Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07BAGHDAD1895
2007-06-08 11:36:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Baghdad
Cable title:  

UNAMI SRSG QAZI DISCUSSES ARTICLE 140, KIRKUK, AND

Tags:  IZ PREL UN 
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VZCZCXRO9721
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #1895/01 1591136
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 081136Z JUN 07 ZFF4
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1592
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 001895 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/07/2017
TAGS: IZ PREL UN
SUBJECT: UNAMI SRSG QAZI DISCUSSES ARTICLE 140, KIRKUK, AND
OTHER ISSUES


Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 001895

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/07/2017
TAGS: IZ PREL UN
SUBJECT: UNAMI SRSG QAZI DISCUSSES ARTICLE 140, KIRKUK, AND
OTHER ISSUES


Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: Special Representative to the Secretary
General (SRSG) Ashraf Qazi for the United Nations Assistance
Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) stated in a June 4 meeting with the
Ambassador that, because of Kurd inaction, an Article 140
referendum on the status of Kirkuk was no longer technically
feasible by November. Having painted themselves into a
corner, the Kurds are now looking for a face saving way to
delay the referendum, said Qazi. The Ambassador suggested
that an offer of UN involvement might provide the Kurds with
a publicly palatable reason for delay. End Summary.

--------------
ARTICLE 140 AND KIRKUK
--------------


2. (C) SRSG Qazi stated that Kurdish Regional Government
(KRG) President Massoud Barzani (Kurdistan Alliance List -
Kurdistan Democratic Party) is "between a rock and a hard
place," because a straight Article 140 referendum is no
longer possible. The Kurds have not invested either the time
or political capital on any of the prerequisites for a
successful referendum, such as defining the political
question to be answered, the granularity of the referendum
(provincial wide or district by district),or the boundaries
to be used, he said. In fact, Qazi pointed out that holding
provincial wide referenda using current boundaries, as
Barzani recently stated publicly, would result in the
counter-intuitive result of having several Kurdish districts
that are effectively part of the KRG revert to being minority
districts in a non-Kurdish province. To obtain the result
they want, the Kurds would need to pursue district by
district referenda, which are now technically impossible
given the time remaining, and even then the Kurdish desired
result could not be guaranteed.


3. (C) Qazi asserted that the delicacy of the political
questions at hand will make it impossible for the Council of
Representatives to pass the required Article 140 referendum
legislation in time to hold a November referendum. "The
Kurds have painted themselves into a corner," stated Qazi,
"and now they want Maliki to set the referendum boundaries by
decree, like Saddam did." The Ambassador confirmed that it
is unrealistic for the Kurds to seek decrees to set any part

of the criteria for the referendum. Qazi stated that, for
these reasons, Barzani hinted to him that he is willing to
delay the referendum, if it can be blamed on technical or
international reasons, which would allow him to save face.
The question, said Qazi, is in what sequence the political
leaders should be engaged to engineer this delay. The
Ambassador stated that we should begin with Talabani, then
Barzani, before approaching Prime Minister Maliki.


4. (C) Qazi stated that a UNAMI role in resolving Article 140
could only occur if both the GOI and the Government of
Kurdistan invited UN participation. When the Ambassador
asked if Qazi had raised the issue with PM Maliki, Qazi
responded that he had not. The Ambassador pointed out that
Barzani's comments to Qazi suggested a willingness to accept
UN involvement as a way to save face for any delay. In
preparation for an upcoming meeting with Barzani, the
Ambassador asked Qazi to put down on paper UNAMI's informal
ideas on how to handle the Kirkuk referendum. If the
meetings in Irbil are successful, said the Ambassador, the UN
role could then be raised with PM Maliki.

--------------
Summit Working Groups
--------------


5. (C) The Ambassador asked Qazi if there had been any
progress with the working groups that were created at the
recent Sharm El-Sheikh Neighbor's Conference. Qazi said the
Turks agreed on the dates of June 14-15 for their energy
working group, the Jordanians had agreed in principle but not
yet set a date for their refugee working group, and the
Syrians had linked their working group on security issues to
the release of two recent Syrian detainees. The Ambassador
suggested that this would only encourage the GOI to wonder
why these detainees were so important and cause them to
investigate them more thoroughly. Qazi and the Ambassador
agreed that Syria needed to de-link their security working
group from these types of unpredictable tactical issues, or
the working group would meet so sporadically as to be
ineffective. (Note: In a subsequent conversation with the
DCM, Zebari emphasized that there was no Syrian "linkage"
between the detainees and hosting the working group, but he
acknowledged that solving the issue quickly would facilitate
the process. End note.)

--------------

BAGHDAD 00001895 002 OF 002


UNAMI Quarterly Report
--------------


6. (SBU) Qazi said the UNAMI quarterly report was due July
14, and he would most likely travel to New York to make the
presentation himself. He asked if it would be useful for him
to make a side trip to Washington D.C. The Ambassador said
we would be glad to review any proposed dates.

--------------
UNAMI Staffing
--------------


7. (SBU) Qazi explained that although there had been some
delays in shipping building materials, the first phase of
hardened overhead cover should be completed in a couple of
weeks. Once this is accomplished, he anticipates
authorization from New York to raise the staffing limit. The
Ambassador emphasized that UN involvement in Iraq is
important and a high priority for us, and we look forward to
their increased staffing.

--------------
UNAMI Mandate
--------------


8. (C) Qazi suggested that there were two approaches to
revising the UNAMI mandate. The first approach would be
similar in style to the existing mandate, which focused on
events. In this case, new current events are needed to
replace existing obsolete events. The second approach would
be to focus on a more general UNAMI role facilitating
national reconciliation. Qazi did not elaborate any
additional detail on this second approach.

CROCKER