces would be
able to regain control of security. Daoud also expressed hope
the moderate bloc idea could be revived with a different
approach. END SUMMARY.

--------------
Daoud Laments Iranian Influence
--------------


2. (C) Daoud provided the Political Counselor with a readout
of his three-day official visit to Tehran in late December.
He said he had been to Iran once or twice in the 1990s but
had resisted visiting for the past two years until the
Iranian Ambassador to Iraq insisted he come. Daoud said the
Iranians had a bitter taste in their mouths from the
Coalition,s detention of Iranian diplomats in Iraq two days
prior to his arrival in Tehran. While there, Daoud met with
IRGC-Quds Force Commander Qassem Suleimani, Secretary for the
Iranian Supreme Council for National Security Ali Larijani,
Chairman of the Expediency and Discernment Council Akbar
Hashemi Rafsanjani, and the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and
Intelligence.


3. (S) Daoud said he was shocked to see the influence Iran
has on Iraq,s political process, saying he concluded Tehran
controls nearly two-thirds of the Council of Representatives
(CoR) seats. Daoud cited Iraqi CoR member Abu Mahdi
al-Muhandis as an example of someone under Tehran,s
influence and said Suleimani introduced him to Muhandis
during the visit. (Note: Muhandis is a former Badr
Organization commander with ties to the IRGC who allegedly
participated in a plot to bomb the US Embassy in Kuwait in
1983.) Daoud characterized his Iranian interlocutors as
well-organized and professional, and noted Laranjani
specialized in American affairs while Suleimani specialized
in Iraqi affairs. He opined the Iranians feel frustrated
with Washington and said they interpreted the detention of
Iranian diplomats in December as one institution in
Washington,s attempt to work against Iran. Daoud
characterized Tehran as desperate to open negotiations with
Washington.

--------------
And Praises New Iraq Strategy
--------------


4. (C) Daoud called the new Iraq strategy announced on
January 11 "promising." He praised the pairing of Coalition
forces with Iraqi forces because he said it sent a signal to
Iraqi citizens that the forces would act in a nonsectarian
manner. He said his reservations were on the Iraqi side and
characterized the Iraqis as a hard, incompetent partner for
the Americans. Daoud opined that Iraq should start building
new Iraqi security forces of recent university graduates who
are trained abroad and become the core of a new force that
eventually would replace the current partisan forces. He
said Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani,s son, Muhammad Ridha,
was still studying the new strategy and would get back to him
with an opinion on it.

--------------
Moderate Front Needs a New Approach
--------------


5. (C) Daoud supported building a moderate front in the CoR
and suggested efforts to create one needed a new approach.
When questioned if Sistani had censured a moderate front,
Daoud said no. He said Muhammad Ridha had told him
Sistani,s office released a statement saying Sistani did not
support the front because SCIRI had announced Sistani,s
support for the front without consulting Sistani first.
Daoud insisted that Sistani did not hold an opinion on the
moderate front and did not like every Iraqi politician
knocking on his door to find out his opinion on political
issues. Daoud said Sistani needed the moderate front idea
explained to him and suggested the U.S. President write a
letter to Sistani clarifying his initiatives. He added that
Sistani respects President Bush.

--------------

BAGHDAD 00000190 002 OF 002


Updates on CoR-related Issues
--------------


6. (C) Daoud said he is going to submit a proposal to the
constitutional review committee that changes
de-Ba'athification from a political to a legal issue. He
proposes the De-Ba'athification Commission be connected to
the Independent Electoral Commission so that a person can be
screened before entering politics. Daoud confirmed that the
hydrocarbon law is ready and said it would be submitted to
the CoR in January or February. Nevertheless, he was not
satisfied with the law, saying the CoR should amend the
constitution to assuage Sunni fears that regions might take
advantage of the constitutional ambiguity about regional
control over hydrocarbons.
KHALILZAD